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Bond v. United States
12-158
Ruling Below: United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 978
(U.S. 2013).
Defendant was convicted by guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania of possessing and using a chemical weapon and mail theft, and she
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the
conviction. On remand, upon considering the constitutional merits, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act did not exceed Congress'
power under Necessary and Proper Clause and the conviction was upheld.
Question Presented: (1) Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose
any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid
treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope
of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy
the government’s treaty obligations; and (2) whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary
poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the
Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and
continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland.

UNITED STATES of America
v.
Carol Anne BOND, Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided on May 3, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
JORDAN, Circuit Judge
This case is before us on remand from the
Supreme Court, which vacated our earlier
judgment that Appellant Carol Anne Bond
lacked standing to challenge, on Tenth

Amendment grounds, her conviction under
the penal provision of the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of
1998, (the “Act”), which implements the
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1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (the
“Convention”). The Supreme Court
determined that Bond does have standing to
advance that challenge, and returned the
case to us to consider her constitutional
argument.
In her merits argument, Bond urges us to set
aside as inapplicable the landmark decision
Missouri v. Holland, which is sometimes
cited for the proposition that the Tenth
Amendment has no bearing on Congress's
ability to legislate in furtherance of the
Treaty Power in Article II, § 2 of the
Constitution. Cognizant of the widening
scope of issues taken up in international
agreements, as well as the renewed vigor
with which principles of federalism have
been employed by the Supreme Court in
scrutinizing assertions of federal authority,
we agree with Bond that treatyimplementing legislation ought not, by
virtue of that status alone, stand immune
from scrutiny under principles of federalism.
However, because the Convention is an
international agreement with a subject
matter that lies at the core of the Treaty
Power and because Holland instructs that
“there can be no dispute about the validity of
[a] statute” that implements a valid treaty,
we will affirm Bond's conviction.
I. Factual Background and Procedural
History
A. Facts
Bond's criminal acts are detailed in our prior
opinion, and in the Supreme Court's opinion,
Bond v. United States (“Bond II”), so we
provide only a brief recitation here. Suffice
it to say that, while Bond was employed by

the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas,
she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes
was pregnant and that Bond's own husband
was the baby's father. Bond became intent
on revenge. To that end, she set about
acquiring highly toxic chemicals, stealing
10–chlorophenoxarsine from her employer
and purchasing potassium dichromate over
the Internet. She then applied those
chemicals to Haynes's mailbox, car door
handles, and house doorknob. Bond's
poisonous activities were eventually
discovered and she was indicted on two
counts of acquiring, transferring, receiving,
retaining, or possessing a chemical weapon,
in violation of the Act. She was, in addition,
charged with two counts of theft of mail
matter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708.
B. Procedural History
Bond filed a motion to dismiss the counts
that alleged violations of the Act. She
argued that the Act was unconstitutional,
both facially and as applied to her. More
particularly, she said that the Act violated
constitutional “fair notice” requirements,
that it was inconsistent with the Convention
it was meant to implement, and that it
represented a breach of the Tenth
Amendment's
protection
of
state
sovereignty. Emphasizing that last point,
Bond contended that neither the Commerce
Clause, nor the Necessary and Proper Clause
in connection with the Treaty Power, could
support the expansive wording of the statute,
let alone her prosecution. The government's
response has shifted over time, but it has
been consistent in maintaining that the Act
is a constitutional exercise of Congress's
authority to enact treaty-implementing
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legislation under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The District Court accepted that
argument and denied Bond's motion to
dismiss.
We affirmed on appeal, concluding that
Bond lacked standing to pursue her Tenth
Amendment challenge and that the Act was
neither unconstitutionally vague nor
unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the
question of “[w]hether a criminal defendant
convicted under a federal statute has
standing to challenge her conviction on
grounds that, as applied to her, the statute is
beyond the federal government's enumerated
powers and inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment.” Ultimately, the Court
concluded that Bond “does have standing to
challenge the federal statute.” The case was
remanded to us to address the “issue of the
statute's validity” which, as the Court
instructed, “turns in part on whether the law
can be deemed ‘necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution’ the President's
Article II, § 2 Treaty Power.”
II. Discussion
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court
declared that, if a treaty is valid, “there can
be no dispute about the validity of the statute
[implementing it] under Article 1, Section 8,
as a necessary and proper means to execute
the powers of the Government.” Implicit in
that statement is the premise that principles
of federalism will ordinarily impose no
limitation on Congress's ability to write laws
supporting treaties, because the only
relevant question is whether the underlying
treaty is valid. Reasoning that a reading of

Holland that categorically rejects federalism
as a check on Congress's treatyimplementing authority is of questionable
constitutional validity, Bond asks us to
invalidate her conviction because the Act is
unconstitutional as applied to her. She says
that to hold otherwise would offend the
Constitution's balance of power between
state and federal authority by “intrud [ing] ...
on the traditional state prerogative to punish
assaults.”
A. Constitutional Avoidance
Bond first argues, however, that we should
avoid reaching the constitutional question by
construing the Act not to apply to her
conduct at all.
Her avoidance argument begins with the text
of the Act itself, which provides, in pertinent
part, that “it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly ... to develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly,
receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or
use, or threaten to use, any chemical
weapon.” The term “chemical weapon” is
defined broadly to include any “toxic
chemical and its precursors,” and “[t]he term
‘toxic chemical’ means any chemical which
through its chemical action on life processes
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans or animals.”
Congress did put some limit on the sweep of
the Act by excluding from the definition of
“chemical weapon” any chemicals and
precursors “intended for a purpose not
prohibited under this chapter as long as the
type and quantity is consistent with such a
purpose.” The phrase “purpose not
prohibited under this chapter,” is then
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defined, in part, as “[a]ny peaceful purpose
related to an industrial, agricultural,
research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity
or other activity.” It is that “peaceful
purpose” language that Bond urges us to
take as our interpretive lodestar.
Specifically, Bond argues that, by looking to
the “peaceful purpose” exception, we can
employ a “common sense interpretation of §
229” that avoids “mak[ing] every malicious
use of a household chemical”—including
her own—a federal offense. All we need do
is “interpret the statute ... to reach [only the
kind of acts] that would violate the
Convention if undertaken by a signatory
state.” In other words, as Bond sees it, the
modifier “peaceful” should be understood in
contradistinction to “warlike” and, when so
understood, the statute will not reach
“conduct that no signatory state could
possibly engage in—such as using
chemicals in an effort to poison a romantic
rival,” as Bond did. That interpretation is
tempting, in light of the challenges inherent
in the Act's remarkably broad language, but,
as we held the first time we had this case,
Bond's behavior “clearly constituted
unlawful possession and use of a chemical
weapon under § 229.”
That holding is in better keeping with the
Act's use of the term “peaceful purpose”
than the construction Bond would have us
give it. The ordinary meaning of “peaceful”
is “untroubled by conflict, agitation, or
commotion,” “of or relating to a state or
time of peace,” or “devoid of violence or
force,” and Bond's “deploy [ment of] highly
toxic chemicals with the intent of harming
Haynes,” can hardly be characterized as

“peaceful” under that word's commonly
understood meaning. The term “peaceful,”
moreover, does not appear in isolation: the
Act only excludes from its ambit “peaceful
purpose[s] ... related to an industrial,
agricultural,
research,
medical,
or
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.”
Bond's attacks on Haynes—even if nonwarlike—were certainly not “related to an
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or
pharmaceutical activity.” Nor can her use of
chemicals be said to be a “peaceful purpose[
] ... related to an ... other activity,” because
regarding her assaultive behavior as such
would improperly expand § 229F(7)(A)'s
scope.
Thus, while one may well question whether
Congress envisioned the Act being applied
in a case like this, the language itself does
cover Bond's criminal conduct. And, given
the clarity of the statute, we cannot avoid the
constitutional question presented. It is not
our prerogative to rewrite a statute, and we
see no sound basis on which we can accept
Bond's construction of the Act without
usurping Congress's legislative role. Though
we agree it would be better, if possible, to
apply a limiting construction to the Act
rather than consider Bond's argument that it
is unconstitutional, the statute speaks with
sufficient certainty that we feel compelled to
consider the hard question presented in this
appeal.
B. Constitutionality of the Act as Applied
Understanding whether application of the
Act to Bond violates the structural limits of
federalism begins with the Tenth
Amendment, which Bond cites and which
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provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.”
That text, as the Supreme Court has
observed, “confirms that the power of the
Federal Government is subject to limits that
may ... reserve power to the States.” Thus, it
encapsulates the principles of federalism
upon which our nation was founded.
Endeavoring to discover what impact the
Tenth Amendment may have on treatyimplementing legislation immediately leads,
as we have indicated, to the Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri v. Holland. The statute
at issue in that case, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, implemented a treaty between
the United States and Great Britain that
banned the hunting of migratory birds
during certain seasons. The State of
Missouri brought suit against a U.S. game
warden,
arguing
that
the
statute
unconstitutionally interfered with the rights
reserved to Missouri by the Tenth
Amendment because Missouri was free to
do what it wished with the birds while they
were within its borders. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Holmes, rejected
that argument, reasoning that “it is not
enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment,
reserving the powers not delegated to the
United States, because by Article 2, Section
2, the power to make treaties is delegated
expressly.”
As noted earlier, the Court made it clear that
Congress may, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, legislate to implement a valid
treaty, regardless of whether Congress
would otherwise have the power to act or

whether the legislation causes an intrusion
into what would otherwise be within the
state's traditional province. While the Court
did allow that there may be “qualifications
to the treaty-making power,” it also said,
somewhat obscurely, that they had to be
found “in a different way” than one might
find limitations on other grants of power to
the federal government. After implying that
Congress's powers are particularly sweeping
when dealing with “matters requiring
national action,” the Court suggested one
limitation on the Treaty Power: if the
implementation of a treaty “contravene[s]
any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution,”
then
it
may
be
unconstitutional. Since the treaty in question
did not do that, the only remaining question
was “whether it [was] forbidden by some
invisible radiation from the general terms of
the Tenth Amendment.” The Court
concluded that it was not. Finally, the Court
assumed without further discussion that,
because the treaty was valid, so was the
implementing statute.
In sum, Holland teaches that, when there is a
valid treaty, Congress has authority to enact
implementing
legislation
under
the
Necessary and Proper Clause, even if it
might otherwise lack the ability to legislate
in the domain in question. The legislation
must, of course, meet the Necessary and
Proper Clause's general requirement that
legislation implemented under that Clause
be “rationally related to the implementation
of a constitutionally enumerated power.” In
the treaty context, that requirement has been
understood to mean that a treaty and its
implementing legislation must be rationally
related to one another. Thus, as long as “the
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effectuating legislation bear[s] a rational
relationship to” a valid treaty, the arguable
consequence of Holland is that treaties and
associated legislation are simply not subject
to Tenth Amendment scrutiny, no matter
how far into the realm of states' rights the
President and Congress may choose to
venture.

of the states. Nevertheless, resolving the
argument Bond does lodge against her
prosecution requires at least some
consideration of whether the Convention is,
in fact, valid. We therefore turn briefly to
whether the Convention falls within the
Treaty Power's appropriate scope, bearing in
mind that Bond seems to accept that it does.

Bond vigorously disputes the implications of
that conclusion. Specifically, she argues that
legal trends since the Supreme Court's 1920
decision in Holland make it clear that the
Tenth Amendment should not be treated as
irrelevant when examining the validity of
treaty-implementing legislation. Concluding
otherwise, she asserts, would make “nothing
... off-limits” in a world where, more and
more, “international treaties govern[ ] a
virtually unlimited range of subjects and
intrud[e] deeply on internal concerns.” That
latter point is not without merit. Juxtaposed
against increasingly broad conceptions of
the Treaty Power's scope, reading Holland
to confer on Congress an unfettered ability
to effectuate what would now be considered
by some to be valid exercises of the Treaty
Power runs a significant risk of disrupting
the delicate balance between state and
federal authority.

1. The Convention's Validity

Those concerns notwithstanding, Bond does
not argue that the Convention itself is
constitutionally infirm. On the contrary, she
admits “that a treaty restricting chemical
weapons is a ‘proper subject[ ] of
negotiations between our government and
other nations.’ ” Accordingly, we need not
tackle, head on, whether an arguably invalid
treaty has led to legislation encroaching on
matters traditionally left to the police powers

The Constitution does not have within it any
explicit subject matter limitation on the
power granted in Article II, § 2. That section
states simply that the President has the
“Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.” Throughout much of American
history, however, including when Holland
was handed down, it was understood that the
Treaty Power was impliedly limited to
certain subject matters.
Contemporaneous records such as the
Virginia Ratifying Convention show that the
Founders generally accepted that the
purpose of treaties was, as James Madison
put it, to regulate “intercourse with foreign
nations,” and that the “exercise” of the
Treaty Power was expected to be “consistent
with” those “external” ends. As Madison
later explained, if there was
no limitation on the Treaty-making power
..., it might admit of a doubt whether the
United States might not be enabled to do
those things by Treaty which are forbidden
to be done by Congress ...; but no such
consequence can follow, for it is a sound
rule of construction, that what is forbidden
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to be done by all the branches of
Government conjointly, cannot be done by
one or more of them separately.
Early cases followed that reasoning and
indicated that the Treaty Power is confined
to matters traditionally understood to be of
international concern.
That is not to say, however, that any treaty
encroaching on matters ordinarily left to the
states was considered to be beyond the
Treaty Power's permissible ambit. On the
contrary, so long as the subject matter
limitation
was
satisfied—which
it
undoubtedly was in cases involving
“subjects [such as] peace, alliance,
commerce, neutrality, and others of a similar
nature,” or, as Jay put it, “war, peace, and
commerce,”—it was accepted that treaties
could affect domestic issues. Many early
decisions of the Supreme Court upheld
treaties of that nature, including treaties
regarding the ownership and transfer of
property. Still, it was widely accepted that
the Treaty Power was inherently limited in
the subject matter it could properly be used
to address, and that the purpose of limiting
the Treaty Power to matters which “in the
ordinary intercourse of nations had usually
been made subjects of negotiation and
treaty” was to ensure that treaties were
“consistent with ... the distribution of
powers between the general and state
governments.”
Despite the long history of that view of the
Treaty Power, the tide of opinion, at least in
some quarters, has shifted decisively in the
last half-century. Many influential voices
now urge that there is no limitation on the

Treaty Power, at least not in the way
understood from the founding through to the
middle of the Twentieth Century. That
change is reflected in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States
(1987) (the “Third
Restatement”), which declares flatly that,
“[c]ontrary to what was once suggested, the
Constitution does not require that an
international agreement deal only with
‘matters of international concern.’ ”
Whatever the Treaty Power's proper bounds
may be, however, we are confident that the
Convention we are dealing with here falls
comfortably within them. The Convention,
after all, regulates the proliferation and use
of chemical weapons. One need not be a
student of modern warfare to have some
appreciation for the devastation chemical
weapons can cause and the corresponding
impetus for international collaboration to
take steps against their use. Given its
quintessentially international character, we
conclude that the Convention is valid under
any reasonable conception of the Treaty
Power's scope. In fact, as we discuss at
greater length herein, because the
Convention relates to war, peace, and
perhaps commerce, it fits at the core of the
Treaty Power.
2. Interpreting Holland
Because Holland clearly instructs that “there
can be no dispute about the validity of [a]
statute” that implements a valid treaty, the
constitutionality of Bond's prosecution
would seem to turn on whether the Act goes
beyond what is necessary and proper to
carry the Convention into effect, or, in other
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words, whether the Act fails to “bear a
rational relationship to” the Convention.
According to Bond, however, only a
simplistic reading of Holland could lead one
to think that the Supreme Court was saying
that “Congress's power to implement treaties
is subject to no limit other than affirmative
restrictions on government power like the
First Amendment.”
The problem with Bond's attack is that, with
practically no qualifying language in
Holland to turn to, we are bound to take at
face value the Supreme Court's statement
that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no
dispute about the validity of the statute ... as
a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.” A plurality of
the Supreme Court itself apparently gave
that passage the simplistic reading Bond
denounces when it said, in Reid v. Covert,
that:
The Court [in Holland ] was concerned
with the Tenth Amendment which
reserves to the States or the people all
power not delegated to the National
Government. To the extent that the
United States can validly make treaties,
the people and the States have delegated
their power to the National Government
and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.
It is true that Justice Holmes spoke later in
Holland in language that implies a balancing
of the national interest against the interest
claimed by the State, but that was in the
context of assessing the validity of the
Migratory Bird Treaty itself, not the
implementing statute. That the latter was
constitutional in light of the validity of the

former seemed to the Supreme Court to
require no further comment at all.
That does not mean, of course, that the
Holland court would have spoken in the
same unqualified terms had it foreseen the
late Twentieth Century's changing claims
about the limits of the Treaty Power, or had
it been faced with a treaty that transgressed
the traditional subject matter limitation. It
may well have chosen to say more about
how to assess the validity of a treaty, and
hence of coextensive treaty-implementing
legislation. Perhaps Holland's vague
comment about “invisible radiation[s] from
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment”
would have been given some further
explication. As we have previously
described, when Holland was decided, and,
more importantly, when the Founders
created the Treaty Power, it was generally
understood that treaties should concern only
matters that were clearly “international” in
character, matters which, in Holland's
words, invoke a national interest that “can
be protected only by national action in
concert with that of another [sovereign
nation].” All the authors of The Federalist
Papers, along with others from that era,
considered the Treaty Power to be a
necessary attribute
of the central
government for the important but limited
purpose of permitting our “intercourse with
foreign nations,” and thereby allowing for
compacts “especially as [they] relate[ ] to
war, peace, and commerce.” It was not a
general and unlimited grant of power to the
federal government.
Because an implied subject matter limitation
on the Treaty Power was a given at the time
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Holland was written, it was enough to
answer the states' rights question in that case
by pointing out that the Tenth Amendment
only reserves those powers that are not
delegated and that “the power to make
treaties is delegated expressly.” Thus,
Holland's statement that “there can be no
dispute about the validity” of a statute
implementing a valid treaty, sensible in
context and, in any event, binds us. We do
not discount the significance of the Supreme
Court's emphasis on the important role that
federalism plays in preserving individual
rights, and it may be that there is more to
say about the uncompromising language
used in Holland than we are able to say, but
that very direct language demands from us a
direct acknowledgement of its meaning,
even if the result may be viewed as
simplistic. If there is nuance there that has
escaped us, it is for the Supreme Court to
elucidate.
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Thus, because the Convention falls
comfortably within the Treaty Power's
traditional subject matter limitation, the Act
is within the constitutional powers of the
federal government under the Necessary and
Proper Clause and the Treaty Power, unless
it somehow goes beyond the Convention.
Bond argues that it does.
She says that the Act covers a range of
activity not actually banned by the
Convention and thus cannot be sustained by
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Whether
that argument amounts to a facial or an asapplied attack on the Act, it fails. We stated
in Bond I that “Section 229 ... closely

adheres to the language of the ...
Convention,” and so it does. True, as Bond
notes, the Convention bans persons from
using, developing, acquiring, stockpiling, or
retaining chemical weapons, while the Act
makes it unlawful to “receive, stockpile,
retain, own, possess, use, or threaten to use”
a chemical weapon, but those differences in
wording do not prove that the Act has
materially expanded on the Convention. The
meaning of the list in the former seems
rather to fairly encompass the latter (with
the possible exception of the “threaten to
use” provision of the Act) and, if the Act
goes beyond the Convention at all, does not
do so in the “use” aspect at issue here.
So while Bond's prosecution seems a
questionable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, and indeed appears to justify her
assertion that this case “trivializes the
concept of chemical weapons” the treaty that
gave rise to it was implemented by
sufficiently related legislation.
In short, because the Convention pertains to
the proliferation and use of chemical
weapons, which are matters plainly relating
to war and peace, we think it clear that the
Convention falls within the Treaty Power's
core. Consequently, we cannot say that the
Act disrupts the balance of power between
the federal government and the states,
regardless of how it has been applied here.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the
judgment of conviction.
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring.
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I fully agree with the Majority's reasoning
and result. I write separately to cast the issue
before us in a somewhat different light, by
expanding upon two aspects of the
Majority's reasoning which, I believe, decide
this case. As it crystallized before us at oral
argument, Ms. Bond's challenge has little to
do with the validity of the Convention. Her
problem lies with the Act. She contends that
the structure of federal-state relations is such
that the Act should not apply to her actions,
namely, conduct involving a domestic
dispute that could be prosecuted under state
law. But, as the Majority rightly concludes,
the Act is a valid exercise of Congress's
Necessary and Proper Power. Moreover, no
jurisprudential principle, grounded in
federalism or elsewhere, saves her from the
Act's reach.
I consider two questions raised by her
argument: What is legally wrong with the
Act, which reaches Ms. Bond's conduct?;
and, What is wrong with the Act's
application to Ms. Bond, given the structure
of federal-state relations? The answer to
both is: Nothing.
As to the first question, nothing “wrong”
occurred at the moment Congress passed the
Act. As the Majority has thoroughly
discussed, the Convention itself is valid—
indeed, Ms. Bond unequivocally concedes
that point. In turn, the Act, which
implements the Convention, is valid as an
exercise of Congress's Necessary and Proper
Power. That is because the Necessary and
Proper Clause affords Congress “ ‘ample
means' ” to implement the Convention, and
gives Congress the authority “to enact laws
that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or

‘conducive’ ... to the ‘beneficial exercise’ ”
of the federal government's Treaty Power.
There is no question that the Act is
rationally related to the Convention; it
faithfully tracks the language of the
Convention. Enacting a statute that
essentially mirrors the terms of an
underlying treaty is plainly a means which is
“reasonably adapted to the attainment of a
legitimate end”—ensuring that the United
States complies with our international
obligations under a valid treaty.
In examining the constitutionality of
Congress's exercise of its Necessary and
Proper Power, we need not consider whether
the prosecution of Ms. Bond is necessary
and proper to complying with the
Convention, as she would have us do. In
other words, she argues that no nation-state
would submit that the United States has
failed to comply with its obligations under
the Convention if the federal government
did not prosecute Ms. Bond under the Act.
But that is not the appropriate test.
Examining the scope of Congress's
Necessary and Proper Power by definition
requires us to examine the Act, not its
enforcement. To determine if the Act is
necessary and proper, we ask whether it
bears a rational relationship to the
Convention. Ms. Bond's actions fall plainly
within the terms of the Act, and the Act
bears a rational relationship to the
Convention. So ends the Necessary and
Proper inquiry.
The foregoing conclusion is enough to
affirm Ms. Bond's conviction. As the
Majority correctly reasons, Missouri v.
Holland forecloses challenging a valid
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statute implementing a valid treaty on
Necessary and Proper grounds or federalism
grounds.
But even if Ms. Bond were able to assert a
federalism challenge to her conviction, she
proposes no principle of federalism that
would limit the federal government's
authority to prosecute her under the Act.
Thus, as to the second question, Ms. Bond
argues that if the statute is applied to her,
and, is thus read to “criminalize every
malicious use of poisoning,” then principles
of federalism are violated by disturbing the
division of power between the federal
government and the states. As appealing as
the argument sounds—that a federal statute
should not reach an essentially local offense
like this—there is in fact no principled
reason to limit the Act's reach when her
conduct is squarely prohibited by it. The fact
that an otherwise constitutional federal
statute might criminalize conduct considered
to be local does not render that particular
criminalization unconstitutional. As the
Supreme Court explained in Gonzales v.
Raich, when “the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach
of federal power, the courts have no power
to excise, as trivial, individual instances of
the class.” The fact that the Act, which
properly implements a valid treaty, reaches
non-terrorist uses of chemical weapons
leaves us powerless to excise such an
individual instance. True, Raich involved
Congress's Commerce Clause Power. But
the Majority is correct to apply its principle
to this case, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's rejection, in Holland, of
federalism as a basis to challenge a statute
implementing an otherwise valid treaty.

Ms. Bond continues to urge otherwise,
asking us to consider the “world where the
Supreme Court recognizes that the Tenth
Amendment is primarily about protecting
individual liberty,” in which the Supreme
Court recognized that some acts of
Congress, even if they are otherwise valid
under an enumerated power, can run afoul of
the Tenth Amendment. But this case is not
like New York or Printz, in which Congress
wrongfully commandeered states' legislative
processes and public officials. Nothing in
those cases suggests a principle of
federalism that would apply to this case.
Moreover, it is not enough to urge, as Ms.
Bond does, that Pennsylvania law and
authorities are equally able to handle, and
punish, this conduct so that, from a
federalism standpoint, we should leave the
matter to Pennsylvania. That view simply
misstates the law. We have a system of dual
sovereignty. Instances of overlapping
federal and state criminalization of similar
conduct abound. But Ms. Bond argues that
here, unlike the case with other federal
crimes, no federal interest is being served by
prosecuting every malicious use of a
chemical. That argument fails for two
reasons. First, there exists nowhere in the
law a rule requiring that a statute
implementing a treaty contain an element
explicitly tying the statute to a federal
interest so as to ensure that a particular
application of the statute is constitutional.
Second, even if we were to require that there
be a clear federal interest, Ms. Bond
incorrectly characterizes the federal interest
that is represented by her prosecution as one
in prosecuting every malicious use of a
chemical. Rather, the federal interest served
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is twofold: combating the use and
proliferation of chemical weapons, and
complying with the United States'
obligations
under
a
valid
treaty.
Additionally, whether there is a distinction,
and where that distinction lies, between
combating the use and proliferation of
chemical weapons and prosecuting the
malicious use of a chemical, is exceedingly
difficult to discern.
In sum, Congress passed the Act, which is
constitutionally sound legislation, to
implement
the
Convention,
a
constitutionally sound treaty. Ms. Bond's
appeal generally to federalism, rather than to
a workable principle that would limit the
federal government's authority to apply the
Act to her, is to no avail.
The real culprits here are three. First, the
fact pattern. No one would question a
prosecution under the Act if the defendant
were a deranged person who scattered
potassium dichromate and 10–chloro–10H–
phenoxarsine, the chemicals which Ms.
Bond used, on the seats of the New York
subway cars. While that defendant could be
punished under state law, applying the Act
there would not offend our sensibilities. The
application, however, to this “domestic
dispute,” somehow does.
Second, the “use” of chemical weapons as
prescribed in the Act has an admittedly
broad sweep. Because the Act tracks the
Convention, however, Congress had the
power to criminalize all such uses. Perhaps,
in carrying out the United States' treaty
obligations, Congress could have created a

more expansive exception for “peaceful
purposes,” but it did not.
Lastly, the decision to prosecute is troubling.
The judgment call to prosecute Ms. Bond
under a chemical weapons statute rather than
allowing state authorities to process the case
is one that we question. But we see that
every day in drug cases. Perhaps lured by
the perception of easier convictions and
tougher sentences, prosecutors opt to
proceed federally. There is no law against
this, or principle that we can call upon, to
limit or regulate it.
While the Majority opinion explores
arguments regarding the limits of the Treaty
Power, I find Ms. Bond's argument to be
much more limited in scope, although
equally unsupportable. I agree that we
should affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by Judge
Jordan's thoughtful opinion. I write
separately to urge the Supreme Court to
provide a clarifying explanation of its
statement in Missouri v. Holland that “[i]f
[a] treaty is valid there can be no dispute
about the validity of the statute
[implementing that treaty] under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means
to execute the powers of the Government.”
Absent that undertaking, a blank check
exists for the Federal Government to enact
any laws that are rationally related to a valid
treaty and that do not transgress affirmative
constitutional restrictions, like the First
Amendment. This acquirable police power,
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however, can run counter to the fundamental
principle that the Constitution delegates
powers to the Federal Government that are
“few and defined” while the States retain
powers that are “numerous and indefinite.”

statutes like Section 229 are in deep tension
with an important structural feature of our
Government: “ ‘The States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law.’ ”

Since Holland, Congress has largely resisted
testing the outer bounds of its treatyimplementing authority. But if ever there
were a statute that did test those limits, it
would be Section 229. With its shockingly
broad definitions, Section 229 federalizes
purely local, run-of-the-mill criminal
conduct. The statute is a troublesome
example of the Federal Government's
appetite for criminal lawmaking. Sweeping

I hope that the Supreme Court will soon
flesh out “[t]he most important sentence in
the most important case about the
constitutional law of foreign affairs,” and,
doing so, clarify (indeed curtail) the
contours of federal power to enact laws that
intrude on matters so local that no drafter of
the Convention contemplated their inclusion
in it.
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“Chemical Weapon or Just Poison? Supreme Court Takes Case”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel & Terry Baynes
January 18, 2013
The Supreme Court on Friday agreed to hear
a new appeal by a woman convicted under a
federal law intended to combat chemical
weapons in a case where she admitted trying
to poison a former friend who had an affair
with her husband.
At the center of the case is a 1998 U.S. law
banning the use of chemical weapons other
than for a "peaceful purpose."
That law grew out of the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention, an international
agreement designed to keep rogue countries
and terrorists from obtaining weapons of
mass destruction.
Carol Anne Bond, a trained microbiologist
who once worked at the chemical company
Rohm and Haas Co, admitted to trying to
poison her former best friend Myrlinda
Haynes after learning that Haynes, a single
mother, became pregnant by Bond's
husband.
The toxic chemicals were taken from Rohm
& Haas, and lethal compounds were
sprinkled on Haynes' mailbox, car door
handles and house doorknob on several
occasions between November 2006 and June
2007.
Such cases are normally handled by local
prosecutors under traditional criminal laws,
but Bond was prosecuted under the federal
chemical weapons law.

The case could give the court a chance to
revisit a 1920 precedent written by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes that gave Congress
broad authority to adopt laws implementing
treaties.
It also presents an unusual clash between the
desire to enforce international treaty norms,
including provisions designed to thwart
terrorism, and the 10th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, which limits federal
power.
Bond, a Pennsylvania resident, was
sentenced to six years in prison after
entering a guilty plea that gave her a right to
appeal the use of that law in her case. Bond
said its use invaded the powers reserved to
U.S. states under the 10th Amendment.
In 2011, the Supreme Court said Bond had
standing to fight her conviction, without
deciding the merits, and sent the case to the
3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia.
CACHE IN EACH CUPBOARD
In May, the 3rd Circuit upheld the
conviction, despite finding that the law
"turns each kitchen cupboard and cleaning
cabinet in America into a potential chemical
weapons cache."
The 3rd Circuit said the 1920 Supreme
Court precedent, Missouri v. Holland,
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limited its review to whether the federal law
was rationally related to a valid treaty.
"The arguable consequence of Holland is
that treaties and associated legislation are
simply not subject to Tenth Amendment
scrutiny, no matter how far into the realm of
states' rights the president and Congress may
choose to venture," it found.
In her latest Supreme Court appeal, Bond,
represented by former Solicitor General Paul
Clement, claimed that the federal
government overreached in trying to
criminalize "purely local conduct" by
implementing the chemical weapons treaty.

The U.S. government opposed the appeal,
saying Congress had authority under the
Constitution's Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause to enact the
1998 law.
It also said Bond could not escape the law
"because her actions were anything but
peaceful."
The court could hear the appeal in April, and
if it does would likely issue a decision by
the end of June.

358

“Jilted Suburbanite To Fight Terrorism Conviction In The Supreme Court”
Business Insider
Erin Fuchs
January 22, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Friday to
hear an unusually dramatic dispute: the case
of a Pennsylvania suburbanite who allegedly
tried to poison her husband's pregnant
mistress.

Clement's Supreme Court petition in the
case paints a sad and intimate story of the
alleged betrayal that led to a 42-year-old
suburbanite's conviction under a federal
anti-terror law.

The nation's highest court will reexamine
the conviction of Carol Anne Bond
for allegedly spreading poison around the
home of her husband's mistress, who was
also her best friend.

The drama began to unfold in 2006, when
Bond's best friend Myrlinda Haynes
announced her pregnancy. Bond, who
couldn't have biological children of her own,
was initially happy for her best friend.

In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled
Bond could challenge her conviction under a
federal anti-terrorism law, and an appeals
court ultimately upheld her six-year prison
term.

But then she learned her own husband was
the father, the petition claims.

Now the Supreme Court will hear the case a
second time, this time reviewing the merits
of the prosecution including whether
prosecutors had a right to charge Bond
under
the Chemical
Weapons
Implementation Act.
The justices will consider Bond's argument
that U.S. prosecutors had no business
jumping into a "domestic dispute,"
especially using a law designed to police
chemical weapons of mass destruction.
Bond is represented by legal superstar Paul
Clement, who's best known for opposing
Obamacare and spearheading the legal battle
to preserve the anti-gay Defense of Marriage
Act.

"This double betrayal brought back painful
memories of her father's infidelities, and
petitioner
suffered
an
emotional
breakdown," the petition states. Her hair fell
out. She had panic attacks.
During the emotional breakdown, she
bought
potassium
dichromate
from
Amazon.com and spread it around Haynes'
house with the intention of giving her
former best friend a rash, Bond's lawyers
say.
Ultimately, Haynes suffered only a tiny
chemical burn on her thumb, according to
Bond.
Federal prosecutors then overstepped their
authority by prosecuting Bond under an
international arms-control treaty meant to
stop the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, her lawyers argue.
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"Domestic disputes resulting from marital
infidelities and culminating in a thumb burn
are appropriately handled by local law
enforcement authorities," the petition stated.
The government argues Bond's conduct fell
squarely
within
the
anti-terrorism
law. Haynes suffered 24 "chemical attacks"
during a three-month period, forcing her to

constantly have to check the area around her
house for chemicals, the government says in
its brief.
The government goes on to say that Bond
"vowed revenge and promised she would
make Haynes' life a living hell."
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“Once More Unto the Treaty-Power Breach”
Cato Institute
Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus
May 16, 2013
The Carol Anne Bond saga continues. Now
in her second trip to the Supreme Court—
and with Cato’s support for the fourth
time—Bond is still hoping to avoid federal
punishment stemming from her attempts to
get back at her erstwhile best friend for
having an affair with her husband.
Bond, a microbiologist, spread toxic
chemicals on her friend’s car and mailbox.
Postal inspectors discovered this plot after
they caught Bond on film stealing from the
woman’s mailbox. Rather than leave this
caper to local law enforcement, however, a
federal prosecutor reached into his bag of
tricks and charged Bond with violating a
statute that implements U.S. treaty
obligations under the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention.
Yes, rather than being charged with
attempted murder and the like, Bond is
essentially accused of chemical warfare.
Bond challenged the federal government’s
power to charge her with a crime, arguing
that Congress lacks constitutional authority
to pass general criminal statutes and cannot
somehow acquire that authority through a
treaty. Before a court could reach this issue,
however, there was a question whether Bond
could even make that argument under the
Tenth Amendment, which reaffirms that any
powers not delegated to Congress are
reserved to the states or to the people. On

Bond’s first trip to the Supreme Court, the
Court unanimously accepted the argument,
offered in an amicus brief by Cato and the
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, that
there’s no reason in constitutional structure
or history that someone can’t use the Tenth
Amendment
to
challenge
the
constitutionality of the statute under which
she was convicted.
On remand to the Philadelphia-based U.S
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and
now with standing to challenge that law,
Bond raised the argument that Congress’s
limited and enumerated powers cannot be
increased by treaties. We again filed in that
case in support of Bond. The Third Circuit
disagreed, however—if reluctantly—based
on one sentence written by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in the 1920 case
of Missouri v. Holland, which has been
interpreted to mean that treaties can indeed
expand Congress’s powers. With Cato
supporting her bid to return to the Supreme
Court on that treaty power question, Bond’s
case reached the high court.
Now, in a brief authored by professor
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz and joined by
the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence,
the Atlantic Legal Foundation, and former
attorney general Edwin Meese III—in what
we hope will be our final filing in the case—
we argue that a treaty cannot give Congress
the constitutional authority to charge Bond.
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Allowing Congress to broaden its powers
via treaties is an astounding manner in
which to interpret a document that creates a
federal government of limited powers.
Not only would this mean that the president
has the ability to expand federal power by
signing a treaty, but it would mean
that foreign governments could change
federal power by abrogating previously
valid
treaties—thus
removing
the
constitutional authority from certain laws.
This perverse result makes Missouri v.
Holland a doctrinal anomaly that the Court
must either overrule or clarify. We also
point out how the most influential argument

supporting Holland is based on a clear
misreading of constitutional history that has
been repeated without question.
Although Holland is nearly 100 years old,
there is thus no reason to adhere to a
precedent that is not only blatantly incorrect,
but could severely threaten our system of
government. We’re in a constitutional
quagmire with respect to the treaty power,
one that can only be escaped by limiting or
overturning Missouri v. Holland.
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments
in Bond v. United States in October.
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Brima WURIE, Defendant, Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
Decided on May 17, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
STAHL, Circuit Judge
This case requires us to decide whether the
police, after seizing a cell phone from an
individual's person as part of his lawful
arrest, can search the phone's data without a
warrant. We conclude that such a search
exceeds the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment
search-incident-to-arrest
exception. Because the government has not
argued that the search here was justified by
exigent circumstances or any other
exception to the warrant requirement, we
reverse the denial of defendant-appellant
Brima Wurie's motion to suppress, vacate
his conviction, and remand his case to the
district court.
I. Facts & Background
On the evening of September 5, 2007,
Sergeant Detective Paul Murphy of the
Boston Police Department (BPD) was
performing routine surveillance in South
Boston. He observed Brima Wurie, who was
driving a Nissan Altima, stop in [a] parking
lot … pick up a man later identified as Fred
Wade, and engage in what Murphy believed
was a drug sale in the car. Murphy and
another BPD officer subsequently stopped
Wade and found two plastic bags in his
pocket, each containing 3.5 grams of crack

cocaine. Wade admitted that he had bought
the drugs from “B,” the man driving the
Altima [and] that “B” lived in South Boston
and sold crack cocaine.
Murphy notified a third BPD officer, who
was following the Altima. After Wurie
parked the car, that officer arrested Wurie
for distributing crack cocaine, read him
Miranda warnings, and took him to the
police station. When Wurie arrived at the
station, two cell phones, a set of keys, and
$1,275 in cash were taken from him.
Five to ten minutes after Wurie arrived at
the station, but before he was booked, two
other BPD officers noticed that one of
Wurie's cell phones, a gray Verizon LG
phone, was repeatedly receiving calls from a
number identified as “my house” on the
external caller ID screen on the front of the
phone. The officers were able to see the
caller ID screen, and the “my house” label,
in plain view. After about five more
minutes, the officers opened the phone to
look at Wurie's call log. Immediately upon
opening the phone, the officers saw a
photograph of a young black woman holding
a baby, which was set as the phone's
“wallpaper.” The officers then [determined]
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the phone number associated with the “my
house” caller ID reference.

marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and $250 in
cash.

One of the officers typed that phone number
into an online white pages directory, which
revealed that the address associated with the
number was on Silver Street... The name
associated with the address was Manny
Cristal.

Wurie was charged with possessing with
intent to distribute and distributing cocaine
base and with being a felon in possession of
a firearm and ammunition. He filed a motion
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the warrantless search of his cell phone;
the parties agreed that the relevant facts
were not in dispute and that an evidentiary
hearing was unnecessary. The district court
denied Wurie's motion to suppress, and,
after a four-day trial, the jury found Wurie
guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced
to 262 months in prison. This appeal
followed.

Sergeant Detective Murphy then gave Wurie
a new set of Miranda warnings and asked
him a series of questions. Wurie said, among
other things, that he lived at an address on
Speedwell Street in Dorchester and that he
had only been “cruising around” in South
Boston. He denied having stopped at the...
store, having given anyone a ride, and
having sold crack cocaine.
Suspecting that Wurie was a drug dealer,
that he was lying about his address, and that
he might have drugs hidden at his house,
Murphy took Wurie's keys and, with other
officers, went to the Silver Street address
associated with the “my house” number.
One of the mailboxes at that address listed
the names Wurie and Cristal. Through the
first-floor apartment window, the officers
saw a black woman who looked like the
woman whose picture appeared on Wurie's
cell phone wallpaper. The officers entered
the apartment to “freeze” it while they
obtained a search warrant. Inside the
apartment, they found a sleeping child who
looked like the child in the picture on
Wurie's phone. After obtaining the warrant,
the officers seized from the apartment,
among other things, 215 grams of crack
cocaine, a firearm, ammunition, four bags of

II. Analysis
In considering the denial of a motion to
suppress, we review the district court's
factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo.
…Today, a warrantless search is per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
unless one of “a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions” applies.
One of those exceptions allows the police,
when they make a lawful arrest, to search
“the arrestee's person and the area within his
immediate control.” In recent years, courts
have grappled with the question of whether
the
search-incident-to-arrest
exception
extends to data within an arrestee's cell
phone.
A. The legal landscape
The
modern
search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine emerged from Chimel v. California,
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in which the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless search of the defendant's entire
house was not justified by the fact that it
occurred as part of his valid arrest. The
Court found that the search-incident-toarrest exception permits an arresting officer
“to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction” and to search
“the area into which an arrestee might reach
in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items.” The justifications underlying the
exception, as articulated in Chimel, were
protecting officer safety and ensuring the
preservation of evidence.

preserve evidence on his person for later use
at trial.” However, the Court also said the
following:
The authority to search the person
incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and
to discover evidence, does not depend on
what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact
be found upon the person of the suspect.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that
intrusion being lawful, a search incident
to the arrest requires no additional
justification.

Four years later, in United States v.
Robinson, the Supreme Court examined how
the
search-incident-to-arrest
exception
applies to searches of the person. Robinson
was arrested for driving with a revoked
license, and in conducting a pat down, the
arresting officer felt an object that he could
not identify in Robinson's coat pocket. He
removed the object, which turned out to be a
cigarette package, and then felt the package
and determined that it contained something
other than cigarettes. Upon opening the
package, the officer found fourteen capsules
of heroin. The Court held that the
warrantless search of the cigarette package
was valid, explaining that the police have
the authority to conduct “a full search of the
person” incident to a lawful arrest.

The following year, the Court decided
United States v. Edwards. Edwards was
arrested on suspicion of burglary and
detained at a local jail. After his arrest,
police realized that Edwards's clothing,
which he was still wearing, might contain
paint chips tying him to the burglary. The
police seized the articles of clothing and
examined them for paint fragments. The
Court upheld the search, concluding that
once it became apparent that the items of
clothing might contain destructible evidence
of a crime, “the police were entitled to take,
examine, and preserve them for use as
evidence, just as they are normally permitted
to seize evidence of crime when it is
lawfully encountered.”

Robinson reiterated the principle, discussed
in Chimel, that “[t]he justification or reason
for the authority to search incident to a
lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need
to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody as it does on the need to

The Court again addressed the searchincident-to-arrest exception in United States
v. Chadwick, abrogated on other grounds by
California
v.
Acevedo,
this
time
emphasizing that not all warrantless
searches undertaken in the context of a
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custodial
arrest
are
constitutionally
reasonable. In Chadwick, the defendants
were arrested immediately after having
loaded a footlocker into the trunk of a car.
The footlocker remained under the exclusive
control of federal narcotics agents until they
opened it, without a warrant and about an
hour and a half after the defendants were
arrested, and found marijuana in it. The
Court invalidated the search, concluding that
the justifications for the search-incident-toarrest exception—the need for the arresting
officer “[t]o safeguard himself and others,
and to prevent the loss of evidence”—were
absent. The search “was conducted more
than an hour after federal agents had gained
exclusive control of the footlocker and long
after respondents were securely in custody”
and therefore could not “be viewed as
incidental to the arrest or as justified by any
other exigency.”
Finally, there is the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Arizona v. Gant. Gant involved
the search of an arrestee's vehicle... Once
again, the Court reiterated the twin
rationales underlying the exception, first
articulated in Chimel… Relying on [] safety
and evidentiary justifications, the Court
found that a search of a vehicle incident to
arrest is lawful “when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment at the time of the
search.”
Courts have struggled to apply the Supreme
Court's
search-incident-to-arrest
jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell
phone seized from the person. The searches
at issue in the cases that have arisen thus far
have involved everything from simply

obtaining a cell phone's number, to looking
through an arrestee's call records, text
messages, or photographs.
Though a majority of these courts have
ultimately upheld warrantless cell phone
data searches, they have used a variety of
approaches. Some have concluded that,
under Robinson and Edwards, a cell phone
can be freely searched incident to a
defendant's lawful arrest, with no
justification beyond the fact of the arrest
itself. Others have, to varying degrees, relied
on the need to preserve evidence on a cell
phone. The Seventh Circuit discussed the
Chimel rationales more explicitly in Flores–
Lopez, assuming that warrantless cell phone
searches must be justified by a need to
protect arresting officers or preserve
destructible evidence, and finding that
evidence preservation concerns outweighed
the invasion of privacy at issue in that case,
because the search was minimally invasive.
A smaller number of courts have rejected
warrantless cell phone searches, with
similarly disparate reasoning. In United
States v. Park, for example, the court
concluded that a cell phone should be
viewed not as an item immediately
associated with the person under Robinson
and Edwards but as a possession within an
arrestee's
immediate
control
under
Chadwick, which cannot be searched once
the phone comes into the exclusive control
of
the
police,
absent
exigent
circumstances…
B. Our vantage point
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We begin from the premise that, in the
Fourth Amendment context, “[a] single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social
and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.”…
Thus, we find it necessary to craft a brightline rule that applies to all warrantless cell
phone searches, rather than resolving this
case based solely on the particular
circumstances of the search at issue.
The government seems to agree, urging us to
find that a cell phone, like any other item
carried on the person, can be thoroughly
searched incident to a lawful arrest. The
government's reasoning goes roughly as
follows: (1) Wurie's cell phone was an item
immediately associated with his person…;
(2) such items can be freely searched
without any justification beyond the fact of
the lawful arrest; (3) the search can occur
even after the defendant has been taken into
custody and transported to the station house;
and (4) there is no limit on the scope of the
search, other than the Fourth Amendment's
core reasonableness requirement.
This “literal reading of the Robinson
decision” fails to account for the fact that the
Supreme Court has determined that there are
categories of searches undertaken following
an arrest that are inherently unreasonable
because they are never justified by one of
the Chimel rationales: protecting arresting
officers or preserving destructible evidence.
As we explain below, this case therefore
turns on whether the government can
demonstrate that warrantless cell phone

searches, as a category, fall within the
boundaries laid out in Chimel.
The government admitted at oral argument
that its interpretation of the search-incidentto-arrest exception would give law
enforcement broad latitude to search any
electronic device seized from a person
during his lawful arrest... The search could
encompass things like text messages, emails,
or photographs, though the officers here
only searched Wurie's call log. Robinson
and Edwards, the government claims,
compel such a finding.
We suspect that the eighty-five percent of
Americans who own cell phones and “use
the devices to do much more than make
phone calls,” would have some difficulty
with the government's view that “Wurie's
cell phone was indistinguishable from other
kinds of personal possessions, like a
cigarette package, wallet, pager, or address
book, that fall within the search incident to
arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.” In reality, “a modern
cell phone is a computer,” and “a computer
... is not just another purse or address
book.”…
That information is, by and large, of a
highly personal nature: photographs, videos,
written and audio messages (text, email, and
voicemail), contacts, calendar appointments,
web search and browsing history, purchases,
and financial and medical records. It is the
kind of information one would previously
have stored in one's home and that would
have been off-limits to officers performing a
search incident to arrest…
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In short, individuals today store much more
personal information on their cell phones
than could ever fit in a wallet, address book,
briefcase, or any of the other traditional
containers that the government has
invoked… [T]he government's proposed
rule would give law enforcement automatic
access to “a virtual warehouse” of an
individual's “most intimate communications
and photographs without probable cause” if
the individual is subject to a custodial arrest,
even for something as minor as a traffic
violation…
It is true that Robinson speaks broadly, and
that the Supreme Court has never found the
constitutionality of a search of the person
incident to arrest to turn on the kind of item
seized or its capacity to store private
information. In our view, however, what
distinguishes a warrantless search of the data
within a modern cell phone from the
inspection of an arrestee's cigarette pack or
the examination of his clothing is not just
the nature of the item searched, but the
nature and scope of the search itself.
In Gant, the Court emphasized the need for
“the scope of a search incident to arrest” to
be “commensurate with its purposes,” which
include “protecting arresting officers and
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of
arrest that an arrestee might conceal or
destroy.” Inspecting the contents of a
cigarette pack can (and, in Robinson, did)
preserve destructible evidence (heroin
capsules). It is also at least theoretically
necessary to protect the arresting officer,
who does not know what he will find inside
the cigarette pack. Examining the clothing
an arrestee is wearing can (and, in Edwards,

did) preserve destructible evidence (paint
chips). Thus, the searches at issue in
Robinson and Edwards were the kinds of
reasonable, self-limiting searches that do not
offend the Fourth Amendment, even when
conducted without a warrant. The same can
be said of searches of wallets, address
books, purses, and briefcases, which are all
potential repositories for destructible
evidence and, in some cases, weapons.
When faced, however, with categories of
searches that cannot ever be justified under
Chimel, the Supreme Court has taken a
different approach. In Chadwick, the Court
struck down warrantless searches of
“luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of
the arrestee” that the police have “reduced ...
to their exclusive control,” because such
searches are not necessary to preserve
destructible evidence or protect officer
safety. The searches at issue in Chadwick
[was] general, evidence-gathering search,
not easily subject to any limiting principle,
and the Fourth Amendment permits such
searches only pursuant to a lawful warrant.
We therefore find it necessary to ask
whether the warrantless search of data
within a cell phone can ever be justified
under Chimel. The government has provided
little guidance on that question. [T]he
government has included just one, notably
tentative footnote in its brief attempting to
place warrantless cell phone data searches
within the Chimel boundaries. We find
ourselves unconvinced.
The government does not argue that cell
phone data searches are justified by a need
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to protect arresting officers. Wurie concedes
that arresting officers can inspect a cell
phone to ensure that it is not actually a
weapon, but we have no reason to believe
that officer safety would require a further
intrusion into the phone's contents…
The government has, however, suggested
that the search here was “arguably”
necessary to prevent the destruction of
evidence. Specifically, the government
points to the possibility that the calls on
Wurie's call log could have been overwritten
or the contents of his phone remotely wiped
if the officers had waited to obtain a
warrant. The problem with the government's
argument is that it does not seem to be
particularly difficult to prevent overwriting
of calls or remote wiping of information on
a cell phone today. Arresting officers have at
least three options. First, in some instances,
they can simply turn the phone off or
remove its battery. Second, they can put the
phone in a Faraday enclosure, a relatively
inexpensive device…Third, they may be
able “to ‘mirror’ (copy) the entire cell phone
contents, to preserve them should the phone
be remotely wiped, without looking at the
copy unless the original disappears.”
Indeed, if there is a genuine threat of remote
wiping or overwriting, we find it difficult to
understand why the police do not routinely
use these evidence preservation methods,
rather than risking the loss of the evidence
during the time it takes them to search
through the phone… While the measures
described above may be less convenient for
arresting officers than conducting a full
search of a cell phone's data incident to
arrest, the government has not suggested

that they are unworkable, and it bears the
burden of justifying its failure to obtain a
warrant.
Instead of truly attempting to fit this case
within the Chimel framework, the
government insists that we should disregard
the Chimel rationales entirely, for two
reasons.
First, the government emphasizes that
Robinson rejected the idea that “there must
be litigated in each case the issue of whether
or not there was present one of the reasons
supporting the authority for a search of the
person incident to a lawful arrest.” That
holding was predicated on an assumption,
clarified in Chadwick, that “[t]he potential
dangers lurking in all custodial arrests” are
what “make warrantless searches of items
within the ‘immediate control’ area
reasonable without requiring the arresting
officer to calculate the probability that
weapons or destructible evidence may be
involved.”… [H]owever, we are not
suggesting a rule that would require
arresting officers or reviewing courts to
decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a
particular cell phone data search is justified
under Chimel. Rather, we believe that
warrantless cell phone data searches are
categorically unlawful under the searchincident-to-arrest exception, given the
government's failure to demonstrate that
they are ever necessary to promote officer
safety or prevent the destruction of
evidence. We read Robinson as compatible
with such a finding.
Second, the government places great weight
on a footnote at the end of Chadwick stating
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that searches of the person, unlike “searches
of possessions within an arrestee's
immediate control,” are “justified by ...
reduced expectations of privacy caused by
the arrest.” …
Yet the Court clearly stated in Robinson that
“[t]he authority to search the person incident
to a lawful custodial arrest” is “based upon
the need to disarm and to discover
evidence,” and Chadwick did not alter that
rule. When the Court decided Robinson in
1973 and Chadwick in 1977, any search of
the person would almost certainly have been
the type of self-limiting search that could be
justified under Chimel. The Court, more
than thirty-five years ago, could not have
envisioned a world in which the vast
majority of arrestees would be carrying on
their person an item containing not physical
evidence but a vast store of intangible
data—data that is not immediately
destructible and poses no threat to the
arresting officers.
In the end, we therefore part ways with the
Seventh Circuit, which also applied the
Chimel rationales in Flores–Lopez. Though
the court described the risk of evidence
destruction as arguably “so slight as to be
outweighed by the invasion of privacy from
the search,” it found that risk to be
sufficient, given the minimal nature of the
intrusion at issue (the officers had only
searched the cell phone for its number). That
conclusion was based, at least in part, on
Seventh Circuit precedent allowing a
“minimally invasive” warrantless search.
We are faced with different precedent and
different facts, but we also see little room

for a case-specific holding, given the
Supreme Court's insistence on bright-line
rules in the Fourth Amendment context.…
[W]hile the search of Wurie's call log was
less invasive than a search of text messages,
emails, or photographs, it is necessary for all
warrantless cell phone data searches to be
governed by the same rule…
We therefore hold that the search-incidentto-arrest exception does not authorize the
warrantless search of data on a cell phone
seized from an arrestee's person, because the
government has not convinced us that such a
search is ever necessary to protect arresting
officers or preserve destructible evidence.
Instead, warrantless cell phone data searches
strike us as a convenient way for the police
to obtain information related to a defendant's
crime of arrest—or other, as yet
undiscovered crimes—without having to
secure a warrant. We find nothing in the
Supreme Court's search-incident-to-arrest
jurisprudence that sanctions such a “general
evidence-gathering search.”
There are, however, other exceptions to the
warrant requirement that the government has
not invoked here but that might justify a
warrantless search of cell phone data under
the right conditions. Most importantly, we
assume that the exigent circumstances
exception would allow the police to conduct
an immediate, warrantless search of a cell
phone's data where they have probable cause
to believe that the phone contains evidence
of a crime, as well as a compelling need to
act quickly that makes it impracticable for
them to obtain a warrant-for example, where
the phone is believed to contain evidence
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necessary to locate a kidnapped child or to
investigate a bombing plot or incident.
C. The good-faith exception
That leaves only the government's belated
argument, made for the first time in a
footnote in its brief on appeal, that
suppression is inappropriate here under the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. The government bears the “heavy
burden” of proving that the good-faith
exception applies, and it did not invoke the
exception before the district court.
… In this case, [] we do not believe that
ground should be one with respect to which
the government bore the burden of proof and
entirely failed to carry that burden below,
despite the fact that the issue was ripe for
the district court's review.
III. Conclusion
… Today, many Americans store their most
personal “papers” and “effects,” in
electronic format on a cell phone, carried on
the person. Allowing the police to search
that data without a warrant any time they
conduct a lawful arrest would, in our view,
create “a serious and recurring threat to the
privacy of countless individuals.”
We therefore reverse the denial of Wurie's
motion to suppress, vacate his conviction,
and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
HOWARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Undoubtedly, most of us would prefer that
the information stored in our cell phones be

kept from prying eyes, should a phone be
lost or taken from our hands by the police
during an arrest. One could, individually,
take protective steps to enhance the phone's
security settings with respect to that
information, or for that matter legislation
might be enacted to make such unprotected
information off-limits to finders or to the
police unless they first obtain a warrant to
search the phone. But the question here is
whether the Fourth Amendment requires this
court to abandon long-standing precedent
and place such unprotected information
contained in cell phones beyond the reach of
the police when making a custodial arrest. I
think that we are neither required nor
authorized to rule as the majority has.
Instead, this case requires us to apply a
familiar legal standard to a new form of
technology…. In this exercise, consistency
is a virtue… Having scrutinized the relevant
Supreme Court decisions, as well as our own
precedent, I find no support for Wurie's
claim that he had a constitutional right
protecting the information obtained during
the warrantless search. Nor do I believe that
we possess the authority to create such a
right. Therefore, I respectfully dissent…
We have long acknowledged that police
officers can extract this type of information
from containers immediately associated with
a person at the time of arrest. In United
States v. Sheehan, police arrested a
suspected bank robber and then searched his
wallet, which included a piece of paper
bearing several names and telephone
numbers. The police officers copied this
piece of paper, which action Sheehan
challenged as an unconstitutional seizure.
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The claim is made that Sheehan is
inapposite to the present case because it
concerned a challenge to the seizure, not the
search. We, however, did not address the
warrantless search in Sheehan because its
legality was beyond dispute…
The police officers' limited search of one
telephone number in Wurie's call log was
even less intrusive than the searches in these
cases. The police observed, in plain view,
multiple calls from “my house”… to Wurie's
cell phone. Only then did they initiate their
search and only for the limited purpose of
retrieving the actual phone number
associated with “my house.” The police did
not rummage through Wurie's cell phone,
unsure of what they could find… The
additional step of identifying the actual
telephone number hardly constituted a
further intrusion on Wurie's privacy
interests, especially since that information is
immediately known to the third-party
telephone company. This case fits easily
within existing precedent.
Nor are there any other persuasive grounds
for distinguishing this case from our
previous decisions. That the container the
police searched was a cell phone is not, by
itself, dispositive, for “a constitutional
distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’
containers would be improper.” We made a
similar observation in United States v.
Eatherton, where we upheld the warrantless
search of a briefcase incident to an arrest…
Even assuming that cell phones possess
unique attributes that we must consider as
part of our analysis, none of those attributes
are present in this case. Though we do not

know the storage capacity of Wurie's cell
phone, we know that the police did not
browse through voluminous data in search
of general evidence. Nor did they search the
“cloud,” or other applications containing
particularly sensitive information. Instead,
they conducted a focused and limited search
of Wurie's electronic call log. If the
information that they sought had been
written on a piece of paper, as opposed to
stored electronically, there would be no
question
that
the
police
acted
constitutionally, so I see no reason to hold
otherwise in this case. The constitutionality
of a search cannot turn solely on whether the
information is written in ink or displayed
electronically.
The issue of warrantless cell phone searches
has come before a number of circuits. None
of them have adopted the majority's
categorical bar on warrantless cell phone
searches. Instead, they unanimously have
concluded that the cell phone searches
before them did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
I reach the same conclusion here….
In my view, there is another rationale,
apparent from the record, for upholding this
search: the risk that others might have
destroyed evidence after Wurie did not
answer his phone. Wurie received repeated
calls from “my house” in the span of a few
minutes after his arrest. His failure to answer
these phone calls could have alerted Wurie's
confederates to his arrest, prompting them to
destroy further evidence of his crimes. The
majority asserts that this scenario would be
present “in almost every instance of a
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custodial arrest,” giving police an ever-ready
justification to search cell phones. On the
contrary, the justification is based on the
specific facts of this case. The fact that “my
house” repeatedly called Wurie's cell phone
provided an objective basis for enhanced
concern that evidence might be destroyed
and thus gave the police a valid reason to
inspect the phone…
Wurie himself suffered no constitutional
violation during the search. If we are to
fashion a rule, it cannot elide the facts
before us. “The constitutional validity of a
warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort
of question which can only be decided in the
concrete factual context of the individual
case.” Yet the competing analysis focuses
on hypothetical searches that have not
emerged in any case or controversy before
this court…
The majority gets around this problem by
requiring the government to “demonstrate
that warrantless cell phone searches, as a
category, fall within the boundaries laid out
in Chimel.” … The Supreme Court [has
held] on two occasions, neither of which
involved the search of items held by the
arrestee, that certain types of searches
require a warrant because they lack any
Chimel justification. But the Supreme Court
has not extrapolated from those cases a
general rule that the government justify each
category of searches under Chimel, nor a
requirement that the appellate courts
conduct this sort of analysis.
Indeed, if the Supreme Court wishes us to
look at searches incident to arrest on a
categorical basis, it is curious that the Court

has offered absolutely no framework for
defining what constitutes a distinct category.
… Yet no relevant criteria are articulated for
establishing these categories…
Thus, either we are drastically altering the
holding in United States v. Robinson by
forcing the government to provide a Chimel
rationale for practically every search, or we
are putting ourselves in the position of
deciding, without any conceptual basis,
which searches are part of a distinct
“category” and which are not. This runs the
risk of spreading confusion in the law
enforcement community and multiplying,
rather than limiting, litigation pertaining to
these searches…
As the government points out, the Supreme
Court cases treat searches of the arrestee and
the items on the arrestee—as is the case
here—as either not subject to the Chimel
analysis, or at a least subject to a lower level
of Chimel scrutiny. These cases, unlike
Chimel and Gant, are on point with Wurie's
case, and we are not free to disregard them
in favor of the principles enunciated in
Gant…
In Robinson, the Supreme Court drew a
sharp distinction between two types of
searches pursuant to an arrest: searches of
the arrestee and searches of the area within
his control. “The validity of the search of a
person incident to a lawful arrest has been
regarded as settled from its first enunciation,
and has remained virtually unchallenged....
Throughout the series of cases in which the
Court has addressed the second [type of
search,] no doubt has been expressed as to
the unqualified authority of the arresting
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authority to search the person of the
arrestee.” The Supreme Court did state that
the basis of this authority is “the need to
disarm and to discover evidence,” but in the
next sentence clarified that “[a] custodial
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification,”
Indeed, the Court could not rely on a Chimel
justification in Robinson, as the arresting
officer conceded that he “did not in fact
believe that the object in [Robinson]'s coat
pocket was a weapon” and that he gave no
thought to the destruction of evidence either.
Robinson may not have rejected Chimel in
the context of searches of an arrestee and
items on the arrestee, but it did establish that
these searches differ from other types of
searches incident to arrest…
Even in Chadwick, where the Supreme
Court did require the police to obtain a
warrant for a category of searches, it
continued to treat the search of an arrestee
and items immediately associated with him
as independently justified by “reduced
expectations of privacy caused by the
arrest.”… These cases, taken together,
establish that items immediately associated
with the arrestee—as a category—may be
searched without any Chimel justification.
The majority seeks a bright-line rule to
govern cell phone searches, but denies the
fact that such a rule—covering all items on
the arrestee's person—already exists.
But even if searches of items on an arrestee
required Chimel justifications, I cannot see

why cell phones fail to meet this standard if
wallets, cigarette packages, address books,
briefcases, and purses do…
One argument is that these other items,
unlike cell phones, all theoretically could
contain “destructible” evidence, which
justifies examining them. But the evidence
in a cell phone is just as destructible as the
evidence in a wallet: with the press of a few
buttons, accomplished even remotely, cell
phones can wipe themselves clean of data.
Any claim that the information is not
destructible strikes me as simply wrong…
Another argument is that because cell phone
searches are not “self-limiting,” they always
require a warrant. The majority does not
precisely define the term “self-limiting,” but
I gather that it refers to the danger that cell
phones, because of their vast storage
capabilities, are susceptible to “general,
evidence-gathering searches.” As an initial
matter, this has never been the focus of
Supreme Court cases discussing the search
incident to arrest exception for items
immediately
associated
with
the
arrestee.Thus, I am reluctant to give it much
weight in assessing Wurie's constitutional
claim.
Nonetheless, if we are concerned that police
officers will exceed the limits of
constitutional behavior while searching cell
phones, then we should define those limits
so that police can perform their job both
effectively and constitutionally. Instead, the
majority has lumped all cell phone searches
together, even while perhaps acknowledging
that its broad rule may prohibit some
otherwise constitutional searches…
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Still, I share many of the majority's concerns
about the privacy interests at stake in cell
phone searches. While the warrantless
search of Wurie's phone fits within one of
our “specifically established and welldelineated exceptions,” due to the rapid
technological development of cell phones
and their increasing prevalence in society,
cell phone searches do pose a risk of
depriving arrestees of their protection
against unlawful searches and seizures.
There must be an outer limit to their legality.
In Flores–Lopez, Judge Posner suggested
that courts should balance the need to search
a cell phone against the privacy interests at
stake.
[E]ven when the risk either to the police
officers or to the existence of the
evidence is negligible, the search is
allowed, provided it's no more invasive
than, say, a frisk, or the search of a
conventional
container,
such
as
Robinson's cigarette pack, in which
heroin was found. If instead of a frisk it's
a strip search, the risk to the officers'
safety or to the preservation of evidence
of crime must be greater to justify the
search.
I believe that cell phone searches should
follow this formula. That is not to say that
the police must prove a risk to officer safety
or destruction of evidence in every case.
There is, inherent in every custodial arrest,

some minimal risk to officer safety and
destruction
of
evidence.
Moreover,
Chadwick states that the arrest itself
diminishes the arrestee's privacy rights over
items “immediately associated” with the
arrestee. But the invasion of the arrestee's
privacy should be proportional to the
justification for the warrantless search…
[W]hile Robinson's principles generally
authorize cell phone searches, and certainly
encompass the search in this case, there are
reasonable limits to Robinson that we should
not hesitate to enforce, especially in light of
a cell phone's unique technological
capabilities, for “[i]t would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”…
But ultimately the question of what
constitutes an unreasonable cell phone
search should be left for another day. The
majority has outlined some of the more
troubling privacy invasions that could occur
during a warrantless search. So long as they
remain in the hypothetical realm, I think it
premature to draw the line. Suffice it to say
that, for the reasons I have stated, the search
in this case fell on the constitutional side of
that line.
I respectfully dissent.
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“U.S. Appeals on Cellphone Privacy”
SCOTUS Blog
Lyle Denniston
August 16, 2013
The Obama administration, taking the
advice of two judges to rush the issue to the
Supreme Court, has moved quickly to ask
the Justices to rule that police are free to
look through the contents of a private
cellphone they take from an individual they
arrest, and to do so without a judge’s
approval.
About two weeks after the First Circuit
Court voted to leave intact a ruling that such
searches are unconstitutional if police do not
have a search warrant, the government on
Thursday asked the Supreme Court to
overturn that decision. The government
could have taken three months to begin an
appeal. The case is United States v. Wurie
(docket 13-212). An earlier post on the
constitutional controversy can be read here.
The key to the government’s argument is
that police have long had the authority,
without a warrant, to search items that are
found on a person whom they arrest. That
has been “a bright-line rule,” the petition
said, that as long as the arrest was valid,
items that person was carrying should be
open to search by officers.
Creating exceptions to that rule, on an
“item-by-item” basis, would undercut that
rule and complicate police enforcement
activity. “No sound rule justifies excluding
cellphones, the contents of which are far
more susceptible to destruction than most
other evidence,” the petition argued. There

are no exceptions for wallets, calendars,
address books, pagers, and pocket diaries,
and none should be created for hand-held
telephones, the government contended.
The issue, however, has divided lower
courts, the petition noted. In fact, the First
Circuit Court ruling requiring a warrant for
officers to search an arrestee’s cellphone
conflicts directly with an opposite ruling by
the highest court of Massachusetts.
Massachusetts, of course, is in the
geographic area of the First Circuit, so the
petition said that the conflict between the
two courts in that area leaves police with
“the task of making sense” of their legal
duty.
The petition added: “Particularly given the
ubiquity of cellphone use by drug traffickers
and other serious offenders, and the
important law-enforcement consequences of
unsettling search-incident-to-arrest doctrine,
the question presented now ‘requires an
authoritative answer from the Supreme
Court,’” the petition said, quoting a judge on
the First Circuit Court.
The same issue raised in the case is already
on file at the Court, in Riley v. California
(docket 12-132). With the widening conflict
among lower courts, review of the issue by
the Justices is highly likely, during the new
Term that opens in October.
The new
government petition mentions the Riley case
in a final footnote, but implied that the
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Wurie case would present a better test of the
constitutional issues.
(A reader has
suggested that the government may have
rushed to file its own appeal in order to give

it an added chance to be considered in
competition with the Riley case.)
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“What Seized Cellphones and Leftovers Have in Common”
Wall Street Journal
Jacob Gershman
August 26, 2013
We think of Reynolds Wrap as the stuff used
to cover last night’s roast chicken.
In a new paper, law professor Adam
Gershowitz of William & Mary Law School
explains how aluminium foil can be used to
literally foil criminal suspects.
The paper concerns one of the most hotly
debated legal questions of the day – whether
the U.S. Constitution permits police to
search a suspect’s cellphone at the time of
arrest.
Mr. Gershowitz thinks that police should be
allowed to seize a phone. But, absent a
specific exigency, he thinks police should
have to get a warrant before searching its
contents.
A problem for authorities is that
smartphones come with remote-erase
features that allow a suspect to wipe
evidence from a seized phone.
In a forthcoming article in the William &
Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Mr. Gershowitz
lays out how police can minimize that risk
without stepping over constitutional lines.
One option, he says, is using a data
extraction device to copy the phone’s

contents. Those devices cost tens of
thousands of dollars, making it unrealistic
for police to carry a bunch of them around
on patrol.
Here’s where his paper starts to read like
those old “Bet You Can” science books for
kids.
Mr. Gershowitz suggests that police shield
store the device in a signal-blocking Faraday
bag, which you can buy on Amazon.com for
$58.
An even cheaper option can be found in any
kitchen cabinet — aluminum foil.
“When the police seize a phone, they simply
have to wrap the phone in a few layers of
aluminum foil and the chance of remote
wiping of the phone will be almost
completely
eliminated,”
writes
Mr.
Gershowitz.
The bag and foil tricks aren’t foolproof.
They won’t save data that has been preprogrammed to delete.
But he says the measures could go a long
way toward protecting evidence without
giving police “carte blanche” to conduct
warrantless searches.
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“Can Police Search a Seized Cell Phone Without a Warrant?”
FindLaw
Kelly Cheung
May 23, 2013
Seized cell phones are safe from a
warrantless search by police, the First
Circuit recently held. The court ruled that a
police cell phone search for data is not
constitutional when a person is arrested
unless officers get a warrant first.
For Brima Wurie, his cell phone was the one
important item that was searched by police
officers the evening he was arrested for
possessing crack cocaine. Because police
looked through his seized cell phone without
a warrant, they knew to search Wurie's
house, where they found 215 grams of
cocaine -- a huge difference from the 3.5
grams found in his possession.
The Fourth Amendment, which Wurie
claims was violated in his case, protects
people's right to feel secure in their persons,
homes, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search and seizures. The First
Circuit had to decide if the search-incidentto-arrest exception to a warrantless search
includes a police search of an arrestee's
seized cell phone.
The court considered various case
precedents that involved items like clothing,
footlockers, cigarette packages, and cell
phones. It ultimately focused on both the
nature and scope of the search conducted on
the confiscated cell phone.
According to the court, what is
distinguishable about a seized cell phone is

that it does not hold any evidence that can
be destroyed before police get a warrant. An
arrestee is away from it at that point. The
seized phone itself also does not pose any
immediate safety threat to the arresting
officers to justify a warrantless search of it
either.
The government attempted to create an
argument that the phone data could get
overwritten remotely. But the court stated
that there were simple methods for police to
address that concern. For example, police
can simply turn the phone off, take the
battery out, or copy the data before it gets
wiped clean.
In Wurie's case, police could have just
waited to get a warrant to search Wurie's
seized cell phone, the court held. There was
no need to go through the confiscated cell
phone before obtaining a warrant. With the
suspect under arrest, the evidence in this
case would have still been there safely at his
house.
As technology advances, our arrest and
warrant rules may need to be modified as
technology changes our lives. There's a huge
privacy concern when it comes to cell
phones, and this court recognized that.
The privacy concerns far outweigh the need
for police to search a seized cell phone
without a warrant. Cell phones are more like
our papers and effects protected under the
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Fourth Amendment. They carry a lot of
personal information that most of us
wouldn't even want our family members
looking at, let alone a police officer. Hence,
the utility of a password protection feature
that would have prevented police from
snooping so soon in Wurie's case.

warrantless cell phone searches are
unconstitutional just a few weeks ago.
However, four other federal circuit courts
have ruled in favor of searching a person's
cell phone after arrest, as the Associated
Press reported. It will be interesting to see if
and how the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh
in on this very private issue.

Police search of seized cell phones is an
important issue that affects most people. The
Florida Supreme Court found that
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Paroline v. U.S.
12-8561
Ruling Below: In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 2013 WL
497856 (U.S. 2013).
Following defendant's conviction for possession of material involving sexual exploitation of
children, child depicted in images requested restitution. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas denied the request. Child petitioned for writ of mandamus. A divided
panel initially refused petition, but on rehearing, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. In a
separate case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana awarded
restitution against defendant convicted of possession of child pornography. Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals vacated. Rehearing en banc was granted for both cases. The Fifth Circuit
held that: victim was limited to mandamus review; restitution statute was not subject to general
proximate cause requirement; and victim's petition for writ of mandamus would be granted.
Question Presented: What, if any, causal relationship or nexus between the defendant's conduct
and the victim's harm or damages must the government or the victim establish in order to recover
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259?

IN RE AMY UNKNOWN, Petitioner.
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Doyle Randall Paroline, Defendant–Appellee,
v.
Amy Unknown, Movant–Appellant.
United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Michael Wright, Defendant–Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on November 19, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GARZA, Circuit Judge
The original opinion in this matter was
issued by the en banc court on October 1,
2012. A petition for rehearing en banc is
currently pending before the en banc court.
The petition for rehearing en banc is granted

in part. Accordingly, we WITHDRAW our
previous opinion and replace it with the
following opinion.
The issue presented to the en banc court is
whether 18 U.S.C. § 2259 requires a district
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court to find that a defendant's criminal acts
proximately caused a crime victim's losses
before the district court may order
restitution, even though that statute only
contains a “proximate result” requirement in
§ 2259(b)(3)(F). All our sister circuits that
have addressed this question have expanded
the meaning of § 2259(b)(3)(F) to apply to
all losses under § 2259(b)(3), thereby
restricting the district court's award of
restitution to a victim's losses that were
proximately caused by a defendant's
criminal acts. A panel of this court rejected
that reading, and instead focused on § 2259's
plain language to hold that § 2259 does not
limit a victim's total recoverable losses to
those proximately resulting from a
defendant's conduct. A subsequent panel
applied that holding to another appeal, yet
simultaneously questioned it in a special
concurrence that mirrored the reasoning of
our sister circuits. To address the
discrepancy between the holdings of this and
other circuits, and to respond to the concerns
of our court's special concurrence, we
granted rehearing en banc and vacated the
panel opinions.
This en banc court holds that § 2259 only
imposes a proximate result requirement in §
2259(b)(3)(F); it does not require the
Government to show proximate cause to
trigger a defendant's restitution obligations
for the categories of losses in §
2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). Instead, with respect to
those categories, the plain language of the
statute dictates that a district court must
award restitution for the full amount of those
losses. We VACATE the district court's
judgment in United States v. Paroline, and
REMAND
for
further
proceedings

consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM
the district court's judgment in United States
v. Wright.
I
We review a set of appeals arising from two
separate criminal judgments issued by
different district courts within this circuit.
Both appeals involve restitution requests by
Amy, a young adult whose uncle sexually
abused her as a child, captured his acts on
film, and then distributed them for others to
see. The National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, which reports that it has
found at least 35,000 images of Amy's abuse
among the evidence in over 3,200 child
pornography cases since 1998, describes the
content of these images as “extremely
graphic.” The Government reports that
restitution has been ordered for Amy in at
least 174 child pornography cases across the
United States in amounts ranging from $100
to $3,543,471.
A
In the consolidated cases In re Amy and In
re Amy Unknown a panel of this court
reviewed Amy's mandamus petition and
appeal, both of which challenged the district
court's order denying Amy restitution in
connection with a criminal defendant's
sentence.
In the case underlying Amy's mandamus
petition and appeal, Doyle Paroline
(“Paroline”) pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2252
for possessing 150 to 300 images of minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. At
least two images were of Amy. Pursuant to
Amy's right to restitution under the Crime
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Victims' Rights Act the Government and
Amy moved the district court to order
restitution under § 2259. Amy supported this
request with her psychiatrist's report, which
itemized her future damages for specific
categories of treatment and estimated total
damages nearing $3.4 million.
The district court denied Amy restitution.
The district court held that § 2259 required
the Government to prove that by possessing
images depicting Amy's sexual abuse,
Paroline proximately caused the injuries for
which she sought restitution…. Amy
petitioned for mandamus, asking this court
to direct the district court to order Paroline
to pay her the full amount of the restitution
she had requested.
Over one dissent, that panel denied her relief
because it was not clear or indisputable that
§ 2259 mandates restitution irrespective of
proximate cause. Amy sought rehearing and
filed a separate notice of appeal from the
district court's restitution order; her
mandamus petition and appeal were
consolidated. The panel assigned to hear
Amy's appeal granted her rehearing request.
That panel then granted mandamus and
rejected a requirement of proof of proximate
cause in § 2259 because “[i]ncorporating a
proximate causation requirement where
none exists is a clear and indisputable error,”
but declined to reach the question of
whether crime victims such as Amy have a
right to an appeal. The panel remanded for
the district court's entry of a restitution
order.
B

In United States v. Wright, a separate panel
of this court heard the appeal of Michael
Wright (“Wright”). Like Paroline, Wright
pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for
possession of over 30,000 images of child
pornography, which included images of
Amy's abuse. The Government sought
restitution for Amy under § 2259,
supporting its request with the same
psychiatric report Amy provided in
Paroline's case. The district court awarded
Amy $529,661 in restitution, explaining that
“[t]his amount was reached by adding the
estimated costs of the victim's future
treatment and counseling at $512,681.00 and
the costs of the victim's expert witness fees
at $16,980.00.” The district court did not
explain why it awarded no restitution for the
other amounts that Amy had requested and
made no reference to a proximate cause
requirement. Observing that Amy had been
awarded restitution in another district court,
the district court further explained that “[t]he
restitution ordered herein is concurrent with
any other restitution order either already
imposed or to be imposed in the future
payable to this victim.” Wright appealed to
contest the restitution order.
The Wright panel first found that the appeal
waiver in Wright's plea agreement did not
foreclose his right to appeal the restitution
order. Then, applying Amy's holding, the
Wright panel concluded that Amy was
entitled to restitution but that the district
court had given inadequate reasons for the
award it assessed. The panel remanded for
further findings regarding the amount of the
award. The three members on the Wright
panel, however, joined a special concurrence
that questioned Amy's holding and
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suggested that the court rehear both cases en
banc, in part because this court was the first
circuit to hold that a proximate cause
requirement does not attach to the “full
amount of ... losses” under § 2259(b)(3).
This court held the mandates in both Amy
and Wright. A majority of this court's
members voted to rehear these opinions en
banc to resolve the question of how to award
restitution under § 2259 and to address other
related questions raised by these appeals.
II
In rehearing Amy and Wright en banc, we
address the following issues: (1) whether the
Crime Victims' Rights Act (“CVRA”) grants
crime victims a right to an appeal or, if not,
whether this court should review Amy's
mandamus petition under the standard this
court has applied to supervisory writs; (2)
whether 18 U.S.C. § 2259 requires the
Government to show a defendant's criminal
acts proximately caused a victim's injuries
before a district court may award restitution;
and (3) whether, in light of our holding with
respect to § 2259, the district courts in Amy
and Wright erred.
A
Amy petitioned for mandamus and, after this
court initially denied her relief, appealed
from the district court's restitution order. In
the panel opinion in Amy, this court granted
her mandamus on rehearing under our
traditional mandamus inquiry, which this
court held in In re Dean applies to appeals
under the CVRA. In Amy, the panel declined
to decide whether the CVRA entitled her to
bring a direct appeal, even though Dean

seemingly foreclosed that argument. Amy
asks the en banc court to construe the CVRA
to guarantee crime victims the right of
appeal and alternatively asks the court to
hear her mandamus petition under our
supervisory mandamus power, which would
hold her mandamus petition to a less
onerous standard of review than Dean
requires.
1
The CVRA grants crime victims, including
Amy, “[t]he right to full and timely
restitution as provided in law,” and makes
explicit
that
crime
victims,
their
representatives, and the Government may
move the district court to enforce that right.
The CVRA further commands that “[i]n any
court proceeding involving an offense
against a crime victim, the court shall ensure
that the crime victim is afforded [this
right].” Where a district court denies a
victim relief, the CVRA provides that
[T]he movant may petition the court of
appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court
of appeals may issue the writ on the order of
a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
court of appeals shall take up and decide
such application forthwith within 72 hours
after the petition has been filed.
The CVRA further grants the Government,
“[i]n any appeal in a criminal case,” the
authority to “assert as error the district
court's denial of any crime victim's right in
the proceeding to which the appeal relates,”
and makes clear that “[n]othing in this
chapter shall be construed to impair the
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prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney
General or any officer under his direction.”
Amy's argument effectively requires us to
address two questions: first, whether the
CVRA entitles crime victims to an appeal;
and second, whether the CVRA entitles
crime victims' mandamus petitions through
the review standards governing an appeal.
First, we observe that the plain text of the
CVRA expressly grants crime victims only a
right to mandamus relief and makes no
mention of any right of crime victims to an
appeal. In contrast, the CVRA grants the
Government the right to mandamus while
also retaining the Government's right to a
direct appeal. In interpreting the statute,
absent contrary indication, we presume that
Congress “legislated against the background
of our traditional legal concepts,” including
that crime victims have no right to appeal.
Amy fails to show any language in the
statute that reflects Congress' intent to
depart from this principle…. The cases Amy
cites are unconvincing. They allowed nonparties to appeal discrete pre-trial issues
with constitutional implications, which were
unrelated to the merits of the criminal cases
from which they arose…. Because nothing
in the CVRA suggests that Congress
intended to grant crime victims the right to
an appeal or otherwise vary the historical
rule that crime victims do not have the right
of appeal, we conclude that the CVRA
grants crime victims only mandamus review.
Next, we consider whether the CVRA
nonetheless requires appellate courts to
apply the standard of review governing a
direct criminal appeal to mandamus
petitions, and conclude it does not. When

assessing the meaning of the term
“mandamus” in the CVRA, we presume that
this “statutory term ... ha[s] its common-law
meaning,” absent contrary indication. The
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he
remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be
invoked only in extraordinary situations.” …
Certain aspects of the CVRA convince us
that Congress intended mandamus in its
traditional sense when it selected the word
“mandamus.”
Reading
the
statute's
provisions together, the CVRA seems to
intentionally limit victims' right to review as
an extraordinary remedy because it
authorizes review only where a district court
fails to fulfill a statutory duty; the statute
does not extend victims' right to review to
situations where a district court acts on a
discretionary matter. To explain, the CVRA
lists eight rights that it ensures crime
victims, including the right to restitution.
The restrictive statement, “A crime victim
has the following rights,” precedes the list of
those rights and supports the conclusion that
the CVRA's grant of rights is exclusive….
Under this reading, only the Government
would retain a right to appeal even
seemingly discretionary actions, and could
elect to appeal the district court's order to
the extent it exercises its own prosecutorial
discretion to do so. If we were to instead
read the CVRA as extending a right of
appeal to victims, we would expand the
rights granted to crime victims and
simultaneously erode the CVRA's attempt to
preserve the Government's discretion….
The very short timeline in which appellate
courts must act, and the fact that a single
circuit judge may rule on a petition, confirm
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the conclusion that Congress intended to
limit crime victims’ appellate relief under
the CVRA to traditional mandamus review.
These requirements reflect that appellate
courts must grant relief quickly, but rarely,
as “a drastic remedy generally reserved for
really ‘extraordinary’ cases.”
Amy has failed to show that Congress
intended to grant crime victims anything
other than traditional mandamus relief under
the CVRA. While, as Amy insists, it may be
more difficult for a crime victim to enforce
rights through mandamus than appeal, this
limitation reflects the express language of
the statute and honors the common law
tradition in place when the CVRA was
drafted.
2
…
Because we hold that the CVRA entitles
Amy to only mandamus relief, we dismiss
her appeal. Under our traditional mandamus
inquiry, we will grant Amy's requested
mandamus only if (1) she has no other
adequate means to attain the desired relief;
(2) she has demonstrated a clear and
indisputable right to the issuance of a writ;
and (3) in the exercise of our discretion, we
are satisfied that the writ is appropriate.
B
Wright appeals from the district court's
restitution order. This court reviews the
legality of the restitution order de novo. If
the restitution order is legally permitted, we
then review the amount of the order for an
abuse of discretion.

III
To resolve Amy's mandamus petition and
Wright's appeal, we must first ascertain the
level of proof required to award restitution
to Amy and crime victims like her under 18
U.S.C. § 2259. The parties' dispute turns on
the interpretation and effect of the words
“proximate result” in § 2259(b)(3)(F).
A
Our analysis again begins with the text of
the statute. If § 2259's language is plain, our
“sole function” is to “enforce it according to
its terms” so long as “the disposition
required by the text is not absurd.” The
Supreme Court has explained that
“[s]tatutory construction ‘is a holistic
endeavor.’ ” …
Only after we apply principles of statutory
construction, including the canons of
construction, and conclude that the statute is
ambiguous, may we consult legislative
history. For statutory language to be
ambiguous, however, it must be susceptible
to more than one reasonable interpretation or
more than one accepted meaning. …
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 2259 reflects a
broad restitutionary purpose. Section
2259(a) mandates that district courts “shall
order restitution for any offense under this
chapter,” including the offense to which
Paroline and Wright pled guilty. Section
2259(b)(1) specifies that a restitution order
“shall direct the defendant to pay the victim
... the full amount of the victim's losses.”
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Section 2259(b)(3) defines the term “the full
amount of the victim's losses,” contained in
§ 2259(b)(1), as
[A]ny costs incurred by the victim for—
(A) medical services relating to physical,
psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or
rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary
housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys' fees, as well as other costs
incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as
a proximate result of the offense.
Section 2259(b)(4) reinforces that “[t]he
issuance of a restitution order under this
section is mandatory,” and instructs that “[a]
court may not decline to issue an order
under this section because of—(i) the
economic circumstances of the defendant; or
(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled
to, receive compensation for his or her
injuries from the proceeds of insurance or
any other source.” …
B
The district court in Paroline rejected Amy's
argument that § 2259 requires an award of
“the full amount of [her] losses.” Instead,
resorting to the Supreme Court's decision in
Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v.
Mor, which explained that “[w]hen several
words are followed by a clause which is
applicable as much to the first and other
words as to the last, the natural construction
of the language demands that the clause be
read as applicable to all,” the district court

extended the “proximate result” language
contained in § 2259(b)(3)(F) to apply to the
losses described in subsections (A) through
(E). In construing the statute, the district
court expressed its concern that “a
restitution order under section 2259 that is
not limited to losses proximately caused by
the defendant's conduct would under most
facts, including these, violate the Eighth
Amendment,” and that an alternative
“interpretation would be plainly inconsistent
with how the principles of restitution and
causation have historically been applied.” In
reversing the district court's holding, the
Amy panel rejected a generalized proximate
cause requirement and stressed that the
causation requirement in the definition of
“victim,” together with § 3664's mechanism
for joint and several liability, surmounts any
Eighth Amendment concerns.
Unlike the district court in Paroline, the
Wright district court seemed to accept
Amy's argument to a limited degree, as it
awarded all of the restitution she requested
for her future treatment and counseling, and
the costs of her expert witness fees.
Although the Wright panel accepted Amy's
holding as binding precedent in reviewing
the district court's restitution award,
Wright's special concurrence, tracing the
reasoning of the district court in Amy and
challenging the panel's decision not to limit
§ 2259 to damages proximately caused by a
defendant's criminal actions, presaged this
en banc rehearing.
In this en banc rehearing, Amy maintains
that § 2259 is a mandatory statute requiring
district courts to award full restitution to
victims of child pornography. In her view,
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the plain language of the statute dictates that
the proximate result language in §
2259(b)(3)(F) is limited to that category of
losses and does not apply to the categories
of losses described in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E).
The Government contends that § 2259(b)(3)
conditions all of a victim's recoverable
losses on a showing that those losses
proximately resulted from the offense.
Drawing on Porto Rico Railway, the
Government asserts that the statutory text
reflects Congress' intent to condition all
recoverable losses on a showing of
proximate cause. Without citing to
precedent, the Government urges us “to
presume that Congress adhered to the usual
balance in the law of remedies: to hold
defendants fully accountable for the losses
associated with their conduct but in a
manner that respects the deeply-rooted
principle of proximate causation.”…
Paroline similarly construes the “proximate
result” language in the statute and relies on
the construction of other restitution statutes
to support his position. Both Paroline and
Wright draw on legislative materials to
assert that in drafting § 2259, Congress
intended to incorporate a proximate cause
requirement.
C
1
Our plain reading of § 2259 leads us to the
following conclusion: Once a district court
determines that a person is a victim, that is,
an “individual harmed as a result of a
commission of a crime” under the chapter
that relates to the sexual exploitation and

abuse of children, § 2259 requires the
district court to order restitution for that
victim. The restitution order that follows
must encompass “the full amount of the
victim's losses.” Those losses include five
categories of specific losses—medical
services related to physical, psychiatric, or
psychological
care;
physical
and
occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
necessary transportation, temporary housing,
and childcare expenses; lost income; and
attorney's fees and costs—and one category
of “other losses suffered by the victim as a
proximate result of the offense.” The rule of
the last antecedent, recently applied by the
Supreme Court in Barnhart v. Thomas,
instructs that “a limiting clause or phrase,”
such as the “proximate result” phrase in §
2259(b)(3)(F), “should ordinarily be read as
modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows.” …
a
First, the Government, Paroline, Wright, and
Judge Davis's dissenting opinion press the
importance of Porto Rico Railway and other
caselaw relied on by the district court. As
did the Amy panel, however, we doubt
Porto Rico Railway's applicability here.
Porto Rico Railway concerned the following
statute: “Said District Court shall have
jurisdiction of all controversies where all of
the parties on either side of the controversy
are citizens or subjects of a foreign state or
states, or citizens of a state, territory, or
district of the United States not domiciled in
Porto Rico ....” … The Supreme Court
explained, “When several words are
followed by a clause which is applicable as
much to the first and other words as to the
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last, the natural construction of the language
demands that the clause be read as
applicable to all.”
Deprived of its context, Porto Rico
Railway's rule can be contorted to support
the statutory interpretation urged by the
Government and apply the “proximate
result” language in § 2259(b)(3)(F) to the
five categories of loss that precede it. But
applying that rule here to require generalized
proximate cause would disregard that the list
in Porto Rico Railway's statute is
significantly different than the one central to
this appeal. … The Supreme Court
expressed its concern that a different
construction would have left the reader with
a fragmented phrase, which would be overly
broad in application, and which, in turn,
would have failed to satisfy the statute's
overarching purpose to curtail federal courts'
jurisdiction.
Section 2259, in contrast, begins with an
introductory phrase composed of a noun and
verb (“ ‘full amount of the victim's losses'
includes any costs incurred by the victim
for—”) that feeds into a list of six items,
each of which are independent objects that
complete the phrase. …Of course, we do not
sit “as a panel of grammarians,” but we
cannot ignore that “the meaning of a statute
will typically heed the commands of its
punctuation.”
The
structural
and
grammatical differences between § 2259 and
the statute in Porto Rico Railway forcefully
counsel against applying Porto Rico
Railway to the current statute to reach the
Paroline district court's reading.

Seatrain, the other case relied on by the
district court, is similarly inapplicable. …
At least three circuits agree that under rules
of statutory construction, we cannot read the
“proximate result” language in §
2259(b)(3)(F) as applying to the categories
of losses in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). But we do
not ignore that other circuits have used tools
of statutory construction to conclude that the
proximate result language in § 2259(b)(3)(F)
applies to the five categories of loss that
preceded it. These circuits, however,
reached this conclusion for reasons we do
not find compelling. …
b
Next, we consider the Government's
assertion that principles of tort liability limit
the award of restitution under § 2259 to
losses proximately caused by a defendant's
criminal actions. At least three of our sister
circuits have accepted this view and derived
a proximate cause requirement not from “the
catch-all provision of § 2259(b)(3)(F), but
rather [from] traditional principles of tort
and criminal law and [from] § 2259(c)'s
definition of ‘victim’ as an individual
harmed ‘as a result’ of the defendant's
offense.”
In United States v. Monzel, a case that has
served as a springboard for other circuits
evaluating § 2259, the D.C. Circuit
explained that “[i]t is a bedrock rule of both
tort and criminal law that a defendant is only
liable for harms he proximately caused,” and
“a
restitution
statute
[presumably]
incorporates the traditional requirement of
proximate cause unless there is good reason
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to think Congress intended the requirement
not to apply.” The D.C. court posited that
“[a]lthough § 2259 is a criminal statute, it
functions much like a tort statute by
directing the court to make a victim whole
for losses caused by the responsible party,”
and found nothing in the text of § 2259
indicating Congress' intent to eliminate “the
ordinary requirement of proximate cause.”
Rather, “[b]y defining ‘victim’ as a person
harmed ‘as a result of’ the defendant's
offense,' ” the court inferred that “the statute
invokes the standard rule that a defendant is
liable only for harms that he proximately
caused.” The D.C. Circuit worried that
without such a limitation, “liability would
attach to all sorts of injuries a defendant
might indirectly cause, no matter how
‘remote’ or tenuous the causal connection.”
… The D.C. Circuit criticized this court's
decision in Amy because “a ‘general’
causation requirement without a subsidiary
proximate causation requirement is hardly a
requirement at all”; “[s]o long as the victim's
injury would not have occurred but for the
defendant's offense, the defendant would be
liable for the injury.” … We do not accept
this reasoning, however, and refuse to inject
the statute with a proximate cause
requirement based on traditional principles
of liability.
The Supreme Court has explained that we
“ordinarily” should “resist reading words or
elements into a statute that do not appear on
its face.” But the Supreme Court has also
explained that the absence of certain
language in a statute does not necessarily
mean that Congress intended courts to

disregard traditional background principles.
…
In interpreting the omission of intent in a
different statute, the Supreme Court
cautioned that “far more than the simple
omission of the appropriate phrase from the
statutory definition [of the offense] is
necessary to justify dispensing with” a mens
rea requirement.
…In assessing whether Congress intended a
broad proximate cause limitation, we cannot
ignore that § 2259 expresses causal
requirements, yet isolates them to two
discrete points: the definition of victim as an
“individual harmed as a result of a
commission of a crime,” and the limitation
of “any other losses” to those that are the
“proximate result of the offense.” Had
Congress omitted all causal language and
not required award of the full amount of
losses, or positioned the proximate result
language so that it would apply to all
categories of losses, we could consider the
possibility that Congress intended to bind all
categories of losses with a proximate cause
requirement. Instead, Congress resisted
using the phrase “proximate cause”
anywhere in § 2259, including §
2259(b)(3)(F) and further required the court
to order the “full amount of the victim's
losses.” …
This interpretation does not render the
statute unworkable. The problem seeming to
animate the cases in other circuits
interpreting § 2259 to require proximate
cause is how to allocate responsibility for a
victim's harm to any single defendant. These
courts ignore, however, that deciding that a
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defendant “must pay restitution for the
losses he caused (whether proximately or
not),” does not resolve how the court
“determines how those losses should be
allocated in cases where more than one
offender caused them”—injecting the statute
with traditional proximate causation
limitations takes courts no closer to
determining what each defendant must pay
or to supplying crime victims with the “full
amount of [their] losses.” By focusing on the
question of proximate cause, our sister
circuits have not made § 2259 any easier to
apply and seemingly have ignored that §
2259 has armed courts with tools to award
restitution because it instructs courts to refer
to the standards under § 3664.
….
Any fears that Amy and victims like her
might be overcompensated through the use
of joint and several liability, as expressed
under § 3664(h), are unwarranted. The use
of joint and several liability does not mean
that Amy may “recover more than her total
loss: [rather,] once she collects the full
amount of her losses from one defendant,
she can no longer recover from any other.”
Section 3664 provides “reasonable means”
to
defend
against
any theoretical
overcompensation that could result. First, if
Amy recovers the full amount of her losses
from defendants, the Government and
defendant may use this information to
ensure that Amy does not seek further
awards of restitution. Second, § 3664(k)
suggests a means for ending defendants'
existing joint and several restitution
obligations once Amy receives the full

amount of her losses; it allows for a district
court, “on its own motion, or the motion of
any party, including the victim, [to] adjust
the payment schedule, or require immediate
payment in full, as the interests of justice
require.” …
c
Next, the Government asserts that not
restricting the recovery of losses by
proximate cause produces an absurd result—
constitutional implications that could be
avoided if we were to read § 2259 as
requiring proximate causation with respect
to all categories of losses. Specifically, the
Government is concerned that without a
proximate cause limitation, § 2259 could be
challenged on the ground that it subjects a
defendant to excessive punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.
…The Government posits that by giving
effect to the statute's plain text, this court
could cause Eighth Amendment problems
similar to that expressed by a recent
Supreme Court case involving criminal
forfeiture: Where criminal forfeiture “would
be grossly disproportional to the gravity of
[an] offense,” the Supreme Court held that it
would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.
First, we are not persuaded that restitution is
a punishment subject to the same Eighth
Amendment limits as criminal forfeiture. Its
purpose is remedial, not punitive. Even so,
restricting the “proximate result” language
to the catchall category in which it appears
does not open the door to grossly
disproportionate restitution in a way that
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would violate the Eighth Amendment….
Fears over excessive punishment are
misplaced.
Any concern that individual defendants may
bear a greater restitutionary burden than
others convicted of possessing the same
victim's images, moreover, does not
implicate the Eighth Amendment or threaten
to create an absurd result. Restitution is not
tied to the defendant's gain; rather “so long
as the government proved that the victim
suffered the actual loss that the defendant
has been ordered to pay, the restitution is
proportional.” …
The court, moreover, can ameliorate the
impact of joint and several liability on an
individual defendant by establishing a
payment schedule that corresponds to the
defendant's ability to pay.
Ultimately, while the imposition of full
restitution may appear harsh, it is not grossly
disproportionate to the crime of receiving
and possessing child pornography. In light
of restitution's remedial nature, § 2259's
built-in causal requirements, and the
mechanisms described under § 3664, we do
not see any Eighth Amendment concerns
here or any other absurd results that our
plain reading produces.
2
Accordingly, we hold that § 2259 requires a
district court to engage in a two-step inquiry
to award restitution where it determines that
§ 2259 applies. First, the district court must
determine whether a person seeking
restitution is a crime victim under § 2259—
that is, “the individual harmed as a result of

a commission of a crime under this chapter.”
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“[t]he distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children,” and this court has elaborated that
“children depicted in child pornography may
be considered to be the victims of the crime
of receiving child pornography.” This logic
applies with equal force to defendants who
possess child pornography: By possessing,
receiving,
and
distributing
child
pornography, defendants collectively create
the demand that fuels the creation of the
abusive images. Thus, where a defendant is
convicted of possessing, receiving, or
distributing child pornography, a person is a
victim under this definition if the images the
defendant possesses, receives, or distributes
include those of that individual.
Second, the district court must ascertain the
full amount of the victim's losses as defined
under § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(F), limiting only §
2259(b)(3)(F) by the proximate result
language contained in that subsection, and
craft an order guided by the mechanisms
described in § 3664, with a particular focus
on its mechanism for joint and several
liability.
IV
Having resolved this important issue of
statutory interpretation, we apply our
holding to Amy's mandamus and Wright's
appeal.
A
Under our traditional mandamus inquiry, we
will grant Amy's petition for mandamus if
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(1) she has no other adequate means to attain
the desired relief; (2) she has demonstrated a
clear and indisputable right to the issuance
of a writ; and (3) in the exercise of our
discretion, we are satisfied that the writ is
appropriate in these circumstances. As the
Supreme Court has noted, the “hurdles”
limiting use of mandamus, “however
demanding, are not insuperable.”
We easily conclude that the first prong is
met. Because we have held that the CVRA
limits crime victims' relief to the mandamus
remedy, Amy has no other means for
obtaining review of the district court's
decision not to order restitution. We are also
satisfied that a writ is appropriate in these
circumstances: The CVRA expressly
authorizes mandamus, and awarding
restitution would satisfy § 2259's broad
restitutionary purpose. Next, we conclude
that Amy has a “clear and indisputable”
right to restitution in light of our holding
today. First, Amy is a “victim” under §
2259(c). Paroline possessed at least two of
her images, and his possession of those
images partly formed the basis of his
conviction. Amy, as an “individual harmed
as a result of [Paroline's] commission of a
crime” falling within § 2259's scope, is thus
a victim under § 2259. Because Amy is a
victim, § 2259 required the district court to
award her restitution for the “full amount of
[her] losses” as defined under § 2259(b)(3).
Because the district court awarded Amy
nothing, it therefore clearly and indisputably
erred. No matter what discretion the district
court possessed and no matter how
confounding the district court found § 2259,
it was not free to leave Amy with nothing.

On remand, the district court must enter a
restitution order reflecting the “full amount
of [Amy's] losses” in light of our holdings
today.
B
Turning to Wright's appeal, Amy is eligible
for restitution as a “victim” of Wright's
crime of possessing images of her abuse for
the same reasons she is eligible as a victim
of Paroline's crime. It was therefore legal for
the district court to order restitution to Amy.
As such, Wright's appeal necessarily focuses
on the amount of the district court's
restitution award, which we review for an
abuse of discretion. The district court
awarded Amy $529,661 by adding Amy's
estimated future counseling costs to the
value of her expert witness fees. The district
court did not explain why Wright should not
be required to pay for any of the other losses
Amy requested, and the record does not
otherwise disclose why the district court
reduced the Government's full request on
Amy's behalf. While the district court erred
in failing to award Amy the full amount of
her losses, because the Government did not
appeal Wright's sentence and Amy did not
seek mandamus review, under Greenlaw v.
United States, we must affirm Wright's
sentence.
V
For the reasons above, we reject the
approach of our sister circuits and hold that
§ 2259 imposes no generalized proximate
cause requirement before a child
pornography victim may recover restitution
from a defendant possessing images of her
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abuse. We AFFIRM the district court in
United States v. Wright. We VACATE the
district court's judgment in United States v.
Paroline, and REMAND for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part in the judgment:
I respectfully concur in the majority
opinion's decision that the CVRA does not
grant crime victims a right to a direct appeal
from a district court's rejection of her claim
for restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259; that
the CVRA grants crime victims only a right
to seek traditional mandamus review; and
that the CVRA grants the government the
right to seek mandamus and to retain its
right to a direct appeal.
I further agree with the majority that neither
the Government nor the victim is required to
prove that the victim's losses defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E) were a
proximate result of the defendant's crime; it
is only “any other loss suffered by the
victim” that must be proved to be “a
proximate result of the offense.” Section
2259(c) defines “victim” as an “individual
harmed as a result of a commission of a
crime under this chapter,” but it does not
require a showing that the victim's losses
included in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E) be a
“proximate result of the offense.” From this,
I infer that the statute places only a slight
burden on the victim or the government to
show that the victim's losses or harms
enumerated in those subsections plausibly
resulted from the offense. Once that
showing has been made, in my view, a
presumption arises that those enumerated

losses were the proximate result of the
offense, which the defendant may rebut with
sufficient relevant and admissible evidence.
Finally, I agree with the majority's
conclusion that where a defendant is
convicted of possessing child pornography,
a person is a victim under the statute if the
images include those of that individual. In
these cases, I agree that the government and
the victim have made a sufficient showing,
unrebutted by the defendant, that the victim
is entitled to restitution of losses falling
under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E).
Therefore, I concur in that part of the
majority's judgment that vacates the district
courts' judgments and remands the cases to
them for further proceedings.
In remanding, however, I would simply
direct the district courts to proceed to issue
and enforce the restitution orders in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3664 and
3663A, as required by § 2259(b)(2)….
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by KING, JERRY E. SMITH and
GRAVES, Circuit Judges:
I agree with my colleagues in the majority
that we should grant mandamus in In re Amy
and remand for entry of a restitution award.
I also agree that we should vacate the award
entered in Wright and remand for further
consideration on the amount of the award.
The devil is in the details, however, and I
disagree with most of the majority's
analysis.
I disagree with my colleagues in the
majority in two major respects:
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1. Although I conclude that the proximate
cause proof required by the restitution
statutes can be satisfied in these cases, I
disagree with the majority that the statute
authorizes restitution without any proof that
the violation proximately caused the victim's
losses.
2. I agree with the majority that the district
court must enter a restitution award against
every offender convicted of possession of
the victim's pornographic image; but I
disagree with the majority that in cases such
as these two, where the offenses of multiple
violators contribute to the victim's damages,
the district court must enter an award against
each offender for the full amount of the
victim's losses. No other circuit that has
addressed this issue has adopted such a one
size fits all rule for the restitution feature of
the sentence of an offender. Other circuits
have given the district courts discretion to
assess the amount of the restitution the
offender is ordered to pay.
I.
THE STATUTES
At bottom, this is a statutory interpretation
case, and I begin with a consideration of the
structure and language of the statutes at
issue that facially belie the majority's
position that victims may be awarded
restitution for losses not proximately caused
by offense conduct. Section 2259
specifically governs mandatory restitution
awards for crimes related to the sexual
exploitation and abuse of children. A
number of provisions in the statute make it
clear that proof of a causal connection is

required between the offenses and the
victim's losses.
Section 2259(b)(2) expressly incorporates
the general restitution procedures of 18
U.S.C. § 3664 and states that “[a]n order of
restitution under this section shall be issued
and enforced in accordance with section
3664 in the same manner as an order under
section 3663A.” Section 3664(e) states that
“[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount
of the loss sustained by a victim as a result
of the offense shall be on the attorney for the
Government.”
This language requiring proof of causation
from § 3664(e) is consistent with the
language defining “victim” found in §
2259(c), who is defined as “the individual
harmed as a result of a commission of crime
under this chapter....”
Section 2259(a) states that the court “shall
order restitution for any offense under this
chapter.” Section 2259(b)(3) states that the
victim's losses are defined as those suffered
by the victim “as a proximate result of the
offense.” …
In interpreting [§ 2259(b)(3)] we should
follow the fundamental canon of statutory
construction established by the Supreme
Court in Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power
Co. v. Mor. In that case, the Court held that
“[w]hen several words are followed by a
clause which is applicable as much to the
first and other words as to the last, the
natural construction of the language
demands that the clause be read as
applicable to all.” Applying this cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation, I conclude
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that subsection (F)'s “as a proximate result
of the offense” language applies equally to
the previous five subcategories of losses,
(A) through (E). …
In contrast, the majority concludes that once
the district court determines that a person is
a victim (an individual harmed as a result of
an offense under § 2259) the district court
must order restitution without further proof
of causation.
The majority's reading of § 2259(b)(3) is
patently inconsistent with the rule of
statutory interpretation announced in Porto
Rico Railway, which makes it clear that the
clause should be read to apply to all
categories of loss. My conclusion that Porto
Rico Railway's rule of interpretation applies
in this case is made even clearer when we
consider the multiple references in the
statutes discussed above expressly reflecting
Congressional intent to require proof of
causation….
Other circuits have used different analyses
but all circuits to confront this issue have
interpreted the statute as using a proximate
causation standard connecting the offense to
the losses. This circuit is the only circuit that
has interpreted § 2259 and concluded that
proximate cause is not required by the
statute.
For the above reasons, I conclude that the
statutes at issue require proof that the
defendant's offense conduct proximately
caused the victim's losses before a
restitution award can be entered as part of
the defendant's sentence.
II.

CAUSATION
In cases such as the two cases before this
court where the conduct of multiple
offenders collectively causes the victim's
damages, I would follow the position
advocated by the Government and adopted
by the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit to
establish the proximate cause element
required by § 2259. Under this “collective
causation” theory, it is not necessary to
measure the precise damages each of the
over 100 offenders caused. As the First
Circuit in Kearney stated: “Proximate cause
exists where the tortious conduct of multiple
actors has combined to bring about harm,
even if the harm suffered by the plaintiff
might be the same if one of the numerous
tortfeasors had not committed the tort.” The
court relied on the following statement of
the rule from Prosser and Keeton:
When the conduct of two or more actors
is so related to an event that their
combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is
a but-for cause of the event, and
application of the but-for rule to each of
them individually would absolve all of
them, the conduct of each is a cause in
fact of the event.
The court explained further:
Proximate cause therefore exists on the
aggregate level, and there is no reason to
find it lacking on the individual level.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has
recognized this: causation exits even
where “none of the alternative causes is
sufficient by itself, but together they are
sufficient” to cause the harm.
I agree with the Government and the First
and Fourth Circuits that this definition of
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proximate cause is appropriate in this
context and under this standard the causation
requirement in both cases before us is
satisfied.
III.
AMOUNT OF THE AWARD
The most difficult issue in these cases—
where multiple violators combine to cause
horrendous damage to a young victim—is
establishing some standards to guide the
district court in setting an appropriate
restitution award for the single offender
before the court.
I agree that Amy is a victim in both cases
before us. Defendant Paroline (in In re Amy)
and defendant Wright possessed Amy's
pornographic images and the statute requires
the court to enter an award against them.
I agree that Amy is entitled to a restitution
award from all of her offenders in a sum that
is equal to the amount of her total losses.
But in cases such as these where multiple
violators have contributed to the victim's
losses and only one of those violators is
before the court, I disagree that the court
must always enter an award against that
single violator for the full amount of the
victim's losses. I agree that § 3664(h) gives
the court the option in the appropriate case
of entering an award against a single
defendant for the full amount of the victim's
losses even though other offenders
contributed to these losses. I also agree that
in that circumstance the defendant can seek
contribution from other offenders jointly
liable for the losses. We have allowed such

contribution claims in analogous non-sex
offender cases.
In concluding that an award for the full
amount of the victim's losses is required the
majority relies on § 3664(h) which provides:
If the court finds that more than 1 defendant
has contributed to the loss of a victim, the
court may make each defendant liable for
payment of the full amount of restitution or
may apportion liability among the
defendants to reflect the level of
contribution to the victim's loss and
economic circumstances of each defendant.
The majority simply ignores the second
clause in § 3664(h) emphasized above. That
subsection plainly gives the court the option
of either (1) assessing a restitution award
against the single defendant in an amount
that is equal to the victim's total losses or (2)
apportioning liability among the defendants
to reflect each defendant's level of
contribution to the victim's loss taking into
consideration a number of factors including
the economic circumstances of each
defendant. It would be surprising if
Congress had not given courts this option.
After all, restitution is part of the defendant's
criminal sentence and § 3664(h), consistent
with sentencing principles generally, gives
the sentencing judge discretion to fix the
sentence based on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the defendant's
circumstances, background, and nature of
his conduct. …
I agree with the majority that the defendants
in both cases before us having been
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252
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must be ordered to pay restitution to Amy.
We should leave the calculation of the
appropriate award against each defendant to
the district court in the first instance. I
would give the district court the following
general guidelines:
The court must recognize that Amy's losses
are an aggregation of the acts of the person
who abused and filmed her assault, those
who distributed and redistributed her
images, and those who possessed those
images. The culpability and liability for
restitution of any one defendant regarding
Amy's loss is dependent at least in part on
the role that defendant played with respect
to her exploitation.
The court should first compute the victim's
probable future losses based on evidence of
the damages she will likely incur from the
date of the defendant's offense conduct into
the foreseeable future. The court should
consider all items of damage listed in §
2259(b)(3) as well as any other losses
suffered by the defendant related to the
conduct of the violators of this chapter….
The district court is not required to justify
any award with absolute precision, but the
amount of the award must have a factual
predicate. In determining whether it should
cast the single defendant before it for the
total amount of the victim's losses or in
fixing the amount of a smaller award the
court should consider all relevant facts
including without limitation the following:
1. The egregiousness of the defendant's
conduct including whether he was involved
in the physical abuse of this victim or other

victims, and whether he attempted to make
personal contact with victims whose images
he viewed or possessed.
2. For defendants who possessed images of
the victim, consider the number of images
he possessed and viewed, and whether the
defendant circulated or re-circulated those
images to others.
3. The financial means of the defendant and
his ability to satisfy an award.
4. The court may consider using the
$150,000 liquidated civil damage award
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2255 or a
percentage thereof as a guide in fixing the
amount of the award.
5. The court may also consider as a guide
awards made in similar cases in this circuit
and other circuits.
6. Any other facts relevant to the defendant's
level of contribution to the victim's loss and
economic circumstances of the defendant.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In summary, I would grant mandamus and
vacate the judgment in In re Amy and
remand that case to the district court to enter
an award consistent with the principles
outlined above. I would also vacate the
judgment in Wright and remand for entry of
judgment consistent with the above
guidelines.
LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK,
Judge, dissenting:

Circuit
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We are confronted with a statute that does
not provide clear answers. I join others in
suggesting it would be useful for Congress
“to reconsider whether § 2259 is the best
system for compensating the victims of child
pornography offenses.” The goal is clear:
providing meaningful restitution to victims
of these crimes. How to order restitution in
individual cases in light of that goal is a
difficult question.
Our task today is to effectuate the scheme
according to the congressional design as best
as we can discern it. Both of the other
opinions have ably undertaken this difficult
task. I agree with Judge Davis that this
circuit should not chart a solitary course that
rejects a causation requirement. The reasons
why I believe the statute requires causation
are different than he expresses, though. I
agree with the majority, relying on the lastantecedent rule, that the phrase “as a
proximate result of the offense” that is in
Section 2259(b)(3)(F) only modifies the
category of loss described in (F).
Though I agree with the majority in that
respect, I find persuasive the reasoning of
the Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits that
causation “is a deeply rooted principle in
both tort and criminal law that Congress did
not abrogate when it drafted § 2259.” …
True, the positioning of the phrase
“proximate result” solely within subsection
(F) could be a sign that Congress meant to
eliminate causation for damages falling
under subsections (A)-(E). Any such
implication is thoroughly defeated, though,
by other provisions of the statute. First, as
the D.C. Circuit has recognized, Section

2259 calls for restitution to go to a “victim”
of these crimes, a term defined as “the
individual harmed as a result of a
commission of a crime under this chapter.”
Second, the statute directs that an order of
restitution should be issued and enforced “in
the same manner as an order under section
3663A.” …
I understand the contours of this proximatecause requirement in much the same manner
as does Judge Davis, including his analysis
of “collective causation.” I also agree that
the option of “apportion[ing] liability among
the defendants to reflect the level of
contribution to the victim's loss and
economic circumstances of each defendant”
belies the majority's notion that each case
calls for an award equal to the total loss
incurred by a victim. Yet by making
restitution “mandatory” for all these crimes
of exploitation, including possession and
distribution of child pornography, Congress
made its “goal of ensuring that victims
receive full compensation” plain.
Awards must therefore reflect the need to
make whole the victims of these offenses.
As Amy's suffering illustrates, the
“distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children.” They constitute an indelible
“record of the children's participation and
the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation.”
In light of the unique nature of prosecutions
for child pornography and the clear
congressional intent to maximize awards,
any doubts about the proper amount of
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restitution should be resolved in favor of the
child. This concern is largely a matter of a
difference of emphasis from the views
expressed by Judge Davis. I am concerned
that his emphasis on the discretion of a
district court, though clearly that discretion
exists and can be exercised under the terms
of Section 3664, tends towards accepting
inappropriately low, even nominal awards. I
would not accept that a forward-looking
estimate of the number of future defendants
and awards should be used to estimate a
percentage of overall liability to be assigned
a particular defendant. That puts too much
weight on the interests of the defendants.
Over-compensation
is
an
unlikely
eventuality. Were it to occur, then at that

point district courts might be able to shift to
evening up contributions among past and
future defendants.
In summary, proximate cause must be
shown and the principle of aggregate
causation is the method for proving its
existence. By statute, district courts can
award all damages to each defendant but
also have discretion to make lesser awards if
properly explained. This means that I agree
with requiring additional proceedings as to
both defendants, but disagree that each
district court is required to impose a
restitution award of the full amount of
damages.
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“Supreme Court Takes Up Case on Child Porn Victim Restitution”
Huffington Post
Mark Sherman
June 27, 2013
The Supreme Court said Thursday it will
take up a case about when victims of child
pornography can recover money from
people convicted of viewing their abuse.
The justices agreed to review a question that
has divided lower courts: Must there be a
link between the crime of viewing child
pornography and the victims' injuries before
victims are entitled to restitution?
A woman identified as Amy is seeking
financial payments from Texas resident
Doyle Randall Paroline, who pleaded guilty
to possessing between 150 and 300 images
of child pornography on his computer. Amy
was among the girls depicted.

sexually abused her and widely circulated
images of the abuse, according to court
records. The National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children said it has found at
least 35,000 images of Amy's abuse in more
than 3,200 child pornography cases since
1998.
In at least 174 cases, Amy has been awarded
restitution in amounts ranging from $100 to
more than $3.5 million. She has collected
more than $1.5 million, one of her attorneys
has said.

Amy is seeking more than $3.3 million from
Paroline to cover the cost of her lost income,
attorneys' fees and psychological care.

In another case involving Amy and a second
woman, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco threw out a
restitution order because it found there was
not a sufficient link between a man
convicted of possessing child pornography
and the women.

Last year, the full 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in New Orleans said in a 10-5
decision that victims do not have to show a
link between the crime and their injuries.

That is why Amy's lawyers also urged the
Supreme Court to hear Paroline's appeal, in
an effort to resolve the split among federal
judges.

Amy, now her early 20s and living in
Pennsylvania, was a child when her uncle
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“High Court to Decide Who Owes Restitution to Child Porn Victims - Woman
Filing Against Men who Viewed Images Years Later”
The Blade
Paula Reed Ward
July 7, 2013
It is self-evident that a child is harmed
during the creation of child pornography.

has made similar filings in every U.S.
district court in the country.

But it is less clear if that person is harmed
years later when someone views those
images on the Internet.

But the rulings have been split. In some
districts, restitution of the full amount she is
seeking — $3.4 million — has been granted.
But in others, Amy has been awarded
nothing.

The decision on how harm is calculated
could be the difference between a victim
being compensated or receiving nothing at
all.
The issue has been raised in the Western
District of Pennsylvania and in federal
courts across the country for five years, but
now the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in.
The high court agreed late last month to hear
the case involving “Amy,” who was
sexually abused by her uncle at the ages of 8
and 9. He photographed that abuse and
distributed the images online starting in
1998.
The Block News Alliance does not identify
victims of sexual abuse; Amy is the name
used in court documents for the victim.
According to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, more than
35,000 pornographic images of Amy have
been found in 3,200 criminal cases since.
Amy began filing requests for restitution in
September, 2008, against defendants
convicted of possessing images of her. She

The legal question turns on a single phrase.
The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual
Exploitation of Children Act of 1994
declares that a person harmed as a result of
child pornography shall be paid by the
defendant “the full amount of the victim’s
losses,” which include:
■ Medical services relating to physical,
psychiatric, or psychological care.
■ Physical and occupational therapy or
rehabilitation.
■ Necessary transportation, temporary
housing, and child-care expenses.
■ Lost income.
■ Attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs
incurred.
■ Any other losses suffered by the victim as
“a proximate result of the offense.”
The issue turns on the phrase “as a
proximate result of the offense.” It means a
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direct causal link between the offense and
the loss.

rejected on appeal or are pending. She has
collected $1.6 million.

Defense attorneys for Doyle Paroline, a
defendant from the Eastern District of Texas
whose case will go to the Supreme Court,
argue that victims of child pornography
must be able to prove the losses they
suffered were the “proximate result” of their
individual clients’ viewing online images of
them taken when they were young children.

But in the case involving Paroline, the
district court judge in Tyler, Texas, said he
did not have to pay restitution because the
government failed to show the specific harm
caused to Amy by the man viewing her
images.

But the attorney for Amy says that the
phrase “proximate result” should only apply
to the last subsection for “any other losses,”
because the phrase does not appear in any
other part of the list of losses in the statute.
The question of restitution has been brewing
since Amy filed her first request against a
man convicted of possession in Connecticut.
That defendant, a British foreign national
who was the vice president of global patents
for Pfizer and a millionaire, was the first test
case.
The judge in the district court there awarded
$200,000, although the case later ended with
a settlement among the parties.
In the case in the Western District of
Pennsylvania, a defendant named Kelly
Hardy was also ordered by U.S. District
Judge Nora Barry Fischer to pay restitution.
Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement
for Hardy to pay $1,000.
As of May, restitution for Amy has been
ordered in 174 cases, ranging from $100 to
$3.5 million, although some cases have been

“Certainly, Amy was harmed by Paroline’s
possession of Amy’s two pornographic
images, but this does little to show how
much of her harm, or what amount of her
losses, was proximately caused by
Paroline’s offense,” wrote U.S. District
Judge Leonard Davis. “There is no doubt
that everyone involved with child
pornography — from the abusers and
producers to the end-users and possessors —
contribute to Amy’s ongoing harm.”
While the judge said he was sympathetic to
what Amy has experienced — and will
throughout her lifetime — that is not enough
to dispense with the “proximate cause”
requirement.
However, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned Judge Davis, writing
that the proximate cause requirement applies
only to the last category to the last
subsection, “any other losses suffered by the
victim.”
The 5th Circuit, though, is the only circuit in
the country to have found that way.
Ten other circuits have ruled against
restitution.
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“The Supreme Court is going to have its
work cut out for it,” said Stanley Schneider,
who will represent Paroline at the Supreme
Court. “You have all these underlying issues
that need to be discussed.”

Additionally, Mr. Schneider argues that
Amy suffers harm from the viewing of her
images only because she requests
notification when defendants are arrested for
possessing them.

One of the most obvious to him as to
whether his client should be liable for any
payment, Mr. Schneider said, is the timing
of his arrest. Amy had already created her
restitution model — and submitted requests
in a number of jurisdictions — before
Paroline was arrested in January 2009.

But, he continued, it is her perception that
causes any ill effects, not that a defendant
viewed it.

“It’s an interesting anomaly,” Mr. Schneider
said. “How can someone be liable for [harm
that occurred] before you committed your
criminal act?”

Attorneys for Amy have argued that she is
not seeking to collect more than she has
asserted. Once she has collected $3.4
million, Amy would stop filing, they have
said.
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“D.C. Circuit Weighs Child Pornography Restitution Case”
Blog of Legal Times
May 13, 2013
The thorny question of how to calculate
restitution to victims of child pornography
came back before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit last week, with the U.S.
Department of Justice defending a proposed
formula.
Friday's arguments marked the second time
the court considered the case of Michael
Monzel. Monzel pleaded guilty to one count
each of distribution and possession of child
pornography. A trial judge ordered Monzel
to pay $5,000 to a victim known by the
pseudonym "Amy," but on remand from the
D.C. Circuit reduced the award to zero,
finding the government didn't produce
evidence on how much of Amy's losses he
caused.
The government appealed, arguing U.S.
District Judge Gladys Kessler was wrong to
reduce the award and that its proposed
formula – dividing a victim's total losses by
the number of individuals found criminally
responsible and then adjusting based on
certain factors – represented a fair solution.
Monzel's lawyer, Federal Public Defender
A.J. Kramer, said the formula was arbitrary
and that Kessler was right to reduce the
award after the government presented no
evidence linking his client to specific losses.
Courts across the country have struggled to
find a consistent way to calculate damages
in child pornography cases. As lawyers on
both sides noted, there are often an
unpredictable number of defendants,

especially if the images are distributed
online, and it can be difficult to know the
extent an individual defendant who viewed
or possessed an image was responsible for
harming the victim.
Judge Brett Kavanaugh told Patty Stemler,
chief of the appellate section of the Justice
Department's criminal division, that he was
interested in reaching a decision that would
apply to similar cases in the future.
However, the court expressed concern that
under the government's formula, individuals
convicted earlier would bear more of a
burden. Stemler said the amount owed by
each defendant would be lowered as needed
until a certain threshold.
Kavanaugh asked if the Justice Department
had recommended legislation to Congress
addressing the restitution issue. Stemler said
they were working on it, but had yet to
submit something.
Specific to Monzel's case, Judge Judith
Rogers asked Stemler why the government
didn't provide more information to Kessler
on remand estimating Amy's losses that
could be attributed to Monzel. Kessler had
called the estimates stale, Rogers said.
Stemler said the government was never
asked for more information and followed the
D.C. Circuit's first decision saying Kessler
could request more evidence or a formula.
The court heard from a lawyer representing
Amy's interests, Paul Cassell of the appellate
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clinic at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney
College of Law. Cassell said Kessler was
wrong to not follow a federal statute known
as Masha's Law, which gave victims of child
pornography the right to file a civil lawsuit
and set minimum damages at $150,000 for
each violation of federal child pornography
laws.
Cassell said his team was preparing to take
the case to the U.S. Supreme Court to ask
that defendants pay at least $150,000 in
accordance with Masha's Law.
When asked how the
losses attributable to
several courts found
and that the statute

court should calculate
Monzel, Kramer said
there was no answer
surrounding criminal

restitution was "unworkable." Absent
evidence from the government, Kramer said,
Kessler was justified in finding Monzel
couldn't be responsible for paying specific
losses.
Rogers compared the situation to the
administration of payments to victims of the
terrorist of attacks on September 11, 2001,
saying the court was tasked with finding a
reasonable approach, as opposed to a perfect
solution for allotting payments. Kramer said
the government's formula was arbitrary and
ran afoul of a requirement that restitution be
tied to the defendant's role in contributing to
the victim's losses.
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“Should Child Porn 'Consumers' Pay Victim Millions? Supreme Court to
Decide.”
Christian Science Monitor
Warren Richey
June 27, 2013
The US Supreme Court on Thursday agreed
to examine whether anyone convicted of
possessing images of child pornography can
be required to pay a multimillion dollar
restitution award to the abused child
depicted in the illicit images – even if the
individual had no direct contact with the
child-victim.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court agreed to
examine a case from the Fifth Circuit and
decide whether the government or the victim
must be able to prove there is a causal
relationship between the defendant’s
conduct and harm to the victim and the
victim’s claimed damages.

Under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual
Exploitation of Children Statute, Congress
said that a judge “shall order restitution” for
the victim in a child pornography case in
“the full amount of the victim’s losses.”

The issue arises in the case of an East Texas
man, Doyle Paroline, who faced a restitution
demand of $3.4 million after pleading guilty
to
possessing
child
pornography.
Investigators found 280 images on his
computer. He was sentenced to two years in
prison and 10 years of supervised release.

The law applies to those who personally
engage in physical abuse of a child while
producing pornographic images of the
abuse. But the question in the appeal is
whether the same law requires anyone who
views or possesses the resulting child
pornography to also pay the total amount of
restitution.
The issue has arisen in hundreds of cases
across the country involving possession of
child pornography. The vast majority of
courts have declined to require child
pornography consumers (as opposed to
producers) to pay the full amount of
restitution. Only one federal appeals court,
the New Orleans-based Fifth US Circuit
Court of Appeals, has ordered full restitution
under such circumstances.

After his conviction, experts at the National
Center for Missing and Exploited
Children determined the identity of one of
the children whose images were on
Paroline’s computer. They identify her in
court papers by the pseudonym “Amy.”
They found at least two images of Amy.
Lawyers working on her behalf filed the
request for full restitution.
Amy had been sexually abused as a child by
her uncle. The uncle recorded the abuse on
film and distributed the images on the
Internet. The National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children has found at least
35,000 copies of images of Amy’s abuse
among the evidence in 3,200 child
pornography cases since 1998.
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The images are said to be “extremely
graphic.”
According to federal prosecutors, restitution
has been ordered for Amy in more than 170
child pornography cases. The amounts range
from $100 to $3.5 million. The vast majority
of defendants in child pornography cases are
said to be of limited means and therefore
unable to pay make significant restitution
payments.
The images of Amy’s abuse were traded on
the Internet and are said to have gone “viral”
among consumers of child pornography
worldwide.
Amy has said in court filings that because
images of her abuse continue to be sought
out, traded, and viewed, she feels as if she is
being abused “over and over again.”
She noted: “It feels like I am being raped by
each and every [person who is looking at my
pictures],” according to a brief filed on her
behalf at the high court.
The central issue in the case is whether the
law simply requires full payment of
restitution in child pornography cases, or
whether prosecutors or the victim must be
able to prove a causal relationship showing
the specific actions of a defendant caused
specific harms to the victim.
In some cases, judges have taken the total
amount of damages claimed by a childvictim and divided it by the number of other
defendants ordered to pay restitution to that
child-victim.

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
statute requires judges to order defendants to
pay the full amount.
The appeals court explained that the law
would not allow “Amy” to collect the full
amount of her losses several times over.
Instead, her claims would end once she’d
received the full amount of her claimed
losses from one or more defendants.
In urging the high court to take up a similar
case, lawyers for Amy and another childvictim said that unlike the Fifth Circuit, 10
other federal courts of appeal have ruled that
child pornography victims must be able to
show that a defendant’s actions were the
proximate cause of the harms for which they
seek restitution.
“The practical effect of this clearlyacknowledged circuit split is that child
pornography victims in the Fifth Circuit are
now receiving restitution for the full amount
of their losses, as commanded by Congress,”
wrote
University
of
Utah
Law
Professor Paul Cassell in his brief to the
court in a similar child pornography
restitution case.
He noted that while the defendant in the
Fifth Circuit case was ordered to pay Amy
$3 million, the ordered restitution to Amy in
a Ninth Circuit case was $0.
In identical cases involving the same victim
and the same crime, the restitution award
showed a $3 million variance, Cassell said.
“Allowing such disparate results contradicts
the commitment to fair and equal treatment
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of criminal defendants – and crime victims,”
he wrote.
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Kansas v. Cheever
12-609
Ruling Below: State v. Cheever, 284 P.3d 1007 (Kan. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 1460 (U.S.
2013).
Defendant was convicted in the Greenwood District Court, of capital murder, four counts of
attempted capital murder of law enforcement officers, criminal possession of a firearm based on
a previous felony conviction for aggravated robbery, and manufacture of methamphetamine.
Cheever subsequently appealed. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that allowing State's expert
to testify in rebuttal to defendant's voluntary intoxication defense violated defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights. Additionally, the trial court's error in admitting testimony of State's
psychiatric expert in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights was not harmless error,
and prosecutor's comment (which was made during the penalty-stage closing argument, stating
that jury could consider mitigating circumstances, but did not have to) was not improper.
Question Presented: Whether, when a criminal defendant affirmatively introduces expert
testimony that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit capital murder of a law
enforcement officer due to the alleged temporary and long-term effects of the defendant’s
methamphetamine use, the state violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination by rebutting the defendant’s mental state defense with evidence from a courtordered mental evaluation of the defendant.

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Scott D. CHEEVER, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Kansas
Decided on August 24, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PER CURIAM
A jury convicted Scott D. Cheever of capital
murder for the killing of Greenwood County
Sheriff Matthew Samuels, four counts of
attempted
capital
murder
of
law
enforcement officers Robert Keener, Travis
Stoppel, Mike Mullins, and Tom Harm,
criminal possession of a firearm based on a

previous felony conviction for aggravated
robbery,
and
manufacture
of
methamphetamine. Cheever was sentenced
to death on the capital offense. In addition,
he was given a controlling sentence of 737
months for the attempted capital murder
convictions, which included concurrent
sentences of 146 months for the
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manufacturing conviction and 8 months for
the firearm conviction. Cheever filed a
timely appeal of his convictions and
sentences.
We
have
jurisdiction
under K.S.A. 21–4627(a).
We conclude that allowing the State's
psychiatric expert, Dr. Michael Welner, to
testify based on his court-ordered mental
examination of Cheever, when Cheever had
not waived his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution in that examination by
presenting a mental disease or defect
defense at trial, violated Cheever's privilege
against
compulsory
self-incrimination
secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Because we are unable to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Welner's testimony did not contribute to the
capital murder and attempted capital murder
verdicts obtained in this case, this
constitutional error cannot be declared
harmless.
Consequently,
Cheever's
convictions for capital murder and attempted
capital murder must be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
Cheever did not challenge his convictions
and sentences for manufacture of
methamphetamine and criminal possession
of a firearm. We affirm those convictions
and sentences.
FACTS
AND
BACKGROUND

PROCEDURAL

On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot
and killed Greenwood County Sheriff
Matthew Samuels at Darrell and Belinda

Coopers' residence near Hilltop, Kansas.
Samuels, acting on a tip, had gone to the
Coopers' residence, along with Deputy
Michael Mullins and Detective Tom Harm,
to attempt to serve an outstanding warrant
for Cheever's arrest. Cheever, along with the
Coopers, Matt Denney, and Billy Gene
Nowell, had been cooking and ingesting
methamphetamine in the early morning
hours prior to Samuels' arrival. In the
ensuing attempts to remove the wounded
Samuels from the residence and arrest
Cheever, Cheever also shot at Mullins,
Harm, and two state highway patrol
troopers, Robert Keener and Travis Stoppel.
…There was little discrepancy in the
pictures painted by the various accounts [at
trial].
Shortly before Samuels, Mullins, and Harm
arrived at the Coopers, Belinda had received
a telephone call informing her that the police
were on their way to the house to look for
Cheever. Belinda told Cheever the police
were coming and asked him to get his stuff
together and leave, but Cheever's car had a
flat tire.
When Samuels arrived at the Cooper's
house, Cheever and Denney were hiding in
an upstairs bedroom. Cheever had two guns
with him—a .44 caliber Ruger revolver and
a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. As he
hid upstairs, Cheever heard the officers pull
up to the house and heard Darrell yell that
the cops were there and that he was going to
tell them Cheever was not there. Cheever
also heard Darrell answer the door and tell
Samuels Cheever was not there. Cheever
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heard Darrell agree to allow Samuels inside
to look around.
Cheever heard Samuels calling out his name
as he looked for Cheever on the first floor.
The doorway to the upstairs had a piece of
carpet covering it and Samuels asked
Belinda where the doorway led. Belinda said
it went upstairs. Samuels pulled the carpet
back and yelled for Cheever. Cheever
looked over at Denney and told him, “Don't
move, don't make a sound, just stay right
where you are.” Samuels then went through
the doorway to go upstairs.
Cheever heard Samuels' steps on the stairs.
Cheever had the loaded and cocked .44 in
his hand when he stepped out of the
bedroom and looked down the stairway.
Cheever saw Samuels coming up the stairs.
Cheever pointed his gun and shot Samuels.
Cheever then stepped back into the bedroom
and told Denney not to go out of the window
because they would shoot him. Cheever
returned to the stair railing, looked down the
stairs, saw Samuels, and shot him again.
Cheever stepped back into the bedroom and
saw that Denney had left through the
window. Cheever then shot at Mullins and
Harm as they tried to get the wounded
Samuels out of the stairwell. Later, he shot
at Keener and Stoppel, who were part of the
SWAT team that entered the house to arrest
Cheever.
Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication
defense, based on the theory that
methamphetamine use had rendered him
incapable of forming the necessary
premeditation to support the murder and
attempted murder charges. Cheever's

evidence in support of his defense consisted
of his own testimony and the testimony of
his expert witness, Dr. Roswell Lee Evans,
Jr., a doctor of pharmacy with a specialty in
psychiatric pharmacy.
The jury found Cheever guilty on all counts
as charged. At the penalty phase, the jury
unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the three alleged aggravating
circumstances had been proven to exist and
that they were not outweighed by any
mitigating circumstances found to exist and
therefore sentenced Cheever to death. The
trial court subsequently accepted the jury's
verdict and imposed a sentence of death.
While the facts of the case are relatively
straightforward, the procedural history of the
case is less so. The case was originally filed
in Greenwood County District Court shortly
after the crime. At about the same time, this
court found the Kansas death penalty
scheme unconstitutional in State v. Marsh.
The state proceeding was dismissed after
federal authorities initiated prosecution in
the United States District Court under the
Federal Death Penalty Act.
The federal case went to jury trial in
September 2006, but 7 days into jury
selection, the case was suspended when
Cheever's defense counsel became unable to
proceed. The federal case was subsequently
dismissed without prejudice and the state
case was refiled, went to trial, and resulted
in the convictions and sentences before us in
this appeal. Additional facts will be included
in the discussion where relevant to the
issues.
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I.
COURT-ORDERED
EXAMINATION

MENTAL

During the course of the federal
proceedings, Judge Monte Belot ordered
Cheever to undergo a psychiatric
examination with Dr. Michael Welner, a
forensic psychiatrist hired by the
government.
While
the
precise
circumstances leading to Judge Belot's order
are not in the record before us, the record is
sufficient to show that the mental
examination was ordered because Cheever
had raised the possibility that he would
assert a defense based on mental condition.
… Welner's interview of Cheever lasted 5
and 1/2 hours, was videotaped, and resulted
in a 230–page transcript.
Welner's examination first became an issue
at trial during the State's cross-examination
of Cheever. The State sought to use the
transcript of Cheever's interview with
Welner to impeach Cheever's testimony that
he did not hear Samuels ask if he could go
upstairs. Defense counsel objected, arguing
that because the defense had not filed a
notice of intent to rely on a mental disease
or defect defense, the State was not entitled
to use Welner's examination of Cheever.
The trial court allowed the impeachment as
“a prior inconsistent statement given to a
witness who will testify” after the State
confirmed Welner would be called as a
rebuttal witness to Cheever's voluntary
intoxication defense.
Cheever's expert witness in support of his
voluntary intoxication defense was Dr.
Roswell Lee Evans, Jr., a doctor of
pharmacy, who specialized in psychiatric

pharmacy, the pharmacological effects of
drugs, including illegal drugs such as
methamphetamine. Evans testified that
methamphetamine is a very intense
stimulant
drug
that
has
three
pharmacological phases: the initial rush, the
long-term intoxication, and the neurotoxic
phase. Evans explained that the initial rush
is a virtually instantaneous very extreme
high that lasts approximately 30 minutes.
Following the initial rush is the long-term
intoxication period. He testified that the
intoxication lasts about 13 to 14 hours…
Evans testified that while methamphetamine
is not pharmacologically addictive, the
intense pleasure of the initial rush makes the
drug psychologically addictive. … However,
methamphetamine users develop a tolerance
to the initial rush, leading them to increase
the frequency of use or the dosage, which
then extends the long-term intoxication
stage.
The neurotoxic phase, Evans testified,
develops in chronic, long-term users. He
said that the neurotoxic effect of long-term
use can change the structure of the brain,
resulting in the loss of gray matter and
consequential loss of brain function,
including loss of cognitive functions that
deal with planning, assessing consequences,
abstract reasoning, and judgment. Evans
testified that long-term use can cause
paranoid psychosis which, due to
impairment of the brain functions
responsible for judgment and impulse
control, can result in violence. According to
Evans, chronic users in a state of paranoid
psychosis begin to react…to all sorts of
stimuli based on their paranoid ideations…
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[Evans’] testimony primarily indicated that
these changes persist only as the result of
continued drug use and would abate after a
period of nonuse ranging from 4 to 6
months.

intoxication defense. … The trial court ruled
that Welner's testimony was admissible as
rebuttal to the voluntary intoxication
defense.

Testifying about Cheever specifically, Evans
said that at the time of the crimes, Cheever's
drug use had progressed to the point that he
had developed neurotoxicity and was
showing symptoms of psychosis, evidenced
by doing “really stupid judgment kind of
stuff.” …

Welner's testimony began with a long
discourse on his qualifications, his
substantial fee, and the extensive
methodology he applies to cases under his
review. Welner also described in detail the
materials he reviewed prior to interviewing
Cheever, the 5 and 1/2 hour interview
process, and the psychological testing that
was conducted on Cheever.

Ultimately, Evans testified it was his
opinion that at the time Cheever committed
these crimes, Cheever was both under the
influence of recent methamphetamine use
and impaired by neurotoxicity due to longterm methamphetamine use, which affected
his ability to plan, form intent, and
premeditate the crime. With respect to
shooting Samuels, Evans testified that there
“was no judgment. There was no judgment
at all. This man just did it.”

Welner testified that based on his
examination, it was his opinion that on
January 19, 2005, Cheever's perceptions and
decision-making ability were not impaired
by methamphetamine use. Welner told the
jury that Cheever had the ability to control
his actions, he had the ability to think the
matter over before he shot Samuels, and he
had the ability to form the intent to kill.

On cross-examination, the State made clear
that Evans was not a medical doctor, not a
psychiatrist, not a neurologist, and not a
psychologist. The State characterized Evans
as a “pharmacist.”
At the conclusion of Evans' testimony, the
defense rested. The State then sought to
present Welner as a rebuttal witness.
Defense counsel objected, arguing that
because Cheever had not asserted a mental
disease or defect defense in this case, the
State could not use Welner's examination.
The State contended that Welner's testimony
was proper rebuttal to Cheever's voluntary

Addressing the relationship between
Cheever's level of suspicion on the day of
the crimes and his use of methamphetamine,
Welner testified that while Cheever was
suspicious that morning, his suspicions were
reality based… Welner also concluded that
there was no change in Cheever's level of
suspicion after he used methamphetamine.
Addressing the relationship between
Cheever's level of suspicion and violence,
Welner testified that Cheever's conduct
demonstrated that his suspicions were not a
trigger for violence. He considered it
significant that, although Cheever had
suspicions about the others taking his
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manufacturing supplies or swindling him in
some way, Cheever did not react with
violence. Instead, Cheever attempted to gain
control over the situation and defuse the
perceived threats by giving Denney a
walkie-talkie to monitor the area and
personally engaging with Nowell, whom he
did not trust. …
Welner also addressed whether Cheever had
suffered any “longstanding-effects” or
“brain
damage”
as
a
result
of
methamphetamine use. He noted that
neuropsychological testing conducted by
another doctor showed Cheever had highaverage executive functioning and response
inhibition.…
Focusing specifically on the shooting of
Samuels, Welner described Cheever's
decision-making process:
“The decision-making ability, as I've—as
I've assessed it in this case, began with
his—his decision-making once it became
clear that the police were there. He made
a decision not to try to flee, not to try to
run. … And he made a decision to shoot
when he did.
“And then he engaged Matthew Denney
and then went back and made a decision
to shoot again. And then when he stopped
shooting he made a decision to stop
shooting.”
Welner testified he considered and
ultimately discounted other factors that
could possibly explain Cheever's crimes,
such as psychiatric conditions or disorders.
He also considered and ultimately
discounted environmental phenomena that

could influence Cheever's efforts to avoid
being taken into custody. …
Cheever argues that his Fifth Amendment
privilege
against
compulsory
selfincrimination was violated when the trial
court allowed the State to use the courtordered mental examination by Welner
when Cheever had not waived his privilege
in that examination by asserting a mental
disease or defect defense at trial.
A. Preservation/Standard of Review
The
State
argues
that
Cheever's
constitutional challenge to the admission of
evidence
from
the
court-ordered
examination was not properly preserved for
review because he did not object on Fifth
Amendment grounds at trial.
Although Cheever disputes the State's
contention that his objection was insufficient
to preserve his constitutional claim, he
argues alternatively that preservation is not
fatal to his claim. In support, Cheever relies
on the following language of K.S.A. 21–
4627(b):
“[in a death penalty case] [t]he supreme
court of Kansas shall consider the
question of sentence as well as any errors
asserted in the review and appeal
and shall be authorized to notice
unassigned errors appearing of record if
the ends of justice would be served
thereby.”
Cheever asserts that because Welner's
testimony played a large role in the guilt and
penalty phases, it serves the ends of justice
to determine whether the use of that
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evidence violated his constitutional privilege
against compelled self-incrimination.
We hold that lack of preservation is not an
obstacle to our review, but not because of
our authority to notice unassigned errors
under K.S.A. 21–4627(b), as Cheever
argues. K.S.A. 21–4627(b) provides two
distinct exceptions in death penalty cases to
general rules concerning appellate review: It
requires the court to consider all errors
asserted on appeal, and it authorizes the
court to notice unassigned errors appearing
in the record if doing so serves the ends of
justice.
The first exception applies to errors raised
by the parties. …Thus, the statute imposes a
mandatory exception in death penalty
appeals to the various statutes and rules
barring consideration of unpreserved issues.
The second exception applies to unassigned
errors. An unassigned error is one not raised
by the parties but noticed by the court on its
own during its review of the record. In
contrast to our duty to consider all asserted
errors, our review of unassigned errors is
permissive and conditional.
On this issue and throughout his brief,
Cheever misses the distinction between
these two provisions. Because Cheever
raises the Fifth Amendment issue in his
brief, it is not an unassigned error; it is an
asserted error. Accordingly, we must review
Cheever's
constitutional
claim,
notwithstanding the State's contention that
Cheever's failure to raise that specific
ground at trial precludes appellate review.

Having determined that this issue is
reviewable, we next address the standard of
review. Because Cheever challenges the
legal basis for the admission of this
evidence, our standard of review is de novo.
B. Analysis
Cheever relies primarily on Estelle v.
Smith, Buchanan v. Kentucky, and several
related cases to argue that because he had
not waived the privilege by presenting
evidence of a mental disease or defect at
trial, the State was precluded by the Fifth
Amendment from using statements he made
during Welner's examination, conducted as
part of the federal case, against him. The
State responds that its use of Welner's
examination was proper rebuttal and
impeachment.
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court
held that a court-ordered pretrial psychiatric
examination implicated the defendant's
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, when the defendant neither
initiated the exam nor put his mental
capacity into issue at trial.
In Smith, the trial court ordered a
competency examination of the defendant.
Defense counsel had not raised an issue of
competency or sanity and was unaware that
the
examination
was
ordered. The
psychiatrist interviewed the defendant and
provided a report to the trial court in which
he concluded the defendant was competent
to stand trial. During the penalty phase of
the defendant's capital trial, the State called
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the psychiatrist to testify as to the
defendant's future dangerousness—one of
three factors the State was required to
establish to obtain the death penalty under
Texas law. The psychiatrist's testimony
included his conclusions that the defendant
was a “severe sociopath” with no regard for
property or human life, that he would
continue his criminal behavior if given the
opportunity, and that he had no remorse for
his actions.
The Court determined that under the
“distinct circumstances” of the case, the
Fifth Amendment privilege applied to the
examination. The Court emphasized that the
Fifth Amendment is not implicated by an
order requiring a criminal defendant to
submit to a competency examination “for
the limited, neutral purpose of determining
... competency to stand trial.” Further, as
long as the examination is conducted
consistent with that limited purpose and
used for that neutral purpose, there is no
Fifth Amendment issue.
The Court noted that although the scope of
the examination went beyond the question of
competency, it was not the conduct of the
examination that triggered the Fifth
Amendment, but its use against the
defendant at trial to establish an element
necessary to obtain a verdict of death. The
Court observed that there would have been
no Fifth Amendment issue if the
psychiatrist's findings had been used solely
for
the
purpose
of
determining
competency. But because “the State used
[Smith's] own statements, unwittingly made
without an awareness that he was assisting
the State's efforts to obtain the death

penalty[,]” the Fifth Amendment privilege
applied.
The Court made clear that its ruling applied
only to situations in which the defendant
“neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor
attempts to introduce any psychiatric
evidence” at trial. The Court explained that
where a defendant has placed his or her
mental state in issue, a court-ordered
psychiatric examination may be the only
way the State can rebut the defense…
In Buchanan, the Court addressed the
situation
it
had
distinguished
in Smith. In Buchanan, the defense joined
with the prosecution in requesting a courtordered mental examination of the defendant
and presented evidence supporting a mentalstate-based defense at trial. The Court held
that under those circumstances, allowing the
State to use the results of the mental
examination for the limited purpose of
rebutting that defense did not violate the
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege.
In addition to the Smith/Buchanan line of
precedent, Cheever also relies on Battie v.
Estelle and Gibbs v. Frank. In Battie, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that a defendant waives his or her
Fifth Amendment privilege by requesting or
submitting to a psychiatric examination to
determine sanity at the time of the crime.
The court explained that waiver occurs when
the
defense
introduces
psychiatric
testimony, in the same manner as would the
defendant's election to testify at trial.
We explore Gibbs in some depth, because
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals examined
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and applied the Smith and Buchanan line of
precedent to a situation with similarities to
Cheever's case.

The Third Circuit examined and synthesized
the Supreme Court's precedent to determine
the applicable rules for resolving the issue:

The defendant in Gibbs was tried twice for
the 1984 murder of a security guard in
Pennsylvania. In the first trial, the defense
requested that an expert be appointed for the
purpose of determining whether to raise a
mental infirmity defense. After the
examination, the defense notified the State
of its intent to raise such a defense and,
consequently, the State secured an order for
its own psychiatric examination. The State's
psychiatrist
gave
the
defendant Miranda warnings,
and
the
defendant
made several
inculpatory
statements. At trial, Gibbs offered expert
testimony to establish a diminished capacity
defense, and the State called its own expert
witness to rebut the testimony. The
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to
death, but his conviction was ultimately
reversed.

“…A compelled psychiatric interview
implicates Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.
Before
submitting
to
that
examination, the defendant must receive
Miranda warnings and…counsel must be
notified. …The Fifth and Sixth Amendments
do not necessarily attach, however, when the
defendant himself initiates the psychiatric
examination. Similarly, the Fifth—but not
Sixth—Amendment right can be waived
when the defendant initiates a trial defense
of mental incapacity or disturbance, even
though the defendant had not been given
Miranda warnings. But that waiver is not
limitless; it only allows the prosecution to
use the interview to provide rebuttal to the
psychiatric defense. Finally, the state has no
obligation to warn about possible uses of the
interview that cannot be foreseen because of
future events, such as uncommitted crimes.”

At his second trial, the defendant presented
an identity defense, not a mental-state-based
defense. Nevertheless, the State was
permitted to call its expert psychiatric
witness to testify about the inculpatory
statements the defendant had made during
his examination. The defendant was
convicted, and the conviction was affirmed
on direct appeal. On federal habeas review,
the Third Circuit addressed the defendant's
claim that his Fifth Amendment privilege
was violated when the State was permitted
to introduce its psychiatrist's testimony
despite the fact that the defendant did not
raise the diminished capacity defense at his
second trial.

Applying this synthesis, the Third Circuit
held that while the psychiatrist's testimony
was admissible in the first trial at which the
defendant had presented a mental capacity
defense, it was not admissible at the
subsequent trial….
Kansas statutes and caselaw are consistent
with Smith, Buchanan, Battie,
and Gibbs. Under K.S.A. 22–3219(1), in
order to present a mental disease or defect
defense at trial, a criminal defendant must
file a pretrial notice of the intent to do so.
Filing such a notice is deemed to be consent
to a court-ordered mental examination.
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…The court-ordered examination remains
privileged unless and until the defendant
presents evidence supporting a mental
disease or defect defense at trial.
In Williams, the defendant filed a notice of
intent to raise an insanity defense and then
scheduled and paid for a psychiatric
examination of the defendant. The State
filed a motion to compel discovery of the
report,
arguing
that K.S.A.
22–
3219 required its release. The district court
ordered the defendant to produce the report.
The defendant then withdrew the notice of
intent to use the insanity defense and asked
the district court to vacate its order. The
district court refused, stating the report had
to be produced, regardless of whether it was
going to be used. Defense counsel refused to
comply, arguing that because the notice was
withdrawn, the defendant retained his Fifth
Amendment privilege in the report. Defense
counsel was held in contempt and they
appealed.
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
contempt order and held that the trial
court's initial order to produce the report
was consistent with K.S.A. 22–3219(2),
because the defendant had filed a notice of
intent to assert an insanity defense. After
the defendant withdrew his intent to assert
an insanity defense, however, the district
court's refusal to reconsider its order to
produce was erroneous…
In summary, we hold that K.S.A. 22–
3219 and our caselaw are in harmony with
the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege
as construed in the Smith and Buchanan line

of precedent. Read together, the following
rules apply.
Where a defendant files a notice of intent to
assert a mental disease or defect defense
under K.S.A.
22–3219,
the
Fifth
Amendment does not prevent the court from
ordering the defendant to submit to a mental
examination. The filing of such a notice
constitutes consent to a court-ordered mental
examination by an expert for the State,
making Miranda warnings
unnecessary. Consent to the examination,
however, does not waive the defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege so as to entitle
the State to use the examination against the
defendant at trial. Waiver does not occur
unless or until the defendant presents
evidence at trial that he or she lacked the
requisite criminal intent due to a mental
disease or defect. If the defendant withdraws
the notice to assert a mental disease or
defect defense or does not present evidence
supporting that defense at trial, the Fifth
Amendment privilege remains intact and the
State may not use the mental examination as
evidence against the defendant. If, however,
the defendant presents evidence supporting a
mental disease or defect defense, the State
may use the court-ordered examination for
the limited purpose of rebutting the
defendant's mental disease or defect
defense.
Applying these rules to Cheever's case,
Cheever retained a Fifth Amendment
privilege in the Welner examination.
Cheever could waive his privilege and allow
use of the report under the proper
circumstances. Absent such a waiver,
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however, the report was privileged under the
Fifth Amendment.
1. Did Cheever waive the privilege, thus
entitling the State to use the examination
for rebuttal?
The State contends that Cheever presented
expert testimony at trial regarding his mental
state, and therefore it was entitled to use the
examination to rebut that defense. Cheever
contends that he did not present evidence of
a mental disease or defect defense. Cheever
argues his evidence was limited to showing
voluntary intoxication, which is not a mental
disease or defect under Kansas law and,
therefore, the State was not entitled to use
the examination for rebuttal.
The only mental capacity defense
recognized in Kansas is the mental disease
or defect defense, as defined by K.S.A. 22–
3220:
“It is a defense to a prosecution under any
statute that the defendant, as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacked the mental
state required as an element of the offense
charged. Mental disease or defect is not
otherwise a defense.”
It is well established that voluntaryintoxication-induced temporary mental
incapacity at the time of the crime is not
evidence of a mental disease or defect.
Evidence of permanent mental incapacity
due to long-term use of intoxicants,
however, may support a mental disease or
defect defense.
In Kleypas, the defendant attempted to
introduce expert witness testimony that he

had experienced a blackout at the time of the
offenses due to voluntary intoxication and
chronic cocaine use. The State objected that
the defendant was attempting an end run
around the procedural and substantive
consequences of asserting a mental defect
defense after having withdrawn his
previously filed notice of intent to assert
such a defense. The trial court agreed. On
appeal, we held that the defendant's expert
testimony did not relate to a mental disease
or defect but solely to voluntary
intoxication, and thus the trial court erred in
refusing to allow the defendant to present
that evidence. …
Cheever's voluntary intoxication defense
was based on evidence that his mental state
at the time of the crime was a product of a
combination of immediate voluntary
ingestion of methamphetamine and longterm use of the drug. Cheever did not
present evidence, however, that his use of
methamphetamine had caused permanent
mental impairment. Evans testified that
while neurotoxic changes could potentially
be permanent, in most cases, those changes
abate after a 4– to 6–month period of
nonuse. Evans did not testify that Cheever
had sustained permanent damage. In fact, he
testified that psychological testing done on
Cheever some 6 months after his arrest was
unlikely to be useful for determining his
mental state at the time of the crime because
he would no longer have been suffering the
effects of the drug.
Accordingly, we find that Cheever's
evidence showed only that he suffered from
a temporary mental incapacity due to
voluntary intoxication; it was not evidence
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of a mental disease or defect within the
meaning of K.S.A. 22–3220. … Therefore,
we conclude that allowing Welner to testify
in rebuttal to the voluntary intoxication
defense violated Cheever's constitutional
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
2. Impeachment
Cheever also argues that allowing the State
to use statements he made to Welner to
impeach his testimony at trial violated his
Fifth Amendment privilege. The State
contends that because there is no evidence
Cheever's statements to Welner were
unlawfully coerced and Cheever does not
make such a claim, there was no reason to
exclude that evidence. In its brief, the State
argues:
“Whether viewed as a constitutional
claim or otherwise, there is no basis for
exclusion of Dr. Welner's testimony. The
exclusion of relevant evidence obtained
by the State in a criminal prosecution is a
judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard the rights of defendants
through its deterrent effect. The ‘primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule “is to
deter future unlawful police conduct.” ’
…Because there was no allegation of
government misconduct here, the
exclusion of Dr. Welner's testimony by
the trial court was not warranted.”…
We hold the exclusionary rule argument has
no relevance here. Cheever's statements to
Welner are not excluded as a sanction for
governmental
misconduct;
they
are
inadmissible because they are protected by

the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.
Although not argued by the parties, we note
there is conflicting federal caselaw on the
question of whether a defendant's statements
made during a court-ordered mental
examination, while not admissible to rebut a
mental-state defense, may nevertheless be
used to impeach the defendant's trial
testimony. …
We conclude that under the circumstances,
resolution of this issue must await another
day. … In addition, as discussed below, the
erroneous admission of Welner's testimony
requires reversal and remand of the capital
murder and attempted capital murder
convictions. Thus, even if we were also to
determine that Cheever's statements were
properly admitted for impeachment, that
determination would not change the
outcome in this case.
Last, we address an additional point about
the admissibility of Welner's testimony. The
trial court suggested that Welner's testimony
was admissible for rebuttal because Evans
relied on Welner's report in reaching his
conclusions. During the arguments over
Cheever's objection to the State calling
Welner to testify in rebuttal to Evans, the
State interjected that Evans had testified he
relied on Welner's report. Defense counsel
confirmed the State's representation. The
trial court then stated “that fact standing
alone probably allows the State to call him
to give his own point of view.”
Although defense counsel confirmed the
State's representation, the record does not.
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Evans never stated that he relied upon
Welner's report. Evans specifically testified
that he did not watch the video of Welner's
interview or read the transcript of the
interview. …
…In any event, we need not speculate about
the legal basis for the trial court's suggestion
that Evans' reliance upon Welner's report
provided an alternate ground for allowing
Welner to testify, because the record plainly
fails to establish that Evans actually did rely
upon Welner's report to arrive at his own
opinions.
C. Harmless Error Analysis
Because the admission of Welner's
testimony
violated
Cheever's
Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination, we apply the federal
constitutional
harmless
error
test
of Chapman
v.
California. Under Chapman, an error that
violates a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights requires reversal unless the party who
benefitted from the error—here, the State—
“proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of ... did not affect the
outcome of the trial in light of the entire
record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable
possibility that the error affected the
verdict.”
In Satterwhite v. Texas, the United States
Supreme Court considered whether the
erroneous admission of the defendant's
court-ordered psychiatric examination was
harmless error under Chapman. Because of
parallels with Cheever's case, we set out in

detail the Court's discussion of the evidence
at issue and its effect on the outcome:
“Dr. Grigson [who conducted the
examination of the defendant] was the
State's final witness.… He stated
unequivocably [sic ] that, in his expert
opinion, Satterwhite ‘will present a
continuing threat to society by continuing
acts of violence.’ He explained that
Satterwhite has ‘a lack of conscience’ and
is ‘as severe a sociopath as you can be.’
…Dr. Grigson concluded his testimony
on direct examination with perhaps his
most devastating opinion of all: he told
the jury that Satterwhite was beyond the
reach of psychiatric rehabilitation.
“The District Attorney highlighted Dr.
Grigson's credentials and conclusions in
his closing argument:
‘Doctor
James
Grigson,
Dallas
psychiatrist and medical doctor. And he
tells you: … Severe sociopath. Extremely
dangerous. A continuing threat to our
society. Can it be cured? Well, it's not a
disease. It's not an illness. That's his
personality. That's John T. Satterwhite.’
“The finding of future dangerousness was
critical to the death sentence…. Having
reviewed the evidence in this case, we
find it impossible to say beyond a
reasonable doubt that Dr. Grigson's
expert testimony on the issue of
Satterwhite's future dangerousness did
not influence the sentencing jury.”
Satterwhite involved the admission of
evidence in the penalty phase of a capital
murder proceeding, while here, Welner's
testimony was admitted in the guilt stage. As
the
Court
recognized
in Satterwhite, assessing the prejudicial
effect of error in the sentencing phase can be
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more difficult because of the discretion the
jury has in determining whether death is the
appropriate punishment. That difference
notwithstanding, we find the Court's
analysis of the prejudicial effect of the error
in admitting psychiatric evidence instructive
for the ways in which it parallels Cheever's
case. …
Arguably, it is possible the jury might have
convicted Cheever even without Welner's
testimony; however, that is not the standard
we must apply under Chapman. “The
question ... is not whether the legally
admitted evidence was sufficient to support”
the verdict, “but, rather, whether the State
has proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained.’ ”
Because this error violated Cheever's federal
constitutional rights, we must reverse unless
we can say with “the highest level of
certainty that the error did not affect the
outcome.” After reviewing the entire
record, we do not have that level of
certainty; we cannot conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Welner's testimony
did not contribute to the verdict in this case.
Consequently, the error is not harmless, and
Cheever's convictions for capital murder and
attempted capital murder must be reversed
and remanded for a new trial.
Our
decision
reversing
Cheever's
convictions for capital murder and attempted
capital murder make it unnecessary to
resolve the other issues Cheever has raised.
Nevertheless, because we are remanding the
case for a new trial, we will address those

issues that are likely to arise on remand in
order to provide guidance to the trial court.
II. FELONY MURDER AS A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CAPITAL
MURDER
The trial court instructed the jury on firstdegree premeditated murder as a lesser
included offense of capital murder. On
appeal, Cheever argues that the first-degree
murder instruction should have included the
alternative theory of felony murder as a
lesser included offense of capital murder.
Cheever acknowledges he did not request
such an instruction or object to its absence in
the district court; thus the trial judge did not
have an opportunity to address this issue….
With capital murder as the highest degree of
homicide, first-degree murder is a lesser
degree of capital murder under K.S.A. 21–
3107(2)(a) and is therefore a lesser included
crime of capital murder. The crime of firstdegree murder may be committed in two
ways: premeditated murder and felony
murder. Accordingly, felony murder is a
lesser included crime of capital murder and,
where facts support it, should be included in
instructions on lesser included crimes in
capital murder cases….
III.
VOIR
DIRE
COMMENTS
MENTIONING APPELLATE REVIEW
The trial court divided the prospective jurors
into seven panels for voir dire. The trial
court's introductory remarks to each panel
were substantially similar and began by
introducing the parties, their counsel, and
court personnel, including the court reporter.
In explaining the role of the court reporter,
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the trial court told the prospective jurors that
the court reporter's written record of the
proceedings served two purposes: for
reference during the trial and for appellate
review should the case be appealed.
The following remarks made to the seventh
panel are representative of those made to all
of the panels:
“Almost everything is on the record that we
do in here.
“We refer back to that record from time to
time during the trial to see what someone
said, whether a question's already been
asked, things of that nature, and if this case
should go up on appeal to the appellate
courts in Kansas in Topeka, a transcript is
made of everything we do and that transcript
is sent to the appellate court, along with the
exhibits, and the appellate court decides all
issues on appeal based on that record that
we've made here in the trial court.”
Cheever argues that the trial court's remarks
violated the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution as applied
in Caldwell
v.
Mississippi. Cheever
contends the trial judge's remarks in this
case created the risk that the jurors would
believe that the ultimate responsibility for
Cheever's sentence rested with the appellate
courts, thereby undermining the heightened
reliability the Eighth Amendment demands
of a jury's determination that death is the
appropriate punishment.
In Caldwell, the prosecutor argued to the
jury that a decision to impose the death
sentence would not be final because it was
subject to review by the appellate court. The

Supreme Court held the remarks rendered
the death sentence unconstitutional. …
State v. Nguyen provided this court with an
opportunity to consider whether a trial judge
commits judicial misconduct by mentioning
to a jury the possibility that the case before
it could be appealed. In explaining the
process for the jury to submit questions or
request readbacks during deliberations, the
judge said:
“ ‘I explained to you that if I get a
question, and that will be through my
bailiff, Ms. Mies, the foreman will write
it down and date it. And I would request
also that he write the time—he or she
write the time on there. That question will
be preserved, ‘cause defense, regardless,
would have a right to appeal. As I told
you, that a judge is under a microscope
and that [to] be sure that any defendant
receives the correct legal decisions. I can
be challenged. And I welcome the
challenges.’ ”
…Although we found the comments were
not prejudicial, we unequivocally stressed
that “[a] trial court should not mention a
defendant's right to appeal.”
Nguyen was not a death penalty case;
however, the reasoning is consistent
with Caldwell. Accordingly, we take this
opportunity to reiterate our general
directive: It is improper for a trial court to
make comments to the jury regarding
appellate review. Moreover, we emphasize
that the life-or-death stakes in a capital
murder proceeding require extra vigilance
on the part of the trial court to abide by this
directive. We note the remarks in this case
are not analogous to those that required

424

reversal
in Caldwell.
Nevertheless,
under Nguyen, it is error for the trial judge to
tell jurors, even prospective jurors, that the
exhibits and transcripts of the proceedings
will be reviewed by an appellate court. …
IV. CHEEVER'S AGE AT THE TIME
OF THE OFFENSE
Cheever argues that his death sentence was
imposed in violation of his right to jury trial
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution because the
jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was at least 18 years old at the time
of the crime, a fact that he contends is
necessary to render him eligible for the
enhanced sentence of death. Cheever does
not dispute that he was at least 18 years old
at the time of the capital offense….
Resolution of this issue hinges on whether
the fact Cheever was at least 18 years of age
at the time of the crime is a fact necessary
for imposition of the death penalty. Cheever
argues that it is, relying primarily on Roper
v.
Simmons.
Cheever
points
out
that Roper held that being 18 years or older
at the time of the offense is an eligibility
requirement for the death penalty. …
The State responds that the defendant's age
is not within the scope of Apprendi because
it is not a fact that increases the statutory
maximum sentence. According to the State,
death is the maximum authorized sentence
under our capital sentencing statutes, with
the defendant's age merely a fact that
mitigates that sentence to life in prison. …

We
deem
the
State's
arguments
unpersuasive. First, we disagree that death is
the maximum authorized sentence. …
Second,
the
Supreme
Court
in Roper explicitly rejected the idea that the
Eighth Amendment could be satisfied by
treating the defendant's youth as a mitigating
circumstance. Instead, the Court drew a
bright line, holding that the age of 18 or
older is a requirement for death eligibility.
Third, under our statutory scheme, the fact
the defendant was at least 18 is a
prerequisite to imposition of the death
penalty. …
Accordingly, we conclude that the fact the
defendant was at least 18 years old at the
time of the crime is a fact necessary to
subject the defendant to the death penalty
and therefore within the scope of Sixth
Amendment protection….
V. PENALTY-PHASE INSTRUCTIONS
ON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
…We

note that the [penalty-phase]
instruction at issue followed PIK Crim.3d
56.00–D. That pattern instruction did not
conform to our directive in Kleypas. In
2008, PIK Crim.3d 56.00–D was amended
to inform the jury that mitigating
circumstances do not need to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In any retrial of
this case, the most current version of the
PIK Crim.3d instructions on mitigating
evidence should be used.
VI. MERCY INSTRUCTION
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Cheever
challenges
the
mitigating
circumstances instruction on another
ground, specifically, the following part:
“Mitigating circumstances are those which
in fairness may be considered as extenuating
or reducing the degree of moral culpability
or blame or which justify a sentence of less
than death, even though they do not justify
or excuse the offense.
“The appropriateness of exercising mercy
can itself be a mitigating factor in
determining whether the State has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death
penalty should be imposed.”
Cheever argues that by characterizing mercy
as a mitigating circumstance and placing it
in the context of the weighing equation, the
instruction prevents the jurors from being
able to give full effect to mercy as a basis
for a sentence less than death, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Cheever argues that
the jurors must be allowed the opportunity
to extend mercy and impose a life
sentence after determining
that
the
mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators
and death is the appropriate sentence by law.
…
Cheever's argument is the same argument
we
considered
and
rejected
in Kleypas … Cheever offers nothing new to
support revisiting [previous] decisions….
VII. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
DURING PENALTY STAGE
Cheever contends that certain comments
concerning consideration of mitigating
circumstances made by the prosecutor

during the penalty-stage closing argument
constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
The first comment at issue was made during
the State's closing argument rebuttal:
“Ladies and gentlemen, let's start off by
looking at these mitigating circumstances
offered to you by the defendant, which
Judge Ward has contained in the
instructions. First of all, it's important to
remember that these are contentions only.
The judge, by instructing you about these, is
not suggesting to you that they are true.
What he's telling you is that the defendant
has put these before you, you can consider
them if you choose, but you don't have to. Or
you can give them as little weight as you
choose to give them.” Cheever contends the
highlighted remark told the jury that it did
not
have
to
consider
mitigating
circumstances. Cheever argues that because
the Eighth Amendment is violated when a
capital sentencing jury is precluded from
considering relevant mitigating evidence
that might serve as a basis for a life
sentence, the remark was improper.
The prosecutor's comment in this case was
part of an argument that the mitigating
circumstances identified in the instructions
were only contentions and, as such, the jury
did not have to accept them as established
simply because they were listed in the
instructions. That comment was not an effort
to “cut off in an absolute manner” the jury's
consideration of Cheever's mitigating
evidence. The larger argument, moreover,
was consistent with the law and the
instructions. It was not improper….
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The second comment concerned Cheever's
mitigating circumstance that he “was
addicted to methamphetamine and he was
under its influence at the time of the crime.”
The prosecutor argued:
“The defendant tells us he was addicted to
methamphetamine, and that's the reason,
that's a mitigator. Well, tell that to Robert
Sanders
‘cause
he
wasn't
on
methamphetamine that night. Now, you've
already decided methamphetamine did not
play a role in the capital murder of Matt
Samuels. And you should reject it now, too.”
…The point of the prosecutor's comment
was simply that because the evidence
showed Cheever committed a violent
criminal act when he was not under the
influence of methamphetamine, the jury
should give little weight to Cheever's
mitigating circumstance that he was under
the influence of methamphetamine at the
time of the crime. As such, it was not
improper.
The last comment at issue concerned the
jury's rejection of Cheever's voluntary
intoxication defense in the guilt stage:
“[Y]ou've
already
decided
methamphetamine did not play a role in the
capital murder of Matt Samuels. And you
should reject it now.” According to Cheever,
this remark suggested to the jury that
because it rejected the voluntary intoxication
defense at the guilt stage, it could reject
Cheever's mitigating circumstance that he
was
under
the
influence
of
methamphetamine at the time of the crime.
Although
the
prosecutor
said
“you should reject it,” the remark crossed

the line between comment on the weight of
the evidence as it relates to specific
mitigating circumstances and argument to
the jury that it could not consider a
mitigating circumstance as a matter of
law. Not only is such an argument an
incorrect statement of the law, it could lead
a juror to refuse to consider legally relevant
mitigating evidence, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. We strongly suggest the
State avoid this argument on remand.
The convictions and sentences for
manufacture of methamphetamine and
criminal possession of a firearm are
affirmed. The convictions for capital murder
and attempted capital murder are reversed,
and the case is remanded for a new trial.
ROSEN, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority but write
separately only to comment on Cheever's
argument that jurors be allowed the
opportunity to consider mercy after finding a
determination of death is warranted.
As a result of our decision in State v.
Stallings, capital defendants are denied the
statutory right of allocution to the sentencing
jury. Thus, a capital defendant is deprived of
any meaningful opportunity to make a plea
for mercy, indeed for his or her very life,
before the sentencing jury makes a decision
whether the defendant is to be put to death. I
dissented from the decision in Stallings and
write here to make clear my opinion that
Cheever, like all criminal defendants, should
be afforded an opportunity to offer a direct
allocutory statement in mitigation to his
sentencer.

427

“U.S. Justices Agree to Weigh Defendant's Self-Incrimination Claim”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
February 25, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday
to consider whether a criminal defendant's
right against self-incrimination is violated
when a psychiatrist who examined him
testifies about his mental state.

incrimination was violated when the state
called a psychiatrist who had examined
Cheever to testify in order to rebut the claim
that the defendant was incapable of rational
thought.

Scott Cheever was sentenced to death for
killing Greenwood County, Kansas, Sheriff
Matthew Samuels while officers sought to
enforce a warrant for his arrest in January
2005.

The psychiatrist's testimony was based in
part on what Cheever had said to him during
the evaluation. The Kansas Supreme Court
ruled in Cheever's favor.

Cheever's defense was that he was
intoxicated after using methamphetamine
and therefore incapable of the premeditation
necessary for him to be convicted of murder
and attempted murder.

Oral argument and a decision are expected
in the U.S. Supreme Court's next term,
which begins in October and runs until June
2014.
The case is Kansas v. Cheever, U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 12-609.

The legal question is whether Cheever's
Fifth Amendment right against self-
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“Kansas Supreme Court Overturns Conviction of Death-Row Inmate in
Sheriff’s Killing”
The Wichita Eagle
Hurst Laviana
August 24, 2012
The Kansas Supreme Court on Friday
overturned the capital murder conviction of
a death-row inmate who shot and killed
Greenwood County Sheriff Matt Samuels.
The court said in its ruling that prosecutors
violated Scott Cheever’s right against selfincrimination when they allowed an expert
witness to discuss the results of a mental
exam that Cheever was required by a federal
judge to take.
The Kansas Supreme Court has yet to
uphold a death sentence imposed under the
state’s 1994 capital murder law.
Attorney General Derek Schmidt said his
office was reviewing Friday’s ruling but
didn’t indicate whether the state would retry
the case.
“We will be consulting with appropriate
parties over the next few days to determine
the best course of action to ensure justice is
served,” Schmidt said.
Cheever, now 31, is a special management
inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility.
Cheever was convicted of shooting Samuels
on Jan. 19, 2005, near the Greenwood
County town of Virgil. Acting on a tip,
witnesses at Cheever’s trial testified,
Samuels went to the home to serve an arrest
warrant on Cheever. Cheever and other

residents of the home had been cooking and
using meth before Samuels and a deputy
arrived. Cheever, who was hiding in an
upstairs bedroom, shot Samuels as he
climbed the stairs. Cheever never denied
shooting Samuels.
Although Cheever was originally charged
with capital murder in Greenwood County
District Court, the case was moved to
federal court because the constitutionality of
the state’s death penalty was being
challenged at the time. In the summer of
2006, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the law, and Cheever’s
case was moved back to state court.
During Cheever’s time in the federal court
system, U.S. District Judge Monte Belot
ordered him to undergo a psychiatric
examination by Michael Welner, a forensic
psychiatrist hired by the government. It was
Welner’s testimony at the state court trail
that would eventually result in Cheever’s
conviction being overturned.
During his jury trail, Cheever’s lawyers
relied on a voluntary intoxication defense,
arguing that Cheever’s heavy use of meth
prevented him from forming the intent or
premeditation to commit murder.
Lee Evans, dean of the school of pharmacy
at Auburn University, was called as an
expert witness by the defense to testify that
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Cheever’s use of meth kept him from
making sound decisions.
With respect to shooting Samuels, Evans
testified, there “was no judgment. There was
no judgment at all. This man just did it.”
Welner, who was called by prosecutors as a
rebuttal witness, disagreed.
"He made a decision to shoot when he did,"
he told the jury. “And when he stopped
shooting, he made a decision to stop
shooting."
The Greenwood County jury convicted
Cheever of capital murder on Oct. 30, 2007,
then sentenced him to death two days later.
In a 53-page opinion that overturned the
conviction, the Kansas Supreme Court said
the Fifth Amendment does not prevent a
judge from ordering a defendant to submit to
a mental exam. But the court said it does
prevent the state from using the exam
against the defendant at trial.

testimony was extensive and devastating,”
the ruling said. “He employed a method of
testifying that virtually put words into
Cheever’s mouth. He focused on the events
surrounding the shootings, giving a momentby-moment recounting of Cheever’s
observations and actual thoughts to rebut the
sole defense theory that he did not
premeditate the crimes.”
In addition to capital murder, Cheever was
convicted on four counts of attempted
capital murder for firing at two state
troopers and two sheriff’s deputies. The
court also overturned those convictions.
Cheever’s convictions for manufacturing
methamphetamine and criminal possession
of a firearm were upheld.
Samuels’ death prompted changes in the
Kansas criminal code to make it more
difficult to purchase the ingredients used in
making meth. Changes in the law restricting
the purchase of certain allergy medications
and increased penalties were known as the
Matt Samuels Act.

“Welner was the last witness the jury heard
during the guilt phase of the trail, and his
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Fernandez v. California
12-7822
Ruling Below: California v. Fernandez, 208 Cal.App.4th 100 (App. 2d Dist. 2012), cert
granted, 133 S.Ct. 2388 (U.S. 2013).
Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery and willful infliction of corporal injury on a
spouse, cohabitant, or child's parent. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, held that
warrantless search of apartment over defendant's objection was lawful, where defendant was
arrested and no longer present when co-tenant consented to search.
Question Presented: Whether, under Georgia v. Randolph, a defendant must be personally
present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless
search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a
warrantless search is a continuing assertion of Fourth Amendment rights which cannot be
overridden by a co-tenant.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Walter FERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California
Decided on August 1, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SUZUKAWA, J.
A jury convicted defendant Walter
Fernandez of second degree robbery and
willful infliction of corporal injury on a
spouse, cohabitant, or child's parent; as to
count 1, the jury further found that (1) in the
commission of the offense, the defendant
personally used a dangerous and deadly
weapon, to wit, a knife, within the meaning
of section 12022, subdivision (b) (1), and (2)
the offense was committed for the benefit of,
at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang, within the meaning of
section
186.22,
subdivision
(b)(1).

Defendant pled nolo contendere to
possession of a firearm by a felon, short
barreled shotgun or rifle activity. The trial
court imposed a sentence of 14 years.
In this appeal from the judgment, defendant
contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence seized
during a warrantless search of his apartment;
(2) the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence that a suspect was
arrested for attempted murder in defendant's
apartment; (3) there was insufficient
evidence to support the true finding on the
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gang allegation; and (4) the trial court erred
in denying defendant's Pitchess motion.
In the published portion of the opinion, we
conclude the trial court properly denied
defendant's suppression motion. In the
unpublished portion, we reject defendant's
remaining claims, with the exception of his
contention
of
Pitchess
error.
We
conditionally reverse the section 273.5,
subdivision (a) conviction for the trial court
to conduct an in camera review of one
officer's personnel file; in all other respects,
we affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Prosecution Case
A. Percipient Testimony
1. Abel Lopez
On October 12, 2009, at about 11:00 a.m.,
Abel Lopez was approached after cashing a
check near the corner of 14th Street and
Magnolia in Los Angeles by a man with
light skin, a grey sweater, and a tattoo on his
bald head. The man, whom Lopez later
identified as defendant, asked what
neighborhood Lopez was from. Lopez said,
“I'm from Mexico.” Defendant laughed and
said Lopez was in his territory and should
give him his money. He then said, “The
D.F.S. rules here. They rule here.”
Defendant took a knife out of his pocket and
pointed it towards Lopez's chest. Lopez put
up his hands to protect himself and
defendant cut Lopez's wrist.
Lopez tried to run away and, while running,
took out his cell phone and called 911. He
told the 911 operator he needed help
because someone wanted to kill him.

Defendant then whistled loudly and three or
four men ran out of a building on 14th Street
and Magnolia. They hit Lopez in the face
and all over his body, knocking him to the
ground, where they continued to hit and kick
him. When he got up, Lopez did not have
his cell phone or wallet. He saw the men
running back to the building from which
they had come. As a result of the attack,
Lopez suffered a deep cut on his left wrist
and bruising and swelling over his body.
Several minutes after the attack, the police
and paramedics arrived. Lopez participated
in a field showup, where he identified
defendant.
2. Detective Clark and Officer Cirrito
Detective Kelly Clark and Officer Joseph
Cirrito responded to a police radio dispatch
on October 12, 2009. Because the police
dispatcher indicated possible involvement
by members of the Drifters gang in an
assault with a deadly weapon, Clark and
Cirrito drove to an alley near Magnolia and
14th Street where they knew Drifters
gathered. As they stood in the alley, two
men walked by and one said, “[T]he guy is
in the apartment.” The speaker appeared
very scared and walked away quickly. When
he returned, he again said, “He's in there.
He's in the apartment.” Immediately
thereafter, the detectives saw a tall, lightskinned, Hispanic or white male wearing a
light blue t-shirt and khaki pants run through
the alley and into the house where the
witness was pointing. The house had been
restructured into multiple apartments and
was a known gang location. A minute or so
later, the officers heard sounds of screaming
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and fighting from the apartment building
into which the suspect had run.
Clark and Cirrito called for backup and,
once additional officers arrived, knocked on
the door of the unit from which they had
heard screaming. The door was opened by
Roxanne Rojas, who was holding a baby and
appeared to be crying. Her face was red and
she had a big bump on her nose that looked
fresh. She had blood on her shirt and hand
that appeared to come from a fresh injury.
Cirrito asked what happened and she said
she had been in a fight. Cirrito then asked if
anyone else was inside the apartment, and
she said only her son. When Cirrito asked
her to step outside so he could conduct a
sweep of the apartment, defendant stepped
forward. He was dressed only in boxer
shorts and seemed very agitated. He said,
“You don't have any right to come in here. I
know my rights.” Cirrito removed him from
the residence and took him into custody.
While Cirrito and Clark arrested defendant
at the rear of the house, two men ran out of
the front of the house. Officers detained
them for questioning.
After defendant was removed from the
scene, officers secured the apartment. Clark
then went back to Rojas, told her that
defendant had been identified as a robbery
suspect, and asked for Rojas's consent to
search the apartment. Rojas gave consent,
orally and in writing. During the ensuing
search, officers found Drifters gang
paraphernalia, a butterfly knife, boxing
gloves, and clothing, including black pants
and a light blue shirt. None of the items
stolen from the victim was ever found.

The officers interviewed Rojas about her
injuries. She said that when defendant
entered the apartment, she confronted him
about his relationship with a woman named
Vanessa. They argued, and defendant struck
Rojas in the face. The officers also spoke to
Rojas's four-year-old son, Christian, who
told them defendant had a gun. Officers
recovered a sawed-off shotgun from a
heating unit where Christian told them it
was hidden. …
B. Expert Testimony
1. Defendant's Active Gang Membership
Cirrito testified for the prosecution as a gang
expert, opining that defendant was an active
member of the Drifters, a Latino street gang.
He said that the Drifters began as a “car
club,” but moved into criminal activities in
the 1980's. By the 1990's, they began to
engage in more violent crimes, such as
assaults, carjackings, attempted murders,
and narcotics sales. As of October 2009,
there were about 140 active Drifters
members. In 2009, defendant told officers he
had been a member of the Drifters (12th
Street Bagos clique) for nine years.
The
Drifters'
territory
includes
a
“stronghold” in the area between 14th Street
and 15th Street, and between Hoover and
Menlo. The stronghold is an area where
gang members can retreat if there is danger,
and from which members can escape
through secret passageways. …
Cirrito testified that a “moniker” is a
nickname typically given to a gang member.
Defendant's moniker is “Blocks.” The
moniker “Blocks” appeared in a Drifters
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“roll call” (list of active gang members) on a
water heater near defendant's apartment.
“Blocks” also appeared in tagging on a
garage door a few days after defendant's
arrest, which read “D.F.S. [Drifters], Bagos,
Block [s].” “Bagos” is the Drifters clique in
the area in which defendant lives.
Cirrito testified that an art book recovered
from defendant's bedroom on October 12,
2009, also evidences defendant's gang
membership. Specifically, he noted that the
book contains a roll call with monikers and
references to “D.F.S. 13,” “D.F.S. 12th
Street, Bagos,” “Blocks,” “Rox,” “ Roxy,
12th Street,” “Drifters,” and “Drifters 13.”
Cirrito said that “13” indicates an affiliation
with the Mexican mafia, the “M.A.”…
In summary, Cirrito opined that defendant
was an active member of the Drifters
because he had tattoos that reference the
Drifters gang; he goes by the moniker
“Blocks”; he admitted to officers that he has
been a member of the Drifters; he had gang
paraphernalia in his home; he lived in a
Drifters stronghold; and during the incident
for which he was arrested, he said, “Where
are you from? D.F.S. rules here.”
2. Cirrito's Opinion That the Robbery
Was Gang-related
Cirrito testified that gang members care
deeply about their gang's reputation in the
community because “reputation means
everything to them.” He said that gangs
want respect from rival gangs, but they also
want to terrorize the neighborhoods in which
they operate so people will be afraid to come
forward and talk about the gang's criminal

activities. A gang makes itself known in the
community in several ways, primarily by
committing crimes and tagging.
The Drifters establish their territory “[b]y
committing crimes in—just open daylight.
There's fear and intimidation.... [S]ome of
these younger people ... want to be gang
members. Some of them, it's almost peer
pressure. Some of them are actually forced
because they live in that neighborhood.
They get beat up. They're getting—I'll say
attacked or pocket checked, and, eventually,
they give in to just be part of this gang.”
Cirrito opined that Drifters members
individually and collectively engage in a
pattern of criminal gang activity. Their
primary activities are robbery, grand theft
auto, assault with a deadly weapon,
narcotics, and attempted murder. …
II. Defense Case
Roxanne Rojas testified that on October 12,
2009, she and defendant were living
together in the apartment where defendant
was arrested. At about 11:00 a.m., defendant
left the apartment to buy tacos and
cigarettes; Rojas remained home with their
two-month-old daughter and four-year-old
son. While defendant was gone, a woman
named Vanessa came to the apartment, and
she and Rojas fought. Rojas and Vanessa
were both injured during the fight. When
defendant returned to the apartment through
the back door, Vanessa left out the front
door. Defendant saw that Rojas was injured
and began to yell at her. Moments later, an
officer arrived. The officer asked Rojas to
let him in, and Rojas “didn't say yes. I didn't
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say no. I said let me get my children.” Rojas
agreed that defendant has a Drifters tattoo,
but said he was no longer active in the gang.
Defendant testified that he had been
involved with the Drifters earlier in his life.
He was “forcibly jumped in” when he was
18 or 19 years old and he “had to basically
like go with the flow.” He was never heavily
involved with the Drifters; “[i]t always was
just about like simply like me living there ...
like I'm out there doing stuff in the
neighborhood ... hanging out with people I
grew up with.” He admitted that he had been
convicted of receiving stolen property and
served time in prison. He said he was
released in 2007 and turned his life around.
He began working and got an apartment in
Marina del Rey for himself, Rojas, and her
son. When Rojas got pregnant with her
second child, the family moved to a twobedroom apartment on 15th Street and
Magnolia, but he had nothing to do with the
Drifters.
Defendant testified that on the morning of
October 12, 2009, he woke up late, played
with his son, and then went out to get tacos
for the family. On 14th Street, he was
approached by a Hispanic man who
appeared to be drunk. The man said, “Crazy
Riders,” which is rival gang from the area.
Defendant ignored him and kept walking.
The man continued to talk to him and then
“got into the point where he's coming at
me.” Defendant pushed him away, and the
two men got into a fist fight. When it was
over, defendant continued to the liquor store
to buy cigarettes and then went home.
Defendant never saw the man again. When
he returned home, Rojas told him a girl had

come to the house looking for him, and she
and the girl had gotten into a fight.
Defendant was upset that Rojas had let the
girl in, and he and Rojas began yelling at
one another. He did not hit Rojas during the
argument. The police arrived a few minutes
later and arrested him.
On cross-examination, defendant conceded
that he has four prior felony convictions for
theft-related crimes. He said “Blocks” or
“Blockhead” is his nickname, but it is not a
gang moniker.
III. Sentencing and Appeal
On October 8, 2010, defendant pled nolo
contendere to counts 3, 4, and 5 (firearms
and ammunition possession). In connection
with defendant's plea, the parties agreed that
defendant's son would not be called as a
witness in the jury trial and the prosecution
would not reference a gun seized at
defendant's home after his arrest. On
October 25, 2010, the jury convicted
defendant of counts 1 and 2 (second degree
robbery and corporal injury on a spouse,
cohabitant, or child's parent); as to count 1,
the jury further found that (1) in the
commission of the offense, defendant had
personally used a dangerous and deadly
weapon, and (2) the offense was committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang.
As to count 1, the court sentenced defendant
to 14 years (midterm of three years, plus an
additional consecutive term of 10 years
pursuant to § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), plus
an additional term of one year pursuant to §
12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to count 2, the court
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sentenced defendant to the midterm of three
years, to run concurrent with the principal
term. As to counts 3, 4, and 5, the court
sentenced defendant to the midterm of two
years, to run concurrent with the principal
term.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred
by denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized in his apartment during a warrantless
search; (2) the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence that a
suspect was arrested for attempted murder in
defendant's apartment; (3) there was
insufficient evidence to support the true
finding on the gang allegation; and (4) the
trial court erred by denying defendant's
Pitchess motion. We consider these issues
below.
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion
pursuant to section 1538.5 to suppress
evidence seized during a warrantless search
of his apartment following his arrest.
Specifically, defendant sought to exclude (1)
a Mossberg New Haven 20–gauge shotgun,
(2)
Remington
20–gauge
shotgun
ammunition, (3) a knife with a four and a
half-inch stainless steel blade, (4) any
currency seized during the search, and (5)
any other evidence seized, including
clothing, notebooks, and boxing gloves. The
trial court denied the motion to suppress. We
review the order de novo to determine
whether, on the facts found by the trial court

on the basis of substantial evidence, the
search or seizure was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred
by denying the motion to suppress, noting
that the officers did not obtain a search
warrant and he objected to their entry into
his apartment. Citing Georgia v. Randolph,
he urges that Rojas's subsequent consent to a
search of their apartment was invalid and
any evidence obtained was inadmissible.
The Attorney General disagrees, contending
that
Rojas's
consent
provided
a
constitutionally permissible basis for the
search once defendant was lawfully
removed from the apartment.
We begin by discussing Randolph, in which
the United States Supreme Court held that
police officers may not constitutionally
conduct a warrantless search of a home over
the express refusal of consent by a
physically present resident, even if another
resident consents to a search. We then
discuss the split of authority among the
federal circuit courts as to Randolph's
application to a case like the present one,
where consent to search is given by a
defendant's cotenant after the defendant is
arrested and removed from the residence.
We conclude that under the circumstances of
the present case, the search was lawful.
A. Georgia v. Randolph
In Randolph, defendant's wife, Janet
Randolph, called police to the family home
and complained that her husband was a
cocaine user. An officer asked defendant's
permission to search the house; he refused.
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The officer then sought Mrs. Randolph's
consent to search, which she gave. In
defendant's bedroom, the officer discovered
cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence
as products of a warrantless search. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve
a split of authority on whether one occupant
may give law enforcement effective consent
to search shared premises, as against a cotenant who is present and states a refusal to
permit the search.”
The court noted that to the Fourth
Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the
warrantless entry of a person's house as
unreasonable per se, “one ‘jealously and
carefully drawn’ exception, recognizes the
validity of searches with the voluntary
consent of an individual possessing
authority. That person might be the
householder against whom evidence is
sought, or a fellow occupant who shares
common authority over property, when the
suspect is absent. The exception recognized
in those cases “ ‘does not rest upon the law
of property, with its attendant historical and
legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual
use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has
the right to permit the inspection in his own
right and that the others have assumed the
risk that one of their number might permit
the common area to be searched.’ ”
The “constant element” in assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in the consent
cases, the Supreme Court explained, is “the

great significance given to widely shared
social expectations, which are naturally
enough influenced by the law of property,
but not controlled by its rules. Matlock
accordingly not only holds that a solitary coinhabitant may sometimes consent to a
search of shared premises, but stands for the
proposition that the reasonableness of such a
search is in significant part a function of
commonly held understanding about the
authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in
ways that affect each other's interests.” Such
an understanding includes an assumption
tenants “usually make about their common
authority when they share quarters. They
understand that any one of them may admit
visitors, with the consequence that a guest
obnoxious to one may nevertheless be
admitted in his absence by another. As
Matlock put it, shared tenancy is understood
to include an ‘assumption of risk,’ on which
police officers are entitled to rely[.]”
The situation differs, however, when a
cohabitant is present and denying entrance:
“[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the
door of shared premises would have no
confidence that one occupant's invitation
was a sufficiently good reason to enter when
a fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay
out.’ Without some very good reason, no
sensible person would go inside under those
conditions.... The visitor's reticence without
some such good reason would show not
timidity but a realization that when people
living together disagree over the use of their
common quarters, a resolution must come
through voluntary accommodation, not by
appeals to authority.” “In sum, there is no
common understanding that one co-tenant
generally has a right or authority to prevail
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over the express wishes of another, whether
the issue is the color of the curtains or
invitations to outsiders.”
Applying these principles, the court
concluded that “[s]ince the co-tenant
wishing to open the door to a third party has
no recognized authority in law or social
practice to prevail over a present and
objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation,
without more, gives a police officer no
better claim to reasonableness in entering
than the officer would have in the absence of
any consent at all.” It held that “a
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for
evidence over the express refusal of consent
by a physically present resident cannot be
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis
of consent given to the police by another
resident.”
The court then reaffirmed the continuing
vitality of Matlock and Rodriguez,
explaining as follows: “Although the
Matlock defendant was not present with the
opportunity to object, he was in a squad car
not far away; the Rodriguez defendant was
actually asleep in the apartment, and the
police might have roused him with a knock
on the door before they entered with only
the consent of an apparent co-tenant. If those
cases are not to be undercut by today's
holding, we have to admit that we are
drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant
with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the
door and objects, the co-tenant's permission
does not suffice for a reasonable search,
whereas the potential objector, nearby but
not invited to take part in the threshold
colloquy, loses out.

“This is the line we draw, and we think the
formalism is justified. So long as there is no
evidence that the police have removed the
potentially objecting tenant from the
entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection, there is practical value in the
simple clarity of complementary rules, one
recognizing the co-tenant's permission when
there is no fellow occupant on hand, the
other according dispositive weight to the
fellow occupant's contrary indication when
he expresses it. For the very reason that
Rodriguez held it would be unjustifiably
impractical to require the police to take
affirmative steps to confirm the actual
authority of a consenting individual whose
authority was apparent, we think it would
needlessly limit the capacity of the police to
respond
to
ostensibly
legitimate
opportunities in the field if we were to hold
that reasonableness required the police to
take affirmative steps to find a potentially
objecting co-tenant before acting on the
permission they had already received. There
is no ready reason to believe that efforts to
invite a refusal would make a difference in
many cases, whereas every co-tenant
consent case would turn into a test about the
adequacy of the police's efforts to consult
with a potential objector. Better to accept the
formalism of distinguishing Matlock from
this case than to impose a requirement, time
consuming in the field and in the courtroom,
with no apparent systemic justification. The
pragmatic decision to accept the simplicity
of this line is, moreover, supported by the
substantial number of instances in which
suspects who are asked for permission to
search actually consent, albeit imprudently,
a fact that undercuts any argument that the
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police should try to locate a suspected
inhabitant because his denial of consent
would be a foregone conclusion.”
The case before it, the court concluded,
“invites a straightforward application of the
rule that a physically present inhabitant's
express refusal of consent to a police search
is dispositive as to him, regardless of the
consent of a fellow occupant. Scott
Randolph's refusal is clear, and nothing in
the record justifies the search on grounds
independent of Janet Randolph's consent.
The State does not argue that she gave any
indication to the police of a need for
protection inside the house that might have
justified entry into the portion of the
premises where the police found the
powdery straw (which, if lawfully seized,
could have been used when attempting to
establish probable cause for the warrant
issued later). Nor does the State claim that
the entry and search should be upheld under
the rubric of exigent circumstances, owing
to some apprehension by the police officers
that Scott Randolph would destroy evidence
of drug use before any warrant could be
obtained.”
B. United States v. Murphy
In Murphy, the Ninth Circuit extended
Randolph to hold that if a defendant
expressly withholds consents to search, a
warrantless search conducted after the
defendant has left or been removed from the
residence is invalid even if a cotenant
subsequently consents. In Murphy, the
defendant was living in a storage unit rented
by Dennis Roper. Officers arrested the
defendant, who refused to consent to a

search of the storage unit; later, they arrested
Roper, who consented to a search. During
the
search,
officers
seized
a
methamphetamine lab.
The defendant challenged the validity of
Roper's consent to the search. The Ninth
Circuit held that the search violated the
Fourth
Amendment,
rejecting
the
government's contention that the present
case was distinguishable from Randolph
because the defendant was not present when
Roper consented to the search. It explained:
“The ... distinction that the government
attempts to make between this case and
Randolph is that in the former, unlike in the
latter, the objecting co-tenant was not
physically present when the other tenant
gave consent to the search. Here, Murphy
refused consent and was subsequently
arrested and removed from the scene. Two
hours later, officers located Roper and
obtained consent from him to search the
units. Roper did not know that Murphy had
previously refused consent and Murphy was
not present to object once again to the
second search. We see no reason, however,
why Murphy's arrest should vitiate the
objection he had already registered to the
search. We hold that when a co-tenant
objects to a search and another party with
common authority subsequently gives
consent to that search in the absence of the
first co-tenant the search is invalid as to the
objecting co-tenant.
“We find support for our holding in the
Randolph Court's treatment of the related
issue of police removal of a tenant from the
scene for the purpose of preventing him
from objecting to a search. The Court held
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that third party consent to a search is valid
only ‘[s]o long as there is no evidence that
the police have removed the potentially
objecting tenant from the entrance for the
sake of avoiding a possible objection.’ If the
police cannot prevent a co-tenant from
objecting to a search through arrest, surely
they cannot arrest a co-tenant and then seek
to ignore an objection he has already made.
… Once a co-tenant has registered his
objection, his refusal to grant consent
remains effective barring some objective
manifestation that he has changed his
position and no longer objects. The rule that
Randolph establishes is that when one cotenant objects and the other consents, a valid
search may occur only with respect to the
consenting tenant. It is true that the consent
of either co-tenant may be sufficient in the
absence of an objection by the other, either
because he simply fails to object or because
he is not present to do so. Nevertheless,
when an objection has been made by either
tenant prior to the officers' entry, the search
is not valid as to him and no evidence seized
may be used against him. Rather, as in this
case, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, the police must obtain a
warrant before conducting the search.”
C. Subsequent Case Law
Four federal circuit courts and at least two
state Supreme Courts have rejected the
Ninth Circuit's analysis in Murphy; they
hold that even if a defendant expressly
refuses to allow officers to search his
residence, a cohabitant's consent given after
a defendant leaves or is lawfully removed
will support a warrantless search. United
States v. Hudspeth is one such case. There,

officers executed a search warrant at the
defendant's workplace and discovered child
pornography on the defendant's computer.
The defendant was arrested for possession of
child pornography. The arresting officer
asked the defendant for permission to search
his home computer; he refused. Law
enforcement officers then went to the
defendant's home, where his wife gave
permission to seize the home computer. On
that computer, investigators found additional
child pornography. The defendant was
indicted for possession of child pornography
and pled guilty after unsuccessfully moving
to suppress the evidence seized during the
searches of his work and home computers.
As relevant here, the Eighth Circuit held that
the warrantless search of the defendant's
home computer did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. It explained as follows: “The
legal issue of whether an officer's
knowledge of the prior express refusal by
one co-tenant negates the later obtained
consent of another authorized co-tenant is a
matter of first impression in this court. We
will answer this compound legal question by
answering the separate legal questions
involved.
“First, we know Mrs. Hudspeth was a cotenant authorized to give the officers consent
to search....
“Second, unlike Randolph, the officers in
the present case were not confronted with a
‘social custom’ dilemma, where two
physically
present
co-tenants
have
contemporaneous competing interests and
one consents to a search, while the other
objects. … Thus, this rationale for the
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narrow holding of Randolph, which
repeatedly referenced the defendant's
physical presence and immediate objection,
is inapplicable here. …
“The Randolph opinion repeatedly referred
to an ‘express refusal of consent by a
physically present resident.’ … Hudspeth
was not at the door and objecting and does
not fall within Randolph's ‘fine line.’ ...
“The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
warrantless searches and seizures, nor does
the Fourth Amendment always prohibit
warrantless searches and seizures when the
defendant previously objected to the search
and seizure. ‘What [Hudspeth] is assured by
the Fourth Amendment itself, however, is ...
no such search will occur that is
“unreasonable.” ’ As the Supreme Court
explains, ‘it is reasonable to recognize that
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit the inspection in his [or her] own
right.’ And the absent, expressly objecting
co-inhabitant has ‘assumed the risk’ that
another co-inhabitant ‘might permit the
common area to be searched.’ The
authorized co-tenant may give consent for
several reasons including an unawareness of
contraband on the premises, or a desire to
protect oneself or others….
The Seventh Circuit followed Hudspeth (and
declined to follow Murphy ) in United States
v. Henderson. There, police were called to
the home of the defendant and his wife,
Patricia, to investigate a report of domestic
abuse. Patricia admitted police into the
home, where in “unequivocal terms” the
defendant ordered them out. The officers
arrested the defendant for domestic battery

and took him to jail. After his arrest and
removal from the scene, Patricia signed a
consent-to-search form and led the police on
a search that uncovered firearms, crack
cocaine, and items indicative of drug
dealing. The defendant was indicted on
federal weapon and drug charges. …
“Here, it is undisputed that Henderson
objected to the presence of the police in his
home. Once he was validly arrested for
domestic battery and taken to jail, however,
his objection lost its force, and Patricia was
free to authorize a search of the home. This
she readily did. Patricia's consent rendered
the warrantless search reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence need
not have been suppressed.”
At least two other federal circuit courts and
two state Supreme Courts have followed
Hudspeth and Henderson and declined to
follow Murphy.
D. Analysis
We conclude that Randolph does not require
exclusion of the evidence obtained in the
warrantless search of defendant's home. We
begin by noting that, like the federal
appellate cases discussed above, the facts
here differ in a critical way from those of
Randolph. While the defendant in Randolph
was present and continued to object to a
search of his home, in the present case
defendant had been arrested and removed
from the apartment before Rojas consented
to a search. Thus, unlike in Randolph, there
was in this case no co-tenant “who is present
and states a refusal to permit the search.”
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Defendant's absence from the home when
Rojas consented to a search of the apartment
is, we believe, determinative. … [T]he
Randolph court distinguished between cases
in which a defendant was present and
objected to a search, on the one hand, and
cases in which a defendant was not present
and therefore could not object to a search,
on the other. The court recognized that it
was “drawing a fine line,” but believed its
formalism was justified so long as there was
no evidence that police had removed a
potentially objecting tenant from the scene
for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.
We believe that the line we draw is
consistent with that drawn by the Supreme
Court in Randolph. As in Randolph, the line
we draw is a clear one, distinguishing
between cases in which a defendant is
present and objecting to a search, and those
in which a defendant has been lawfully
arrested and thus is no longer present when a
cotenant consents to a search of a shared
residence. It thus preserves the “simple
clarity of complementary rules” established
by Randolph.
Further, our rule preserves the law
enforcement prerogatives recognized by
Randolph. As we have said, Randolph
expressly reaffirmed the holdings of
Matlock and Rodriguez, noting that “it
would needlessly limit the capacity of the
police to respond to ostensibly legitimate
opportunities in the field if we were to hold
that reasonableness required the police to
take affirmative steps to find a potentially
objecting co-tenant before acting on the
permission they had already received.” We
believe that requiring officers who have

already secured the consent of a defendant's
cotenant to also secure the consent of an
absent defendant would similarly and
needlessly limit the capacity of law
enforcement to respond to “ostensibly
legitimate opportunities in the field.”
We note, as the Seventh Circuit did in
Henderson, that the rule advocated by
defendant and adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Murphy permits “a one-time objection”
by one cotenant to “permanently disable the
other [co-tenant] from ever validly
consenting to a search of their shared
premises.” Like Henderson, we think such a
rule “extends Randolph too far.”
Finally, like the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits, we believe that the
defendant's presence was indispensible to
the decision in Randolph. We again quote
Henderson, which well articulated the
analysis: “[T]he fact of a conflict between
present co-occupants plays a vital role in the
Randolph majority's ‘social expectations'
premise; a third party, attuned to societal
customs regarding shared premises, would
not, ‘[w]ithout some very good reason,’
enter when faced with a disputed invitation
between cotenants. The calculus shifts,
however, when the tenant seeking to deny
entry is no longer present. His objection
loses its force because he is not there to
enforce it[.]”
For all of these reasons, we conclude that
Rojas's consent to a search of the apartment
she shared with defendant was valid, and
thus the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motion to exclude.
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DISPOSITION
The conviction on count 2, willful infliction
of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or
child's parent, is conditionally reversed, with
directions to the trial court to review
relevant portions of Officer Cirrito's
personnel records in chambers. If the trial
court determines that the records contain no
relevant information, it shall reinstate the
judgment as to count 2. If it determines that
the records contain some relevant

information, it shall give defendant a
reasonable opportunity to investigate the
disclosed material and order a new trial if he
demonstrates a reasonable probability of a
different outcome had the evidence been
disclosed; otherwise, the court shall reinstate
the judgment as to count 2. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN,
WILLHITE, J.

P.J.,

and
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“SCOTUS to Hear Fernandez, a Calif. 'Warrantless Search' Case”
FindLaw
William Peacock
May 22, 2013
In 2009, the search for a robbery suspect led
police to the doorstep of convicted-felon
Walter Fernandez. Police were investigating
nearby when they heard the screams of his
girlfriend and cohabitant, Roxanne Rojas.
Once backup arrived, they knocked on the
door and Rojas, with a bruised nose and
bloody hand, answered.
Fernandez came to the door and refused to
allow the police to enter, stating, “You don’t
have any right to come in here. I know my
rights.” He was taken into custody, and later
identified as the suspect in the nearby
robbery.
A short time later, the officers returned,
notified Rojas that Fernandez was a suspect
in a robbery, and asked for consent to
search. She gave both written and verbal
consent. The search turned up a shotgun,
ammunition, a butterfly knife, and gang
paraphernalia.

the split in lower courts' interpretations
of Randolph.
Randolph's Fine Line
The Randolph decision was simple, yet
limited. After noting that they had upheld
warrantless searches stemming from a
cohabitant's consent, including one case
where a defendant was not present to object
(he was in a squad car nearby) and in
another case, where the defendant was
asleep inside the apartment, the court stated:
If those cases are not to be undercut by
today's holding, we have to admit that we
are drawing a fine line; if a potential
defendant with self-interest in objecting
is in fact at the door and objects, the cotenant's permission does not suffice for a
reasonable search ... So long as there is
no evidence that the police have removed
the potentially objecting tenant from the
entrance for the sake of avoiding a
possible objection, there is practical value
in the simple clarity of complementary
rules ...

Fernandez argued that, under the Supreme
Court's
holding
in Georgia
v.
Randolph(2006) and the Ninth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Murphy (2008),
the evidence found in the search should have
been suppressed. The California Court of
Appeal upheld the trial court's admission of
the evidence and explicitly rejected Murphy.

A fine line indeed, but what about situations
like these, where the defendant objects, is
taken into custody, and later, his cohabitant
consents?

Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case, and to resolve

In Murphy, a man living in a storage unit
(with a meth lab) refused to allow a search.

The Murphy Rule
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The man who leased the unit was also
arrested, and this time, he consented to a
search, not knowing of Murphy's prior
refusal. The Ninth Circuit held the search
impermissible, noting that:
If the police cannot prevent a co-tenant
from objecting to a search through arrest,
surely they cannot arrest a co-tenant and
then seek to ignore an objection he has
already made. Nor, more generally, do we
see any reason to limit the Randolph rule
to an objecting tenant's removal by
police. Once a co-tenant has registered
his objection, his refusal to grant consent
remains effective barring some objective

manifestation that he has changed his
position and no longer objects.
A Finer Fine Line
The California court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's approach, and instead followed the
reasoning of at least four other federal
circuit courts and two state supreme courts.
These courts rely upon the physical
presence requirement, limiting Randolph's
protections to physically present objecting
defendants. Their holdings draw an even
more fine line: if the defendant refuses to
allow a search and is then arrested, a
cohabitant's consent is sufficient.
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“Search Allowed by Roommate to High Court”
San Francisco Chronicle
Bob Egelko
May 21, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court took up a
California case Monday to decide whether
police can enter and search a home, over the
objections of a suspect who lives there, by
arresting the suspect and getting a
roommate's consent for the entry.
The justices ruled in 2006 that the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable
searches bars police, in nonemergencies,
from entering a home without a warrant if a
resident objects, even if another resident
consents. But lower courts have been
divided on whether the refusal prohibits
officers from entering the home in the
future, if the objector is not present.
To resolve that question, the court granted
review Monday of an appeal by a Los
Angeles man convicted of a gang-related
robbery after police searched his apartment
without a warrant. The case will be heard in
the term that starts in October, with a ruling
due by June 2014.
According to court records, police
investigating a robbery and assault in a gang
neighborhood in October 2009 went
to Walter Fernandez's apartment after
hearing sounds of screaming and fighting. A
woman came to the door, showing signs of
injuries, but when officers started to enter,
Fernandez stepped forward and objected,
saying, "You don't have any right to come
in here."

Officers arrested Fernandez, then secured
the apartment and told the woman
Fernandez was a robbery suspect. They
entered, with her consent, and found gang
paraphernalia, a knife and a gun, a state
appeals court said in an August 2012 ruling.
Fernandez, identified by the robbery victim
as the man who had stabbed him and called
on accomplices to beat him, was convicted
of robbery and domestic violence in 2010,
and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Ten
years of his sentence stemmed from the jury'
finding that the robbery was gang-related,
based in part on evidence found in
the apartment.
In upholding the search, the state's Second
District Court of Appeal said a resident's
authority to prohibit a warrantless police
entry applies only when that resident is
present. Once Fernandez had been taken
away, the court said, he no longer had the
power to prevent his cohabitant from
admitting police to the apartment she shared.
Fernandez's Supreme Court appeal argued
that police should have gone to a judge to
get a warrant, which they could have done
quickly after securing the apartment.
Otherwise,
defense
lawyer Gerald
Peters said Monday, "all you would do in
every case is, if the person objects, you
arrest him and remove him. Then what good
is the Fourth Amendment?"
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The case is Fernandez vs. California, 12-

7822.
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“Can Police Search the Home of a Defendant by Getting Consent to Enter
from his Co-Tenant?”
California Crime Blog
Aaron J. Sussman
August 2, 2012
If a defendant objects to police entry into his
home and is subsequently arrested, can
police enter his home without a warrant
premised on the consent to enter from the
defendant’s co-tenant? In a remarkable
recent published decision, The People v.
Walter Fernandez, the California Court of
Appeals answered this question, creating a
rare split between the law that governs
California’s
state
prosecutions
and
California’s federal prosecutions. Read
below for more details.
Walter Fernandez was wanted for a gangrelated assault with a knife. Police saw the
defendant running into an apartment
building and followed him to an apartment
from which screaming was heard; they
knocked on the door. A woman, Roxanne
Rojas, answered the door; she was bleeding
from a fresh injury, so officers performed a
protective sweep of the apartment,
discovering Fernandez and two others.
Fernandez said “You don’t have any right to
come in here. I know my rights.” Fernandez
was arrested and removed from the scene.
Then, officers returned to the apartment,
knocked on the door, and asked Rojas if she
would consent to a search of the apartment;
she consented, and officers found gang
paraphernalia and a butterfly knife.
Fernandez was charged with second degree
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon
(the knife) and association with a criminal
street gang. He was found guilty, but he

appealed his conviction, arguing that he had
expressed his refusal to consent to the search
of the apartment, that the search of the
apartment was therefore unconstitutional,
and thus that the evidence found in the
apartment should not have been admitted at
trial.
The
Fourth
Amendment
prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. As the
home is considered inviolate, searches of the
home without a warrant are presumptively
invalid. (Payton v. New York (1980) 445
U.S. 573, 586.) However, a search is not
unreasonable if police have a person with
actual authority, apparent authority, or
common authority over the premises has
consented to the search. (Illinois v.
Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177.) But, in a
2006 decision, Georgia v. Randolph, the
Supreme Court held that “a warrantless
search of a shared dwelling for evidence
over the express refusal of consent by a
physically present resident cannot be
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis
of consent given to the police by another
resident.” (Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547
U.S. 103, 120 (emphasis added).)
The question here, though, was what police
can do when the physically absent defendant
objects to the police entry while the present
co-tenant consents. Courts have split on this
decision. Most notably, the Ninth Circuit –
the federal court of appeals that hears
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appeals from federal trials in many states,
including California – held that “when a cotenant objects to a search and another party
with common authority subsequently gives
consent to that search in the absence of the
first co-tenant, the search is invalid as to the
objecting co-tenant.” (United States v.
Murphy, (2008) 516 F.3d 1117, 1124.) But
most courts have disagreed, holding that a
non-present defendant’s objection does not
nullify the consent of a present co-tenant.
The California Court of Appeals decided to
go with the majority of courts that have
addressed
the
question,
therefore
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit and
holding that a tenant’s consent to police
entry is valid despite the fact that a cotenant, who was not present, would not have
consented. The California Court of Appeals
held that the line to be drawn “is a clear one,
distinguishing between cases in which a
defendant is present and objecting to a
search, and those in which a defendant has
been lawfully arrested and thus is no longer
present when a co-tenant consents to a
search of a shared residence.” The court

relied upon the narrow language of
Randolph, which seemed to limit its holding
to circumstances when the co-tenant was
physically present, and which received a
decisive fifth vote from Justice Breyer,
whose concurring opinion noted plainly that
“The Court’s opinion does not apply where
the objector is not present ‘and
object[ing].’”
This decision creates a rare split in the
courts’ interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment; while federal trial courts in
California are required to follow the Ninth
circuit’s decision in Murphy (holding that
non-consent from a non-present co-tenant
vitiates consent by a present co-tenant), state
trial courts in California must not follow the
California Court of Appeals’ decision in
Fernandez (holding that non-consent by a
non-present co-tenant does not vitiate
consent by a present co-tenant). It’s an
interesting split, perhaps one that the
California Supreme Court or the United
States Supreme Court would want to
examine.
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“California Robbery Case Leads Supreme Court to Reconsider Police Search
Laws”
McClatchy
Michael Doyle
May 20, 2013
A tattooed inmate in one of California’s
most remote prisons will now get his
moment in the Supreme Court sun, along
with a shot at clarifying the rules governing
certain law enforcement searches.
Beating the legal odds, Los Angeles gang
veteran Walter Fernandez succeeded
Monday in convincing the court to hear his
challenge to an apartment search. Fernandez
had objected to the search, but his girlfriend
eventually assented after Fernandez was
taken into custody. This prompted a
constitutional question that has divided
lower courts.
“There’s this long-lasting issue, as to what
extent a cohabitant can give consent to a
search,” Thousand Oaks, Calif.-based
defense attorney Gerald P. Peters said in a
telephone interview Monday. “This is not a
totally unique problem; it’s actually a
foreseeable problem.”
In a 2006 case arising from a Georgia drug
bust, the Supreme Court ruled invalid a
warrantless search of a shared dwelling over
the express refusal of consent by an
individual who was present. That ruling was
based on the Fourth Amendment, which
protects individuals against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”
Lower appellate courts have disagreed,
though, about how far this rule extends.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
which covers Western states, ruled in a 2008
case involving an alleged Oregon
methamphetamine lab that a co-tenant’s
refusal to offer consent remains in effect
even after the individual is absent. But in a
Missouri child pornography case, the 8th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals came to the
opposite conclusion, reasoning that a wife’s
consent sufficed once the resisting husband
was gone.
Resolving such circuit splits often motivates
the Supreme Court to take up a case, though
the odds are always long. The court receives
about 8,000 petitions annually and hears
only about 75. The odds are stacked even
more against petitions like Fernandez’s,
designated as in forma pauperis, which are
often impoverished prisoners’ cases for
which filing fees don’t have to be paid.
During the court’s 2011 term, only seven
such cases were heard out of more than
6,000 on the docket.
“I think it’s a good thing,” Peters said of the
court’s decision to hear the Fernandez case.
“The Supreme Court has been strangely
good for criminal defendants in a number of
cases, and maybe that will carry forward.”
But
another
possibility,
Peters
acknowledged, is that the high court could
use the Fernandez case to strike down the
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9th Circuit’s defendant-friendly rule, which
can impede some police searches.

with,” Fernandez explained at the 2010 trial
that led to his most recent convictions.

“The conflict in the state and federal courts
is heavily lopsided against (the Fernandez)
petition,” California Deputy Attorney
General Louis W. Karlin noted in the state’s
legal filing.

Fernandez was living with Roxanne Rojas in
October 2009 when police investigating a
street robbery responded to sounds of
fighting from their apartment. At the front
door, an agitated Fernandez told police that
“you don’t have any right to come in here,”
according to subsequent trial testimony.
Police recognized one of his scalp tattoos
from a description given by the robbery
victim, and Fernandez was arrested and
taken away.

Peters represents Fernandez, now serving a
14-year sentence on firearms, robbery and
domestic abuse charges at California’s High
Desert State Prison. The maximum security
facility in Lassen County, in the arid
northeast corner of the state, is about 550
miles from the neighborhood where
Fernandez once joined a street gang called
the Drifters.
Though the gang’s identity was tattooed on
his back, among other places, Fernandez
says he was trying to turn his life around and
had moved away from gang involvement
following release from prison on earlier,
theft-related charges.

About an hour later, amid circumstances that
remain in dispute, police returned and
secured permission from Rojas to search the
apartment, in which they found a .20-gauge
shotgun, ammunition, a butterfly knife and
assorted Drifters gang paraphernalia.

“It always was just about . . . me living
there, hanging out with people I grew up
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